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THE ORIGINS OF THE LAW 
Chapter 1. Introduction. 
Flight, that very word has from time 
immemorial stirred the imagination of mankind. 
Man has for long studied the flight of the birds 
in the heavens and contemplated the immense 
possibilities which would be open to him, 
particularly for the destruction of his enemies, 
if only he, either by putting on wings or by 
inventing some strange machine which would carry him, 
could but imitate these winged creatures. Even in 
Johnson's Rasselas such possibilities and dangers 
are conceived. "If men were all virtuous I should 
"with great alacrity teach them all to fly. But 
"what would be the security of the good, if the bad 
"could at pleasure invade them from the sky? 
"Against an army sailing through the clouds, neither 
"walls, nor mountains, nor seas, could afford any 
"security." When these words were written, flight, 
in the modern sense of the word, had not become a 
reality, although, apart from the early legends, 
as early as the eleventh century attempts to fly had 
been made by attaching wings to the body, and a 
balloon ascent, which, however, is not authenticated, 
is mentioned at the Coronation of the Emperor Fo- 
Kien in 1306. 
Yet, hardly thirty years had passed when the 
Montgolfiers made the first successful balloon 
ascent, on June 5th, 1783. In 1794, Coutelle 
ascended with the first military balloon, and 
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several days later, during the battle of Fleurs, 
it again ascended and obtained useful miläary 
information. By 1902, Santos -Dumont had 
completed a flight, which was highly successful, 
in a non -rigid airship, and, in 1906, Count Ferdinand 
von Zeppelin completed a flight of 200 miles in 
a sishilar craft. Prior to this, however, in 103, the 
brothers Wilbur and Orville Wright completed the 
first power flights in heavier -than -air craft at 
Kill Devil Hill, North Carolina, and when this 
occurred it might truly be said that man had 
conquered the air. 
In so doing, he had brought upon himself 
a multitude of new problems, and, in particular, 
in the realm of the law, opened up a vast new 
field of thought. The visions of Rasselas had 
become a reality, the dangers which he had 
visualised were now real dangers, and eminent jurists 
of all nations applied themselves to the task of 
producing new codes of law to regulate the use of 
man's new invention, the flying machine. They were 
not slow to appreciate that the laws which they must 
formulate must be entirely new laws - the air was, in 
itself, a realm of law. Their first and natural 
instinct was to compare the bast spaces of the air 
with what appeared to be, at first sight, the 
similarly extensive expanses of the sea but they were 
soon to be disillusioned, for, while maritime 
precedent might be invoked with success in some of 
the problems with which they were confronted, a close 
comparison between the sea and the air revealed such 
fundamental differences that it became evident that 
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maritime law was virtually useless as the model on 
which to base the new code. 
There were other peculiar and vital 
characteristics about the new machine, the use of 
which had now to be regulated. In particular, 
the lawyers saw that flight was not limited to 
national boundaries, that the sea offered no 
barrier, for in 1909 Louis Bleriot had crossed the 
English Channel in a heavier -than -air craft, and 
that, accordingly, their legislative efforts must 
not be merely national in character. It was an 
International Code of Law which they would require 
to formulate. National codes would also be 
necessary, but it was of primary importance that 
all such National codes must be uniform, and must, 
in principle at least, be based on one International 
Code, if the invention of the flying machine was to 
be developed and its great possibilities exploited 
with success. 
However, the first attempts to formulate codes 
for the regulation of the use of aircraft were 
directed in the main towards regulating the use 
thereof in times of war. When the first military 
balloon ascended in 1794 a new era of warfare was 
inaugurated for, even in the earliest stages of its 
development, it was clear that the balloon was 
potentially dangerous as a weapon of war. Its 
uses in that direction were multifarious but the 
first, and most natural, use to which it was put 
was for purposes of espionage, and the earliest 
legal questions discussed were mainly on that topic. 
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It was only to be expected that this should be so 
and that the rules of warfare should first be 
considered, as the moment man ascended from the 
earth he could be used to advantage in the armed 
forces of his country. Therefore, rules must 
be formulated to regularise his operations. 
Flight had to progress far before there would be 
any necessity for formulating laws to regulate the 
use of aircraft in times of peace, although the 
effect of flight on the question of sovereignty 
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of the airspace must have, and, in fact, did occur 
to the jurists at an early stage in the development 
of this branch of the law. Doubtless, when the 
balloon first appeared, its use for commercial 
purposes was never considered although Zitelmann (1) 
mentions several early writers who discussed questions 
of law arising from the use of aircraft in 
time of peace. In 1793, Putter considered the 
question of "air -balls" becoming practically useful 
and whether, in that event, the Emperor would 
derive revenue from them as "regalia "; in 1891, 
Manduca discussed criminal acts committed in the 
air space; and in 1901, Rosenberg lectured on the 
liability of balloonists in damages for injuries 
caused by them. Perhaps the first judicial 
reference to the effect of aircraft is in the 
English case of Pickering $ Rudd (1815, 4 Camp.219), 
When, on a question of trespass, Lord Ellenborough 
states - "I do not think it is atrespass to interfere 
with the column of air superincumbent on the close... 
(1) Luftschiffahrtsrecht; Hazeltine- Law in the Air. 
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it would follow that an aeronaut is liable to an 
action quare clausum fregit at the suit of the 
occupier of every field over which his balloon 
passes in the course of its voyage." 
The dawn of the twentieth century may truly be 
considered as the dawn of aviation law. Although 
the first serious attempt to legislate had been 
made at the Hague Conference in 1899, and the 
question of espionage had been dealt with at a 
Conference in Brussels in 1874, it was not until 
1901 that the first real attempts to formulate full 
and complete codes of law were made, not only by 
the Institute of International Law and by the 
International Law Association, but also by eminent 
individuals. As we shall see, the development of 
aviation and the corresponding development of 
the law in relation thereto progressed slowly until 
1914, when, on the outbreak of the Great War, the 
development of aviation itself received a sudden 
impetus and abnormal technical progress was made 
during the four years of that conflict. Before 
the War was ended, the possibilities of aircraft 
not as weapons of war, but as a means of communication 
and transit in time of peace were recognised, and 
an exhaustive investigation inter alla as to the laws 
which would require to be enacted on the cessation of 
hostilities, was made in Great Britain by the Civil 
Aerial Transport Committee which reported to the 
newly formed Air Council in 1918. The termination of 
the War found all nations ready and willing to do 
everything in their power to facilitate peace and a 
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glut of International Treaties and Conventions 
followed. Aviation law benefited by this popular 
feeling and the time was now ripe to complete the 
International Convention on Aviatiön law, which 
the Conference held in Paris in 1910 had failed to 
complete, due to the impossibility of reconciling 
divergent views on questions of principle. The 
International Convention of 1919 is the charter of 
the air and is the basis on which the national 
systems of aviation law are founded. 
sly object is to trace this development of 
aviation law, in so far as it is possible to do so, 
in three main parts. In the first, I shall consider 
the origins of the law, that is, the problems which 
arose prior to the outbreak of the Great War; in the 
second, the effect of the Great War on aviation; and, 
in the third, the post war legislation and 
development. I shall concern myself mainly with the 
development in time of peace, that being of 
infinitely more importance than the development of 
rules of warfare, but in each of the first and third 
parts I shall devote a chapter to this latter topic. 
The national system of legislation mainly referred to 
will be that of Great Britain, but other national 
systems and particularly that of the United States of 





The Pioneers of the Law. 
The names of such distinguished jurists as M. 
Paul Fauchille, Dr Hazeltine, Professor Westlake, 
Dr. Lycklama a Nijeholt, Nys, Meyers, Merignhac, 
and others will go down to posterity as the 
pioneers in this new realm of law. They it was 
who foresaw the difficulties, many of which are 
even now unsolved, and their opinions must of 
necessity carry great weight and form the basis 
of any discussion. A survey of the work they 
accomplished is perhaps best undertaken by 
considering the problems with whichthey were 
faced and the manner in which they dealt with them. 
The Right to Fly - The International Law. 
Before any other question raised by the flight 
of aircraft could be considered, it was necessary 
to decide the fundamental question of the right, in 
law, to fly at all. The maxim cujus est solum ejus 
est ad coelum usque ad inferos had long regulated the 
right of the individual in his property and flight 
over such property was apparently a violation of 
the owner's rights as expressed in the maxim. 
Similarly, but of greater importance, what rights 
had the underlying States to regulate the flight of 
aircraft over their territory? Were aircraft free 
to roam at large over the underlying States or did 
these States have the right in law to prevent such 
flight? Was a neutral State powerless to prevent a 
combat between the aircraft of two belligerent 
Powers over its territory in times of war? Such 
were the questions asked and on their solution 
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the whole future development of aviation depended. 
In the seventeenth century, the conflict between 
the mare liberum and the mare clausum commenced, 
and freedom prevailed. In the twentieth century 
the freedom of the air was at stake but the battle 
ended abruptly in 1914 - this time sovereignty had 
triumphed. This battle for freedom of the air 
might never have been waged had it not been for 
two mistaken conceptions which misled the early 
jurists - in the first place, the mistake of 
drawing too close and erroneous an analogy between 
the sea and the air, and, in the second place, the 
failure to distinguish the air as an element from 
the air space which it filled, and the confusion 
of ideas resulting therefrom. 
There were the two distinct schools of thought 
in this conflict for freedom of the air. The one 
school maintained that the air space was by its 
very nature free, while the other maintained that 
the subjacent State had sovereign rights in the air 
space above its territory. These were the two 
main theories diametrically opposed to one another, 
but in each there were varying shades of opinion. 
Of those who maintained complete freedom, some 
advocated freedom without restriction, others 
freedom restricted by some special rightd, and 
others freedom restricted by a territorial zone, 
while the sovereignty theorists had similar 
divisions of opinion, some favouring complete 
sovereignty, others sovereignty restricted by the 
right of innocent passage for aerial navigation, 
9 . 
and others who maintained full sovereignty, but up 
to a limited height only. 
The conflict may truly be said to have 
commenced in 1901 when Fauchille presented his 
Code to the Conference of the Institute of 
International Law. "L'air est libre. Les Etats 
"n'ont sur lui en temps de paix et en temps de guerre 
"que les droits necessaires leur conservation - 
"les droits sont relatifs a la repression de 
"l'espionage, á la police douanniere, á la police 
+sanitaire, et aux necessites de la défense" - so 
read Article 7, of his Code. (1) Fauchille was a 
protagonist of air freedom, but subject to certain 
reservations, and, actually, favoured air freedom 
restricted by a territorial zone. The essential 
words were - "the air is free" - and in support of 
this theory rallied many distinguished lawyers who 
maintained complete air freedom, unfettered by 
restrictions. All, with the exception of Nys, treated 
the air as an element, and in the opinion of Dr 
Hazeltine it is only the arguments of Nys which are 
worthy of consideration. The Roman Law and the works 
of Grotius, the champion of the mare liberum, formed 
the foundations on which the complete air freedom 
theorists built up their arguments. In Justinian's 
Institutes (2) the law is thus set forth - " Naturali 
jure communia sunt omnium haec: aer et aqua profluens 
et mare" - and in other works on the Roman Law the 
air is treated as a res commuais. According to Grotth 3) 
(1) 
(3) 
Annuaire XIX. 1902, p. 32. (2) II. 1, 1. 
Grotius, Rights of War and Peace (Campbell's 
Translation) 1814, p.229. 
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the sea was common to all men,ánd the same might 
be said of the air as common property except that 
no one could enjoy it without at the same time 
using the ground over which it passes or rests. 
This naturally referred to the air as an element, 
and, founding their arguments on such principles, 
it is not difficult to understand how Wheaton held 
that the sea and the air were elements belonging to 
all and that no nation could possess them; how Blunt: 
:schli argued that the States had no authority in 
the air space because they could not enclose the 
air in their frontiers; and how writers such as 
Pradier- Fodéré and Stephen maintained that the great 
air currents were not legally under the control of 
a State. (4) These writers had failed to appreciate 
the crucial difference. Even the supporters of 
complete sovereignty would support the contention 
that the invisible air which is breathed by all 
living creatures is free to all and incapable of 
control by any one individual or State but the air 
space which it fills is in an entirely different 
category. Lycklama á Nijeholt was conscious of the 
difference when he wrote - "Sovereignty wants a 
"sphere, a domain, where it can be exercised. In 
"theory it is of no account what there may be in that 
"sphere; and in practice is the fact that it is 
"filled with a moving element where fixed marks cannot 
"well be imagined enough to make sovereignty there 
"practically impossible? We think not." (5) 
(4) Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 11 
(5) Air Sovereignty, p. 22. 
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Nys appreciated the distinction between the 
air space and the air as an element but, nevertheless, 
advocated complete air freedom. His fault was in 
drawing too closely the analogy between the sea and 
the air, and having failed to see the fundamental 
differences between the two, and, in particular, 
between the ship sailing on the sea and the aircraft 
flying through the air, his argument became 
substantially this - as the principle of ware 
liberum has been accepted then the natural consecpence 
is that complete air freedom must be the rule. (6) 
It is difficult to see how such a distinguished 
jurist could even at the beginning of the twentieth 
century when flight was in its infancy fail to 
appreciate the obvious differences in character 
between the sea and the air, the ship and the 
aircraft, for, to use the words of Kuhn, "The air 
ttat all events is not the sea, an aircraft no ship, 
wand a complete analogy is neither made de lege lata 
ttnor advisable de lege ferenda ". While the idea of 
the air, or even the vast air space, as completely 
free to all must have been alluring, and did, in 
fact, command considerable attention when first 
propounded, it was early discarded, and Fauchille 
who threw down the gauntlet - the air is free - 
criticised it on the grounds, first, that aircraft 
could thereby fly and do just as they pleased over 
the territory of a State without interference, and, 
second, that, as regards delicts committed on 
board both public and private aircraft, they would 
fall to be dealt with according to the law of the 
(6) Annuaire of the Institute XIX pp.106 -108 for 
NYs' views. 
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State under whose flag the aircraft flew. (7) 
Of those who maintained air freedom restricted by 
some special rights, the main exponent was Mehl who, 
in 1908, maintained that the air was free, subject to 
the rights of territorial States to do what was 
necessary for their self preservation. In the 
following year he enlarged upon this view by stating 
that States should have rights not limited horizontally 
for the preservation of their interests enabling them 
to defend themselves against balloons and aeroplanes.(8) 
Iie had the support of the Institute of International 
Law both in 1906, when the control of wireless 
telegraphy was discussed, and again in 1911, when it 
passed a series of Resolutions dealing with the "Regime 
juridique des Aeronefs." The Third Resolution dealing 
with the regulation of aircraft in time of peace was 
couched in the following terms - "La circulation 
"aérienne internationale est libre sauf le dróit pour 
"les Etats sous -jacent de prendre certaines mesures, a 
"determiner, en vue de leur propre securite et de celle 
"des personnes et des biens de leurs habitants." This 
view, which according to M'Nair is based on the 
argument that the air is physically incapable of 
appropriation because it cannot be continually 
occupied (9) also found considerable support at the 
time, due no doubt, to the fact that while it was 
pleasing to the idealist who regarded the ethereal 
sphere as free to all, it also conceded to those more 
(7) La circulation Aerienne et les droits des Etats 
en temps de Paix, 1910. p. 3. . 
(8) Lycklama a Nijeholt "La Souverainete Aérienne" 
pp. 11 - 12. 
(9) M'Nair, 1 Journal Air Law, p. 384. 
13. 
practically minded the right of self protection, the 
necessity for which was only too apparent if air: 
:craft were to be free to fly at will above them. 
The danger of following the analogy of the 
sea is perhaps best seen when the views of those 
writers who supported the zone theory are considered 
-- that is, air freedom restricted by a territorial 
zone. The greatest difficulty with which the 
protagonists of this school of thought was faced was 
the complete failure to obtain unanimity as to the 
height and extent of the zone. Some, such as Ferber, 
were bold enough to fix the limit of the zone 
exactly, but others, such as Meyer, were sufficiently 
non- co.iittal to put the limit as high as a State 
could make its authority felt directly over its 
territory, presumably the limits of gun fire. (10) 
Despagnet maintained that each State ought to have 
the right of preventing such use of the air as is 
dangerous to its own security - "the analogy of the 
maritime belt could be applied to the air space 
above the land." (11) Merignhac advocated freedom 
except for a territorial atmosphere to be fixed by 
International agreement, but not too high. This 
height must be high enough to guarantee the inter: 
:ests of the State and low enough to respect the 
interests of aerial navigation. Oppenheim, on the 
other hand, claimed that the territorial atmosphere 
was not a special part of the territory of the 
State, but each State could exercise jurisdiction 
up to a certain height. (12) The zone theory, 
10 Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, o. 16. 
11 Hazeltine op.cit. pp. 18 -19. 12 Lycklama A Nijeholt, Sovereignty of the Air,p.12 , 
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however, will always be identified with Fauchille, 
whose Article is quoted above, and to whom must go 
the credit of commencing the battle in the field of 
aviation law. It is to the arguments of Fauchille 
that all subsequent writers have directed their 
criticisms. His remarks when he presented his 
proposed Code showed that it was not so much on the 
analogy between the sea and the air that he founded 
his Seventh Article, but rather, that he found support 
from the same source as those who advocated air free: 
:dom restricted by some special rights, namely that 
the air cannot be owned because it cannot be occupied, 
and, therefore, a sovereign jurisdiction cannot be 
exercised. Fauchille has given certain consequences 
which would follow from the adoption of Article 7, 
and these have been summarised by Hazeltine. A 
would have the right to take those means which are 
necessary for the security of its population by 
prohibiting circulation below a certain height. This, 
incidentally, restricts materially his "freedom" 
theory. To protect itself from espionage, a State 
could prohibit aerial navigation in certain regions 
of the atmosphere. It could further visit and search 
aircraft circulating in the air space above it as a 
protection of its own economic and sanitary interests. 
Public and private aircraft are liable for acts 
committed on board, only to the laws of the State of 
the Flag, but where the acts infringe the territorial 
State's right of preservation the aircraft would be 
subject to the regulations of the territorial State. 
The right of preservation would extend to prohibit 
the passage of foreign military aircraft. (13) 
(13) Hazeltine, Law of the Air, pp. 21 -23. 
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At the present day the arguments against air 
freedom are even more forcible than they were some 
thirty years ago, but some of the criticisms even 
then appear almost too obvious. To say that the sea 
lies to the side of the territory of a state whereas 
the air lies directly above it, is to state an 
indisputable fact, but, nevertheless, therein lies 
the crux of the matter. The fact that the air space 
does lie above the territory of a State must undoubt: 
:edly be the death blow to air freedom. No zone and 
no protective rights could possibly safeguard a 
State from the enormous dangers of allowing aircraft 
of foreign States - and, for that part, even its own 
national aircraft - to fly at will over its territory. 
Not only is the air zone important to the State but 
it is essential to the very existence of the inhabit: 
:ants and to the exercise of the State's rights and 
manifold privileges. The protagonists of air 
freedom must have been fully aware of this - indeed 
the very mention of a zone or protective rights 
reveals that they were - and one is tempted to wonder 
how the air freedom theory received the support it 
did from so many distinguished writers. 
The Sovereignty theorists, led by Westlake, were 
on safer ground, but, once again, the parallelism 
of the sea proved an allurement, and beside those 
who maintained absolute sovereignty, are found once 
again the zone theorists and others who maintained 
a type of servitude right of passage for aircraft 
while admitting sovereignty in principle. The 
latter two schools of thought were led astray by 
founding their arguments on the principle of the 
territorial waters. 
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There is little difference in practice between 
the zone theorists of the freedom school and those 
of the sovereignty school. Both agreed that beyond 
a certain height the air was free. Where they 
differed was in the fact that in the case of the 
former only certain rights of preservation were 
recognised up to the fixed limit., whereas in the 
latter case full sovereign rights were accorded to 
the State. Both had the same difficulty in 
determining the height of the zone. Voh Holzendorf 
fixed it at 1000 metres whereas von Bar brought it as 
low as 50 to 60 metres. Von Liszt fixed it with 
reference to the extent of actual domination, while 
to Rivier, Pietri, and Hilti, the resemblance of the 
marginal seas was so complete that they limited the 
zone with reference to the height reached by artillery 
upon the earth. (14) The same criticisms can be made 
against both, for, whether the zone be free subject 
to certain rights of protection or under the complete 
sovereignty of the State the dangers of allowing 
aircraft to meander above the zone are identical. 
Meyer grasps the point completely when he says, "The 
"air is an appendage indivisible from the earth and 
"any use made of it should be predicated upon the 
"legal theory that recognises that fact." (15) 
(14)Lycklama á Nijeholt, La Souveraineté aérienne, 
R.J.L.A. pp. 237 -238 
(15 )Meyers, Sovereignty of the Air, Vol. 24. Green 
Bag, p.229. 
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Turning to those who maintained sovereignty 
subject to a servitude right of passage for aircraft 
we find as the protagonists, Westlake, who first 
propounded the view at the Ghent Session of the 
Institute of international Law in 1906, and Meurer. 
Here, at last, was an attempt to reconcile pie two 
conflicting interests, that of the preservation of 
the State, and that of the unimpeded development of 
aviation. It is true to say that in the whole 
field of aviation law the difficulty in legislating 
for the use of aircraft, whether it be National or 
International legislation, lies in the reconcilement 
of these two interests, the safety of persons and 
property, on the one hand, and progress of aviation, 
on the other. Westlake and Meurer were aware of the 
fact, as were all the protagonists of the sovereignty 
school, and it is only a narrow line which divides 
the supporters of Westlake from the supporters of 
Hazeltine and the other full sovereignty theorists. 
To Westlake's supporters, the States must have full 
sovereign rights, but there is much to be said, in 
some respects, for the freedom school, therefore, 
let us have a servitude of passage for aircraft. 
To Hazeltine's supporters also, States must have 
full sovereign rights, but do not let us detract 
from these rights by allowing a servitude of passage 
to all aircraft as a matter of right. There must 
certainly be no impediment to the progress of 
aviation, therefore, let us allow freedom of 
passage by International Agreement. Neither of the 
conflicting interests will be affected by such an 
arrangement as this. 
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Professor Westlake opened the discussion on 
Fauchille's Report at the Meeting of the Institute 
of International Law and his remarks, as given by 
Hazeltine, disclose such force of reason that it is 
illuminating to give them in full, bearing in mind the 
very early stage in the development of aviation law 
in which they were made. "I accept battle upon the 
"basis of the Report ", he said, "that is upon the 
"principle of the liberty of the air, or more exactly, 
"of the aerial space. The air itself is something 
"that cannot be possessed. It is transported from 
"place to place at the will of the winds, today in 
"Belgitm, tomorrow in France or in Holland; that which 
"we have around us is not air, it is aerial space. 
"Oceanic space and aerial space are two spaces upon 
"which the adjacent State has a "droit de conservation" 
"and the other State a "droit de passage innocent ". 
"Conservation and passage - how can these two rights 
"be combined? Which of them is the rule and which the 
"exception? For the Reporter (Fauchille) it is the 
"right of passage which is first and fundamental. 
"For me it is the right of conservation. Of these 
"two rules, the one which deserves to be the rule is 
"the one which is the more precise; and yet the "droit 
"de conservation" is much clearer than the "droit de 
"passage". That is why the Institute, when it was 
"faced with this question a propos of the oceanic 
"space, replied that in the territorial sea the "droit 
i 
"de souverainete" is the rule and the "droit de 
" passage" the exception. If that holds good as 
"regards the oceanic space it ought also to hold good 
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"as regards the aerial space. The only difficulty is 
"that it is not possible to limit this solution to a 
"certain height. On the sea, the father people go from 
"the coast the less is the risk of their causing 
"destruction and disturbance upon the coast. In the air, 
"the higher one ascends, the greater becomes the 
"destructive force of objects thrown from the balloon 
"upon the earth. If there does exist a limit to the 
"sovereignty of the State in the oceanic space, such a 
"limit does not exist in the aerial space. The right of 
"the territorial State remains the same whatever the 
"distance from the earth." (16) 
Westlake had travelled far along the lines of the 
supporters of complete sovereignty, but had been 
enticed into a loopline when he followed those who saw 
in the maritime law a precedent for aviation law. The 
appeal to compare the two as he has done must indeed 
have been great but he has ignored the fact, so 
concisely put by Hazeltine, that "whereas the maritime 
belt is not strictly necessary for the existence of the 
State, the air space is." (17) 
The International Law Association must, however, 
be numbered amongst the supporters of Westlake, for, 
at the Madrid Meeting in 1913, the following resolution 
was adopted: - 
(1) It is the right of every State to enact such 
prohibitions, restrictions, and regulations as it may 
think proper in regard to the passage of aircraft 
through the air space above its territory and territ: 
:orial waters; 
(16) Hazeltine, Law of the Air, pp. 34 -35, citation. 
(17) Hazeltine, op.cit. p. 37. 
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(2) Subordinate to the right of the subjacent State, 
liberty of passage ought to be freely accorded to the 
aircraft of every nation. 
In December 1910, Dr. Hazeltine delivered three 
Lectures in the University of London at the request of 
the Faculty of Laws, and these were published in book 
form in June 1911. In the first Lecture he made an 
exhaustive study of the rights of States in the air 
space, and, after dealing with all the views expressed 
up to that date, he declared himself to be a supporter 
of the theory of complete sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
it is probable that Lycklama a Nijeholt must be 
credited with being the original supporter of this 
opinion, when, earlier in 1910, he stated, "We therefore 
conclude that State sovereignty reaches quite as high 
as the State's interest can reach, the possibility of 
which ends at the uppermost limit of the atmosphere.... 
in principle, the air space belongs to the sovereign 
state territory so that it has full sovereignty to an 
unlimited height, which sovereignty can only be 
abolished or restricted by Treaty." (18) 
Hazeltine, who maintains that the views of those 
zone theorists, such as von Lizst, von Ulmann and 
Collard, who put their zones as high as can be reached 
by human means, are essentially sovereignty views based 
on the dangers incidental to aerial navigation, 
himself bases his arguments on the then existing legal 
rights which had been recognised. Primarily, various 
systems of law recognise the right of the owner of 
land to own it ad coelum usque ad inferos and this is 
(18) Sovereignty of the Air, p. 46. 
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an implied recognition of the rights of the State to 
concede to the owners of land such a proprietary right. 
While this is so, the appearance of aircraft has caused 
many doubts to be cast on the maxim cuius est solum and, 
as we shall see, there are many who deny any such right 
to an individual landowner. But Hazeltine goes further, 
and points to the rights in the air space which had 
already been recognised. The fact that buildings had 
been erected in the lower stratum of the air space, 
that the right to shoot birds was recognised, and that 
laws had been made to regulate wire and wireless 
telegraphy and even aerial traffic of the Ordinance of 
the State of Florida, were, in his opinion, clearly 
recognition of the sovereign rights of a State in the 
air space above its territory. He concludes by 
asserting that the uniform international regulation of 
aerial navigation will more readily be brought about by 
admitting the doctrine of sovereignty of the air space, 
than by denying it. 
This was the position of the law at the outbreak of 
the World War in 1914. Unanimity on the question of 
sovereignty could not be attained - indeed, the Paris 
Conference of 1910 failed to agree on an International 
Convention for this very reason. How the declaration 
of war changed the whole position and made unanimity 
not merely a matter of academic desire but a matter of 
urgent necessity will be seen when we consider the 
effect of that crisis in its relation to the development 
of aviation law as a whole. 
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The Right to Fly - The National Law. 
At the outset, reference was made to the maxim 
of the law cujus est solum ejus est ad coelum usque 
ad inferos. This maxim appears to be embodied in many 
national legal systems. How it came to be adopted as 
part of the law of such countries is doubtful, and 
diligent research has failed to produce any satisfactory 
solution. In fact, the origin of the maxim itself is 
so far unknown, but Guibe (19) has discovered that the 
earliest source to which it can be traced is to 
Accursius, the Bolognese glossator. It occurs in his 
Glossa Ordinaria on the Corpus Juris, the gloss being 
on the word coelum occurring in the Digest (20). It 
is in the following terms, "Nota:- cujus est solum 
"debet esse usclue ad coelum". A.K. Kuhn who has also 
endeavoured to trace its origin comes to a similar 
conclusion:- "It would seem rather to be the work of 
some gloss upon a passage in the Digest justifying the 
removal of projections from adjoining property over a 
place of burial, because to the sepulchre belongs not 
alone the ground enclosing the remains but everything 
up to the heavens: quia sepulchri sit non solum is 
locum quia recipiat humationem sed omne etiam supra id 
coelum ".(21) The maxim was not, apparently, Roman, 
although somewhat similar sentiments are expressed in 
certain passages of the corpus juris civilis. 
(19) Essai sur la navigation aerienne en droit interne 
et en droit international (Paris 1912). 
(20) VIII. 2. 1pr. 
(21) Beginnings of an Aerial Law. 4 Ann. J. Int. Law 
109, 123. (1910). 
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Whatever may be its source, the maxim, or, at 
least a somewhat similar principle, is part of the 
majority of legal Codes. Once the principle of private 
ownership of land was accepted it would inevitably 
follow that to the individual landowner would be 
conceded the greatest possible rights of ownership. 
The culas est solum maxim provided a neat and concise 
expression of the extent of these rights. At the time 
of Accursius there would be nothing to prevent a 
landowner from having proprietary rights ad coelum 
usque ad inferos, but the appearance of aircraft at 
once raised, in acute form,the question of how far the 
maxim actually did apply. Did a landowner have, in 
fact, full rights of ownership in the airspace above 
his, land to an unlimited height? He had a right to the 
ground below the surface to an unlimited distance; that 
was a right clearly recognised by the law, but did it 
operate in the other ditection? Could he claim a co- 
extensive right of ownership in the airspace above the 
surface of his land? If the maxim was to be interpreted 
literally, and according to the strict letter of the 
law, such a right would appear to be vested in him, and, 
proceeding further, once this right was maintained, 
flight could effectively be prevented. A balloonist 
could not move through the air without thereby 
trespassing and laying himself open to an action of 
damaged for trespass at the instance of every landowner 
over whose land he passed. From the point of view of 
the aeronaut, such a position was intolerable. The 
law could be altered in the interests of aviation but 
the jurists of this period had to consider the question 
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of the applicability of the maxim under the Common Law 
of the land. As far as aviation law was concerned, the 
origin of the maxim was relatively unimportant. It had 
crept into the law at some fairly early stage in its 
development and had, to a certain extent, become part 
of that law. The question of importance was to what 
extent the maxim was applicable ad coelum. Was it 
absolute in its application or did it only apply within 
certain limits? If it did apply only to a limited 
extent was the mere fact of innocent flight an 
encroachment on the rights of the landowner or was 
it not? 
As was usual in all such questions, there was a 
wide divergence of opinion. The landowner might have 
no rights in the airspace, but, on the other hand, it 
equally possible that he did have some rights, and, 
if he did, what were they? They might be defined by 
the height of his buildings or even by the limit of 
effective possession of the airspace; or, they might be 
indefinite, sufficient merely to enable him to enjoy 
his rights of property in the land, or they might be 
absolute. It could even be that the landowner had only 
a servitude right to use the airspace above his land, 
a right which would be thereby accessory to his 
ownership of the land. 
Before considering the English Common Law, and the 
difference, if any, under the law of Scotland, it is 
interesting to observe some of the views as to the 
extent of a landowner's rights in the air space adopted 
in other legal Codes. The Code of the Canton Grieson 
in 1862 is said to have provided that "property in land 
extends to the airspace above and the earth beneath so 
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"far as these may be of productive value to the owner. "(22) 
Napoleon's Code and the old German Code gave the land: 
:owner full proprietary rights, while the Swiss Code and 
the later German Code, although both conceding full 
proprietary rights, laid down the principle that the 
landowner could only exclude persons from the use of the 
airspace above his land if he had an interest in doing 
so. (23). The American Law seems to have followed 
Napoleon's Code and the old German Code, for many 
lawyers have maintained that the right of flight in the 
Unites States does not exist at Common Law, and, as late 
as 1921, the Chief of the Army Air Service was advised 
by his legal adviser that such a right did not exist. It 
has also been suggested that flight would be possible 
only by Constitutional .Amendment or by the acquisition of 
a right of way over private property. American case law, 
on the other hand, tends to adopt the view that innocent 
flight above a certain height will not in itself be a 
cause of action at the instance of a landowner. The 
"only decisions heretofore rendered in this country are 
"two - one by a State District Court of Minnesota, and the 
"other by the Court of Quarter Sessions of Jefferson 
"County, Pennsylvania. Both Courts recognise that air 
"navigation is lawful and does not constitute a trespass." 
(24). 
It is extremely difficult to trace the effect of the 
maxim ad coelurn either in the law of England or in the 
law of Scotland. In neither country can its origin be 
found. It has had a considerable effect on the 
(22) Kuhn, op cit. p. 127 
(23) Art. 905, 1919, Auto Act. Geo. eF Schr 47. 
Eutscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 
(Neue Volge) 25. 
(24) F.F. Lee "Our Commerce Act of 1926 ", 12 Am.Bar Assc. Journal, 376. (1926). 
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development of the law in both countries but at no time 
has it been embodied in Statute or has it been the direct 
object of judicial decision. Yet, several decisions have 
been based on the assumption that it was part of the law, 
and the judicial references all treat it as so well 
founded that it was unnecessary to give a judicial decision 
that it was part,of the law. Blackstone has said that the 
only way of proving that a maxim was a rule of the common 
law was by shewing that it had always been the custom to 
observe it. Judged bJ that standard, there can be no 
doubt that the maxim cujus est solum is part of the law 
both of England and of Scotland. The fact that difficulty 
is found in explaining the effect of the maxim ad coelum 
does not, I consider, justify the statement of Professor 
M'Nair:- "In itself it(the maxim) has no authority in 
"English Law. Only in so far as it has been adopted as part 
"of our law by the judges or by text writers of a very 
"special degree of authority need it concern us. I venture 
"to submit the view that the maxim has been grievously 
"misunderstood and applied so far as its upward limit is 
"concerned." (25) That is his considered view after a 
discussion of the dicta in which the maxim was referred to 
occurring in various cases concerning trespass and nuisance, 
cases concerning telephone and telegraph wires and the 
like, as well as the works of these writers who are 
authorities on the Common Law. But what are these cases anè 
authorities and do they justify such a view? The maxim has 
been invoked in two classes of case, those dealing with the 
rights of the landowner ad centrum and those dealing with 
his rights ad coelum. His rights in the former case,i.e. 
ad centrum, had never been questioned and the maxim applies 
(25) M.'Nair, Law of the Air, p. 33. 
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to the full extent in that direction. It is in the 
upward direction that references to its application are 
so scarce. 
The first case in England in which the maxim was 
referred to in this latter respect was the case of Bury 
v.Pope in 1556(26),a case dealing with light, in which it 
was held that a an can build on his own land in such a 
manner as to obstruct the lights of his neighbour's 
house which had been in existence for thirty orforty 
years. The report concludes "Nota - cujus est solum ejus 
est summitas usque ad coelum". In 1610, Baten's case (27)' 
an overhanging portion of a house was treated in itself 
as a nuisance "For in this case the defendant has built 
a new house,which overhangs part of the plaintiff's house 
(which was not in any of the other cases),so that of 
necessity the rain which falls from the new house must 
fall upon the plaintiff's house. And cujus est solum ejus 
est usque ad coelum.... also he has prevented them from 
building their house higher ". The case of Pickering v. 
Rudd in 1815 has already been referred to for its early 
direct reference to the passage of a balloon over private 
property. The judgment of Lord Ellenborough which was 
quoted (ante p.4) marks the first attempt to limit the 
application of the maxim ad coelum, and it is significant 
indeed that the attempt should be made when first the 
flight of aircraft was in the mind of the judge. That 
must have weighed heavily with Lord Ellenborough when 
arriving at his decision,and,foreseeing as he did the 
impediment bb- aviation which would be occasioned by the 
str ict application or the maxim, he felt constrained to limit its 
(26) Cro. Eliz, 118. 
(27) 9 Rep. 53, b. 
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application, not as a matter of strict la:, but more as 
a ::,atter of sound common sense. The next case, that of 
Fay v. Prentice in 1845, (28) is interesting in that the 
facts closely resemble the Scottish case of Miln v. Mudie 
which had been decided some years before, in 1828 (29). 
The facts in Fay's case were that damages were sought for 
nuisance in respect that a cornice built by the defendant 
upon his house projected over the plaintiff's garden 
and damaged it by overhanging it and shooting rain on to 
it. Although there was no actual damage proved, £40 
damages were awarded on the ground that the bare existenc 
of the projection was a nuisance, but the maxim was 
referred to as a mere presumption of law and one which 
would not apply in all cases. In Kenyon v. Hart (30) 
which was a case dealing with the shooting of a pheasant 
over the land of another, the decision in Pickering v. 
Rudd was considered, and Lord Blackburn declared that he 
could see the good sense but not the legal reason for 
Lord Ellenborough's doubts on the matter. 
There are two other cases which deserve mention, 
both concerning the right to carry wires over the property 
of others. They are the cases of Wandsworth Board of 
Works v. United Telephone Co. (31) and the case which 
followed it and was decided along the same lines, 
Finchley Electric Light Co. v. Finchley Urban District 
Council (32). In the former case wires had been placed 
across a street at a height of thirty feet. While it was 
decided that this was no trespass, the decision turned 
on the rights of the Council in the street and it is the 
(28) 1845, 14 L.J.C.P. 298 
(29) 1826, 6 S. 967 
(30) 1865, 6 B and S. 249 
(31) 1884, 13 Q.B.D. 904. 
(32) 1903, 1 Ch. 437. 
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opinions obiter which are of importance. Fry,L.J. said 
"As at present advised I entertain no doubt that an 
',ordinary proprietor of land can cut and remove a wire 
"placed at any height above his freehold ", and Bowen,L.J , 
in the course of his opinion remarked, "If the Board of 
Works were in the position of simple owners of land 
"I should be extremely loth myself to suggest, or to 
4,acquiesce in any suggestion, th at an owner of land had 
"not the right to objectto anybody putting anything over 
"his land at any height in the sky. It seems to me that 
it is not necessary to decide upon what exact legal 
"fiction, or on the existence of what legal theory, one is 
"to justify the principle which I think is embodied in the 
"law, as far as I have been able to see, that the man who 
"has the land has everything above it, or is entitled at 
"all events to object to anything else being put over it." 
The decision in the Finchley case followed this view and 
in that case we find Lord Esher stating, "that the owner 
"of land owns the soil below usque ad inferos and the 
"column of air above usque ad coelum ". 
Taken by themselves, these decisions would not, I 
submit, justify the statement that the maxim is no part 
of the Common Law. On the contrary, while they are by 
no means illuminating, taken as a whole they do, in effect 
recognise the existence of a principle of the Common Law 
such as is embodied in the maxim, and the learned judges 
in so deciding receive valuable support from the two 
great authorities on the Law of England, Coke and 
Blackstone. The relevant passage from Coke (33) is in 
the following terms : - "And lastly the earth hath in law 
"a great extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been 
"said, but of ayre and all other things even up to heaven; 
(33) 
Co. Litt. 4 a. 
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"for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, as is 
"holden 14 H.8. fo.12; 22 Hen.6.59; 10E.4.14. Registrum 
"origin and other booker ". Blackstone (34) is similar - 
"Land hath also, in its legal signification, an 
"indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards. "Cujus 
p=est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the 
"law upwards." 
The Law of Scotland on this matter is equally 
vague. There is no real difference between the laws of 
the two countries, for in Scotland, as in England, the 
maxim seems to have been regarded as so much a part of 
the law that judicial decision as to its application 
was regarded as quite inappropriate. The Scottish 
Institutional writers have not enunciated a statement so 
clear and definite as those of Coke and Blackstone in 
England, although Bell does embody the principle of the 
maxim in his Principles of the Law of Scotland. There 
have been several decisions on the application of the 
maxim ad centrum but very few on its application ad 
coelum. In all without exception, however, the maxim 
is treated as an integral part of the law. Two cases 
will serve to illustrate the position. The first is the 
case of Miln v. Mudie supra. The Report is exceedingly 
short - "In the erection by Miln and Mudie of their two 
contiguous houses, the former proposed to have a some: 
:what ornamental front, certain cornices of which 
projected a few inches across the centre line of a 
mutual gable between the two houses but without in any 
degree injuring Mudie's house. Mudie, however, so soon 
as they appeared dec=làTed he must have them knocked off; 
(34) Commentaries, Vol.ii. ch.2. p.18. 
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n and on Miln's refusal he presented a Petition to the 
"Dean of Guild to have him ordained to remove the cornices 
n so far as they projected over the front of his house. 
"This was opposed as being purely in emulatione vicini; 
abut the Dean of Guild ordained the projecting cornices to 
nbe removed: "In an advocation the Lord Ordinary and the 
n Court remitted simpliciter, with expenses." It appears 
that the maxim was regarded definitely as part of the 
law and no grounds of judgment are given; there was no 
question but that the projections must be removed. In 
the later case of Glasgow City and District Railway Co. 
v. MacBrayne (35) the question at issue was the right of 
the landowner ad centrum but Lord McLaren, in the course 
of his opinion stated, "In the next place, I dust hold it 
to be clear in law that a conveyance of land in 
unqualified terms gives a right of property in the 
substance or solid contents of land without any assignable 
limit. This is what is meant by a conveyanc97 a có 'io ad 
centrum. There are no limits in the vertical direction 
except such as physical conditions impose ". Thus, the 
Law of Scotland does not differ materially in this 
respect from the Law of England. No judicial decision 
has been given, or even judicial reference made, on the 
effect of flight, and it is perhaps to be regretted that 
the later Scottish writers have been compelled to refer 
to English decisions for guidance when this question has 
been raised. There is one other passage, however, given 
by Bell which should be mentioned, in view of the 
tendency of Lord Ellenborough and the other later English 
Text Writers to find, as it were, a loophole in the law 
as expressed in the maxim, whereby innocent flight would 
(35) 1883, 10 R 894. 
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be permissible. The passage which follows immediately 
on the dissertation oh land ownership, is headed 
"Limitation of Exclusive Use" and proceeds, "The exclusive 
use of a landowner yields wherever public interest or 
necessity requires that it should yield ". (36) Whatever 
may be the law in England, in Scotland at any rate, flight 
might have been justified on this principle of public 
interest. 
While I do not intend at this stage to trace the 
development of the law further than to the outbreak of 
the Great War in 1914, since the only development of the 
law with regard to the maxim and its place in aviation 
law subsequent to that date is statutory, it is perhaps 
convenient to consider here the opinions of the modern 
writers to see whether the common law would in itself 
have justified a derogation from the strict interpretation 
of the maxim, in the interests of flight by aircraft. The 
case of Pickering v. Rudd in England, and the principle 
enunciated by Bell in Scotland could be taken as 
countenancing the view that this would be possible. Furthez 
confirmation may be taken, from a negative point of view, 
from the fact that so far no person has raised any 
objections to the flight of carrier pigeons. While, by 
merely crossing the land of another, they would not be 
likely to cause the same offence as an aircraft would, 
nevertheless, the problem which they present closely 
resembles that of the flight of aircraft. In both,the 
essential elements of a trespass are present, namely the 
property of one person entering the land of another, land 
being taken as including the whole space ad coelum. Yet 
(36) Bell's Principles, Sec. 956. 
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no owner of carrier pigeons has been sued in trespass. 
The effect of the flight of Mullets may be taken as 
settled judicially for, in the case of Clifton v. Bury, 
(37) while an injunction was granted, it was on the ground 
of nuisance and the Report indicates that the mere fact 
of bullets passing over land at a considerable height 
above the ground would not be actionable as a trespass. 
In both cases there is a limit to the application of the 
maxim. 
Turning to the more recent writers, one finds Sir 
Frederick Pollock (38), after referring to the judgments 
of Lord Ellenborough in Pickering v. Rudd, and Lord 
Blackburn in Kenyon v. Hart, proceeding, "Clearly there 
can be wrongful entry on land below the surface, as by 
mining, and in fact this kind of trespass is rather 
prominent in out modern books. It does not seem possible 
on the principles of the common law to assign any reason 
why an entry above the surface should not also be a 
trespass, unless indeed it can be said that the scope of 
possible trespass is limited by that of possible effective 
possession, which might be the most reasonable rule." 
He goes on to say that it would be doubtful whether the 
passing of the projectiles from modern artillery at a 
considerable height would in itself constitute a trespass. 
Sir John Salmond (39), on the other hand, definitely 
asserts that an efitry above the surface is not in itself 
an actionable trespass "for such an extension of the 
rights of the landowner would be an unreasonable 












atmospheric space above the earth's surface." But he is 
forced to admit that "the state of the authorities is 
"such that it is impossible to say with any confidence 
"what the law on the point really is." Lastly, the 
references in Halsbury's Laws of England are of interest 
for in the title on "Real Property and Chattels Real" it 
is stated that "the strict right of property does not 
"extend skyward without limit so as to entitle the owner 
to sue in trespass (Pickering v. Rudd) and the advent of 
"airships has shewn that this would be impracticable ", whi b 
in the title on "Boundaries, Fences and Party Walls" this 
somewhat contradictory sentence is found, "the surface 
"boundary (of land) probably carries with it the right to 
"the column of air over the land up to the sky, and 
"certainly the soil to the centre of the earth, thn the 
"principle cujus est solum ejus est ad coelnm usque ad 
"inferos." 
The law is difficult and confused. 
Authority can be found both for applying the maxim 
rigidly . not only ad centrum but also ad coelum. 
Without statutory enactment, the position of aircraft 
was intolerable, but, this being so, the theorists 
were deprived of a judicial decision when a case on 
point before the highest tribunals would have been 
welcomed. Lacking such a decision one is left to 
conclude, in the first place, that before the advent 
of the aircraft, the cujus est solum maxim was 
generally regarded, and I consider rightly so, as being 
absolute in its application, and, in the second place, 
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that with the coming of aircraft, and other modern 
inventions, the application of the maxim ad coelum 
was questioned and it is possible that, both in England 
and in Scotland, justification could have been found 
for so modifying the law as to permit of innocent 
flight. While Dr Spaight wcis in all likelihood correct 
when he wrote, "It will probably be safe to leave it 
to the common sense of courts and legislatures to resist 
"any attempt to uphold or re- instate a maxim which is 
"utterly repugnant to the spirit of human progress ",(40) 
nevertheless, the weight of authority is in the 
direction of regarding the owner of land as having 
absolute proprietary rights both ad centrum and ad 
coelum. The opinion of Dr Hazeltine is to be preferred 
to that of Professor LONair, when he writes, "I find it 
"difficult to adopt the zone theory so far as the 
"present law is concerned; for I find it difficult to 
the 
"hold that, on /general principles of the common . law, as 
"well as the civil law, the landowner's right either 
"below or above the surface is in any way limited." (41) 
That is unquestionably the sound exposition of the law, 
applicable alike in England and in Scotland. Dr. 
Hazeltine was a supporter of absolute sovereignty 
and his views on the application of the ad coelum 
maxim are in conformity with his opinion on the 
question of sovereignty, for, if States are to be 
regarded as having sovereign rights up to an 
indefinite height, it must necessarily follow that the 
private landowner has co- extensive rights in his own 
piece of land. The maxim cujus est solum ejus est ad 
(40) Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law, p. 55. 
(41) Hazeltine, Law of the Air. 
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coelum uaque ad inferos gives him such rights. 
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The Pioneers of the Law continued - Other Problems 
Chapter 3. of the Law. 
Nuisance: 
While the problem of the right to fly was 
by far the most important question discussed by the 
early jurists, it being the fundamental question 
on which the development of aviation depended, the 
other problems raised by the flight of aircraft, 
both in times of peace and in times of war, were 
legion. 
Closely identified with the tort of 
trespass, just discussed, was the tort of nuisance. 
The decisions on the question of trespass just 
discussed have foreshadowed a certain degree of 
liability under nuisance. The tort of nuisance in 
England is defined by Sir Frederick Pollock as 
"the wrong done to a man by unlawfully disturbing 
"him in the enjoyment of his property, or, in some 
"cases, in the exercise of a common right ", the 
former being a private nuisance, and the latter, a 
public or common nuisance. In Scotland, no such 
distinction exists, a nuisance being defined by 
Bell thus, "Whatever obstructs the public means of 
commef ;ce and intercourse whether in highways or 
navigable rivers; whatever is noxious or unsafe or 
renders life uncomfortable to the public generally 
or to the neighbourhood, whatever is intolerably 
offensive to individuals in their dwellinghouses, 
or inconsistent with the comfort of life, whether 
by stench, by noise, or by indecency, is a 
nuisance." (1) This definition embraces both the 
common or public nuisance and the private nuisance 
of the English law. 
(1) Bell's Principles, Sec. 974. 
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Thus, in both countries, many of the claims which 
would have failed if brought on the grounds of trespass 
might have had more chance of success if based on 
nuisance. While an aircraft which was stationary - of 
necessity, at this stage, a lighter- than -air craft, 
although modern development shows that even heavier - 
than -air craft will be able to remain stationary for 
considerable periods - would not perhaps have founded a 
successful claim under trespass, it would in certain 
circumstances have done so as a nuisance, even although 
actual damage might not have been occasioned. F6r 
instance, a stationary aircraft might conceivably have 
the effect of frightening animals or even children. One 
of considerable size could easily have the effect of 
shutting out the lateral light and the privacy of the 
owner of the land might be invaded to such an extent,to 
be a nuisance, for while an aircraft merely passing 
overhead could not be regarded as a nuisance just because 
the privacy of the landowner was affected, the position 
would be different if it hovered above his land for some 
little time. In all these cases an action for damages 
for nuisance would probably have been successful and 
the continuance of the nuisance restrained. The field 
of action would be extended when moving aircraft were 
considered. Foremost among the nuisances created by 
actual flight, is that of noise accompanied, in most 
cases, by continual low flying, especially in the 
vicinity of aerodromes. At common law this would 
unquestionably have constituted a nuisance, as would 
trick and experimental flying and the instruction of 
novices over populated areas. 
Reference might be made to a very early Scottish 
case, one of the few cases in Scotland in which the 
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effect, or, perhaps more accurately the results of flight, 
have been considered, in which a claim for damages 
succeeded against a parachutist on the grounds of 
nuisance. It is the case of Scott's Trustees v. Moss (2). 
The facts were that moss advertised a balloon ascent by 
one Prof. Baldwin, who, after rising to a certain height, 
would descend by parachute. This he did and landed in a 
field belonging to Scott's Trustees. The crowd overran 
the field and considerable damage to the growing crop 
resulted. The Lord Ordinary, who held that the action was 
irrelevant, in the course of his opinion remarked that a 
continued nuisance of this kind could be interdicted. On 
appeal, however, the decision was reversed and an issue 
for trial allowed on the ground that damages could be 
claimed for a nuisance without waiting for the second 
occasion envisaged by the Lord Ordinary. 
Negligence and Damage: 
Progressing still further, questions next arose as 
to the liability for actual damage caused either by an 
aircraft itself, or by articles falling or dropped from 
it. This matter centered around the common law rules as 
to negligence, and how far any special rule of 4.aw or of 
evidence in relation thereto, could be applied to aircraft. 
Damage could take many forms. It might be damage to 
property or persons carried in the aircraft; or it might 
be damage to the aircraft itself as the result of a 
collision; but, of still greater importance, it might be 
damage to thirlparties outwith the aircraft. The person on 
the ground "is beneath the sword of Damocles, and the 
"sword is not even supported by the horse hair." (3) 
(2) 1889, 17 R. 32. 
(3) Baldwin, "Laws of the Airship ", 4 Ann.J. Int.Law, 
p. 100. (1910) 
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It is to this latter category that I now direct attention. 
It was trite law, both in England and in Scotland, 
and, for that part, in most other countries as well, that 
if a person was doing what he was lawfully entitled to do, 
he would not be liable in damages for injury to a third 
party, if this was the result of pure accident on his 
part. In other words, the injured party had to prove 
negligence. Under the Common Law of England negligence is 
a 
a breach of /duty to use care according to the circumstances. 
It is a default in a duty owed to some person or persons. 
The Law of Scotland is similar in this respect "neglig: 
":ence per se will not make liability unless there is first 
"of all a duty which there has been failure to perform 
"through that neglect." (4) The position, accordingly, was 
that, whether or not there was negligence, depended on the 
circumstances of each case, that is to say, on whether or 
not there was a breach of a duty owed to the injured party. 
With the coming of aircraft, it had to be decided, in the 
first place, whether the aviator owed a duty to any person 
or persons, and, in the second place, allowing that he did 
owe a duty, whether this could be raised to a duty to use 
care in a higher degree than was usual in other cases. 
The first part of the question could easily be 
answered. It had been clearly held that the drivers of 
vehicles owed a duty to the public and that a similar duty 
was observed in maritime law. There could be no doubt that 
the aviator had a duty to take care. But the aircraft was 
a peculiar type of vehicle, and, especially in its early 
stages, was inherently dangerous. It was in this latter 
(4) Clelland Robb, 1911 S.C. 253, Per Lrd. Dunedin. 
41. 
characteristic that it differed materially from the 
ordinary run of vehicles on the highway or ships on the 
sea. The fact that it was suspended in the air, and 
could make an involuntary descent at any moment, or 
that something might readily fall from it causing exten: 
:sive damage, seemed to put aircraft into a special 
category, and there was, as will be seen, a strong 
tendency to apply a rule of absolute liability to 
aircraft for such damage. 
However, in the rule res ipsa loquitur and in the 
doctrine expressed in Rylands v. Fletcher (5) the 
Engbsh and Scottish Laws had made a certain provision 
for dangerous things which might be applied to aircraft. 
The maxim res ipsa loquitur had the effect of moving 
the onus of proof from the injured party to the person 
causing the injury in the cases to which it could be 
applied, that is, in cases where the facts disclosed 
were such that an accident would have been extremely 
unlikely had there been no negligence. The rule was 
thus laid down in Scott v. London Docks Co. (6), "There 
"must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where 
"the thing is shown to be under the management of the 
"defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as 
"in the ordinary case does not happen if those who have 
"the management use proper care, it affords reasonable 
"evidence, in the absence of explanation by the 
"defendants, that the accident arose from want of care." 
The case in question was one in which sacks of sugar 
fell while being lowered from a warehouse. On the basis 
of this decision, therefore, it might be assumed that 
(5) 1868, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
(6) 1865, 3 H & C. 596. 
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the maxim would be applied to articles dropped or falling 
from aircraft. There can be little doubt that it would 
also have been applied in cases where the aircraft itself 
fell, for a person who goes up in an aeroplane knows that 
he must come down and the burden of showing that his 
coming down was the result of circumstances over which he 
had no control should rest on him rather than on the 
injured party. So it has been held in America that, when a 
person was injured in an elevator accident, the onus of 
proof was on the owners of the elevator. (7) It had 
been applied in cases where a bus skidded, and in recent 
years in Scotland, differiñg from England, it was applied 
in the case of a runaway horse. (8). That being so, having 
regard to their peculiar characteristics, it would surely 
be applied in the case of aircraft. 
The doctrine expressed in Rylands $ Fletcher was, 
perhaps, more important, although its application to 
aircraft was not clear. Shortly expressed, the doctrine 
is that'any person who for his own purpose brings on his 
own land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to 
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, 
and, if he does not do so, is prima facie liable for all 
the damage that is the natural consequence of its escape. 
Vis major or the Act of God would abne excuse him. The 
application of the doctrine differed slightly in the two 
countries. In Scotland the tendency was to apply it only 
to cases where something potentially dangerous was 
brought on to land (9), whereas, in England, it had been 
applied in analagous cases. However, even in England, it 
had not been applied to motor vehicles on the highway or 
in similar cases. (10) The ground of such decisions was 
(7) Treadwell v. Whittier (1889) 80 Cal. 574. 
(8) Hendry v. M'Douga11,1923,S.C. 378. 
(9) Reynolds v.Lanarkshire T amw ßs,190 116 T. 230. (10) iing v. London General tmnly s Co.(. Z i90v) 652. 
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clear, for a car on the highway could not really be said 
to be inherently dangerous. 
It has been said that "an aircraft is no more at 
"common law a dangerous thing than a motor car." (11) 
Again, judicial decision, or even dicta, is lacking, but 
the fact that an aircraft is suspended above appears to 
me to cast grave doubts on such a statement. This was the 
essential difference between the aircraft and other 
vehigles, and, by that fact alone, an aircraft must be 
very near the border line of that class of objects 
classified as "dangerous things ". 
From the international aspect, also, the question of 
negligence and damage was important. The international 
character of flight made imperative uniformity of 
principles of negligence and damage. The position of the 
aeronaut would indeed be insufferable if he was subjected 
to different rules of liability in each of the different 
countries over which he flew. The consensus of opinion 
was that, as a general rule, the aeronaut should be made 
liable absolutely for damage caused by the fall of 
articles from an aircraft, or the fall of the aircraft 
itself. "It is not enough to shift the burden of proof 
and to admit an exception for force majeure. The doctrine 
of absolute liability should be substituted and force 
majeure should in no case be admitted as a justification." 
(12) This was the view adopted by the Comité Juridique 
de l'aviation in 1912 and 1913, (13) and was also the 
opinion of Professor de Lapradelle and Dr Hazeltine. 
(11) Charlesworth, Liability for Dangerous Things, 14. 
(12) Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law, 78. 
(13) R.J.L.A. 1913, p. 71. 
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Nevertheless, in an action agair'st Count von Zeppelin in 
Germany in 1912, it was held that he was not liable for 
injuries caused to a person by his dirigible which broke 
loose after he had taken very exceptional precautions to 
prevent such an occurrence,(14) and the Verona Congress of 
1910 maintained that indemnity should only be due when 
there was fault on the part of the aviator, inclining as 
it did towards the unrestricted development of aviation 
rather than the protection of innocent third parties. 
The question of indemnity for damage - assuming that a 
uniform principle of absolute liability was attained - also 
caused much anxiety, for how would damages be recovered 
when found due to a national of one country by an aviator, 
national of another country? Many ingenious suggestions 
were put forward, but the most important were those of M. 
Rennequin and Professor Hans Sperl. The former proposed 
that the courts of the country in which the damage was 
occasioned should have exclusive power to try the cause (15) 
and the latter, a system of insurance and national clearing 
houses which, after paying any damages found due to their 
own nationals, would, in turn, recover those from the 
national clearing house of the country in which the aircraft 
causing the damage was registered. (16) 
Carriage by Air: 
Turning now to another aspect of damage - that occas: 
:ioned to passengers and goods carried by aircraft - resort 
must be had to the rules applicable in the case of carriage 
by land or by sea. There are the two classes of carrier, 
the common carrier and the private carrier. In England and 
in Scotland, although the basis of the law is different, 
(14) 1912 S.B. v. Graf.Z 28 Eutscheidungen des Reichsgerichts 
in Zwilsachen (Neue Volge) 171. 
(15) R.J.L.A. 1912, pp. 216 -217. 
(16) La navigation aerienne au point de vue juridique 
R.D.I. 1911, pp. 490 -491. 
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the common law is that a common carrier - one who under: 
:takes for reward to carry goods of all those who choose 
to employ him in the business which he carries on - is 
bound to carry the goods of the kind usually carried by 
him provided they are not dangerous, or insufficiently 
packed, that they arrive in time, that he has room for 
them, and that his charges are paid. His liability in 
respect of goods so carried is that of an insurer. .A 
private carrier, on the other hand, that is, one who 
exercises his right to select the goods or passengers 
carried, is only liable for fault or negligence. Both 
common and private carriers are only liable for injury 
to passengers if they have been negligent. At Common Law 
also, a carrier, whether common or private, could take 
steps to limit his liability but this must be done in 
plain and unambiguous language. This power was, in the 
case of carriers by land, severely limited by the Carriers 
Act 1830 (17) which made it essential, if the strict 
liability was to be evaded, that special arrangements must 
be made with individual traders and public notice or 
advertisement to that effect was no longer valid although 
it was sufficient to print the conditions on the back of 
tickets or consignment notes if the parties sending the 
goods had fair notice of the existence of the conditions. 
The Carriers Act of 1830 did not apply to carriage by sea, 
but there was one "peculiarity with regard to sea carriage, 
namely the implied warranty of seaworthiness given by the 
shipowner. Such a warranty was not given in the case of 
carriage by land. The carrier by land was only bound to 
provide a vehicle as fit for the purpose as care and skill 
could render it. 
(17) II Geo. IV & I Will. IV. c. 68. 
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While it was evident that a code of law for carriage 
by air would be necessary, and particularly an internat: 
:ional code, it was not difficult to apply the foregoing 
principles to carriage by air. There would be no 
difficulty in defining whether such a carrier was a 
common or private carrier by applying the definitions 
laidcfor carriers by land and sea. The fact that a 
machine was used which flew through the air would not 
affect the question. The Carriers Act of 1830 would not 
apply to aircraft and, accordingly, a common carrier by 
air would be able to contract out of his liability as an 
insurer by public notice or advertisement. Lastly, it 
could be taken as decided law that a carrier by air would 
not be bound by any warranty of "air -worthiness" as in 
the case of the carrier by sea, even allowing that it 
was necessary to have a Certificate of Airworthiness, 
but would only require to supply a machine as fit for 
the purpose as would be required from a carrier by land. 
The warranty that a ship is seaworthy is peduliar to 
carriage by sea. 
Collisions: 
The third and last type of damage which could result 
from flight was that caused to the aircraft themselves 
as a result of a collision. On this subject there was no 
law which could be ap died, and, while the writers of 
this period invariably discussed the matter of "collision! 
the basis of their discourse was not so much what the 
law was, as what law would be applied in the case of a 
collision between aircraft of different nationalities 
and what courts would have jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
it is difficult to find any expression of opinion as to 
the actual law to be applied in any one country. 
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However, precedent could again be taken from other 
sources - the sea and the land. Collisions on land 
were invariably dealt with according to the common law 
rules of negligence and contributory negligence operated 
as a successful defence to a claim for damages. The 
maritime law of various countries was on a different 
basis, and under the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911 
where two ships are at fault the loss caused by a 
collision is apportioned in accordance with the degree 
of fault attributed to each vessel by the court, thus 
differing from the older English Maritime Law where, in 
such a case the loss was divided equally. Aviation law 
could in principle follow either the law of the land 
or that of the sea. One thing had to be horne in mind, 
that there were certain defined "rules of the road" to 
be observed by vehicles on land and by ships on the sea, 
especially in the latter case. There were as yet no 
"rules of the air" although it was pre -supposed that these 
would be such rules, and, accordingly, it was not easy 
to determine which of two colliding aircraft was at 
fault. But, assuming that there were rules of aerial 
navigation, on what basis was a claim for damages as a 
result of such a collision to be determined? The 
inclination was towards applying a law, analagoud to 
maritime law, which would in principle be agreed on 
internationally, and one finds this advocated by Dr 
Hazeltine and Dr Spaight. It was generally felt that 
this was one occasion on which the analogy of the sea 
could be applied in safety as, from the point of view of 
navigation, the sea and the air space were more or less 
akin to one another. 
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Collisions between aircraft, however, did not 
necessarily occur in the air. They required to 
manoeuvre either on land or sea before and after 
flight and they might collide while taxi -ing on land 
or water. With no law in existence it was to be 
presumed that, while still on land the ordinary common 
law rules of negligence and contributory negligence 
would apply, whereas, while maneouvering on the water, 
maritime law would apply but the learned jurists were 
strangely silent on this question, in so far as 
liability, apart from special legislation, is 
concerned. We shall see in due course the principles 
which were finally evolved. 
Wrecks and Salvage: 
A collision on the highway or at sea does not of 
necessity cause a wreck. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to conceive a collision between two aircraft 
in flight where one at least of the colliding craft 
was not wrecked. For this reason, it was usual for 
the early writers on aviation law to couple wrecks 
and collisions together and consider both topics at 
the same time. 
The term "wreck" was strictly applied only to 
wrecks as peculiar to maritime law, but it was generally 
agreed that the maritime law of wreck and salvage 
could be applied to aircraft with little modification 
where the aircraft was wrecked at sea. The necessity 
for a uniform law as to wreck and salvage of aircraft 
could not be over -estimated, but it might be expected 
that the majority of wrecked aircraft would be found 
on land rather than on the sea. Now, when two 
vehicles were wrecked on the highway there was no 
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question of payment of:sav,age. Only maritime property 
could be the subject of salvage and the salvor who 
rendered assistance to wrecked vehicles on land had no 
claim against the owners thereof for his services. It 
might appear inequitable that those who rendered 
assistance to a large aircraft carrying a fair complement 
of passengers and goods which crashed on land should 
receive no reward unless the owners of the craft were 
prepared to pay for their services. Unless it was 
expressly enacted that such was to be the case they 
could have no claim at common law. In fact, it was very 
doubtful whether, if in similar circumstances on the 
high seas a vessel which rendered assistance would under 
the then existing maritime law be entitled to salvage. 
As was indicated by Dr Spaight, (18) when an aircraft 
crashed on foreign territory several parties might be 
interested in the wreck if the owner did not take steps 
to salve it - the finder, the landowner on whose ground 
it falls, or the State of the locus quo - but that was 
a matter, to decide which, international legislation 
was required. As an indication of the type of legis: 
:lation which the jurists had in view, one can take 
the proposal of h. Fauchille (19) who suggested in his 
Code that, "Anyone finding a wrecked aircraft on land 
"or sea must notify it to the municipal authorities of 
"the nearest locality or of the first port at which he 
"calls, within twenty four hours of finding it or 
"reaching port. If the wreck can be identified it will 
"be restored to its owner who will repay the salvor his 
(18) Aircraft in Peace and the Law, p. 100 
(19) Annuaire de l'Institut, 1911, p. 111. 
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"expenses and pay him a remuneration of five per cent. 
"of the value of the wreck. Otherwise it will remain 
'tin the authorities' hands; the internal legislation of 
"each country will fix the time within which the owner 
"will be allowed to reclaim it," this clause being 
almost identical in its terms with that approved by the 
Paris Conference in 1910. Legislation along these 
lines would be necessary in the absence of any other 
law which could be applied. 
Thus far, the whole matter of the law governing 
damage caused by aircraft, whatever its cause and 
whatever its nature, has been dealt with from the point 
of view of reparation for such damage once it had been 
occasioned, but of no less importance was the manner 
in which it was to be prevented. In other words, what 
steps were to be taken to minimise the danger caused 
by the flight of aircraft. This was not really so much 
a matter of law as of regulation, and the various pre- 
war fegulations will be observed in due course. The 
question was dealt with automatically by the various 
national legislatures, at an early stage, in their 
normal functions of ensuring the safety of the persons 
and property of their inhabitants. The regulations 
invariably took the form of ensuring that the craft 
itself was airworthy and that the pilots and navigators 
were competent, or by one or other of those means. 
Certificates to that effect were issued after inspection 
and examination on the analogy of the automobile and 
its driver and the ship and its crew. The only 
question in dispute was just how stringent the 
provisions as to airworthiness and inspection of the 
craft before flight could be made without impeding the 
51. 
development of aviation, and also how far such regul: 
:ations could be made the subject of international 
agreement and recognition. 
Jurisdiction and the Law in the Air. 
Flight further gave rise to innumerable questions 
in the realm of jurisdiction and also the laws to be 
applied with regard to acts done by persons on board an 
aircraft while in flight, but pre -requisite to any such 
discussion was the necessity of deciding whether or not 
an aircraft had, or could have, a nationality. The 
aircraft could be likened, on the one hand, to the ship, 
or, on the other, to the automobile - it was neither the 
one nor the other, but, nevertheless, it had character: 
:istics of both. It might have the full- blooded 
nationality of the ship or it might only have a nation: 
:ality for the same purposes and to the same extent as 
that possessed by the automobile. It was universally 
recognised that, for the purposes of international 
flight, an aircraft would require to be registered in 
some State. That it would also require a nationality 
was not so generally acknowledged and even Meili was aet 
emphatic that aircraft required no nationality. Such, 
however, was the view of only a small minority. The 
consensus of opinion favoured the conferring of a 
nationality of some kind on aircraft, but among this 
majority, while there was unanimity that an aircraft 
should have a nationality, and one only, confusion 
reigned as to how that nationality should be determinad 
and the relationship between nationality and registration, 
particularly the purpose of the latter, a confusion 
which could in no small measure be attributed once again 
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to the seductive analogy of the sea, and a failure to 
conceive the true purpose for which a ship was 
registered. Contrary to the opinions of many, regis: 
:tration of a ship does not in itself confer nation: 
:ality of its owners. The misconception of registrat: 
:ion actually conferring nationality is clearly 
visible in the various arguments which were put 
forward for conferring this or that nationality on an 
aircraft. 
There were two suggestions for conferring nation: 
:ality through the medium of the owner of the aircraft. 
The first was that it should have the nationality of 
its owner's national State, and the second, that of 
the country of the owner's domicile. De Lapradelle 
held thit opinion for three reasons, "two of them 
"firmly established, namely diplomatic immunity, 
"protection and requisition by the State of the Flag, 
tithe third dependant upon the solution which may be 
"given later to the question of exterritoriality, 
"namely, the determination of criminal and givil 
"competence by the "Law of the Flag ",(20), and he was 
supported by Von Bar in the Code which he presented to 
the Institute at Madrid in 1911, and by Fauchille who 
had first raised the point in 1900 in the two projects 
which he submitted. The second, that of the domicile 
of the owner, was one of the alternatives adopted by 
the Paris Conference in 1910, and the French Decret 
of 17th December 1913, was similarly based on that 
principle. Dr Hazeltine favoured the first, for, 
"as between the two, I confess the first seems to me to 
"be the safer and better principle both for times of 
"peace and times of war the adoption of the 
(20) R.J.L.A. 1912, p. 16. 
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"former will greatly simplify the law ". (21) He was 
then referring to the view expressed by the Comité 
Juridique International de Locomotion Aérienne in its 
"Code de l'air" adopted at its Paris Session in 1911 
- "La nationalité de l'aéronef est celle de son 
propretaire ". Professor Oppenhein suggested the Port 
d'attache (22) and M. Armengaud the country in which 
the aircraft was constructed (23) as the true 
criterion of its nationality, but the greatest body 
of support was to be found for the view that nation: 
:ality should be that of the country in which the 
aircraft was registered. This was the official view 
of the Féde'ration Aéronautique Internationale, and 
also that of the Institute of thternational Law,which, 
despite the projects submitted by Fauchille and Von 
Bar, finally resolved that "Tout aéronef doit avoir 
"une nationalité et une seule. Cette nationalité sera 
"celle du pays ou l'aéronef aura été immatricule....... 
"L'Etat auquel l'immatriculation est demandée détermine 
"á quelles personnes et sous quel conditions il peut 
"l'accorder." (24) It was also favoured by Dr Spaight 
who, however, somewhat qualified his acceptance of the 
principle by requiring the aircraft to be normally 
housed in the State in which it was registered. "The 
"aircraft should be regarded as having some fixed'Port 
"d'Attache "or headquarters and it should be registered 
"in the country in which the headquarters are situated.' 
(25) The question was one on which there had to be 
international agreement, but it fell to be decided 
more on the basis of convenience than on legal 
precedent. It was a simple matter in comparison with 
(21) The Law of the Air. 
(22 Annuaire de l'Institut, 1911, pp.307 -310. 
23 R.J.L.A. 1912, p. 114. 
24 R solution 2(a) 
25 Alrcra in e ce and the Law, pp20 -21. 
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the questions which were to be determined once a 
nationality or quasi -nationality had been attributed 
to the aircraft - questions which were wholly theoretical 
and on which there was no precedent. 
These questions covered a very wide range, in fact 
every act done on board an aircraft had to be envisaged. 
Crimes and torts committed by the passengers or crew 
while the aircraft was in flight, contracts executed on 
board, births, deaths or marriages occurring on board - 
by what law was their legality or otherwise to be 
determined? Furthermore there might be violations of a 
State's flying regulations and of international conven: 
:tions but these would arise at a later stage when 
national regulations and international conventions were 
a reality and it was to be hoped that there would be 
international agreement in the conventions themselves 
as to the appropriate tribunals in which such offences 
could be dealt with. Failing this, their decision 
would also be a matter of legal theory just as the law 
to be applied in the other matters indicated above was 
entirely hypothetical. Even allowing that all such 
matters were dealt with by international convention, 
unless such agreement was universal there would always 
be cases which would arise in which resort would have to 
be had to the law, if there was any, which existed apart. 
from the conventions. 
Whether it was a crime, a tort, or a contract there 
might be no fewer than three criteria by which the law 
applicable and the courts hating jurisdiction could be 
determined. The individuals concerned would have a 
nationality and the law of their national state could be 
applied; the aircraft might be regarded as hating a 
nationality much as a ship had and the "law of the flag" 
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might apply; finally, the law of the country over whose 
territory the aircraft was flying could be applied. Such 
depended on the effect of, or rather, the extent of the 
nationality to be given to an aircraft, and still more 
on the delicate question of whether or not a State was 
to have sovereign rights in the airspace above its territ: 
:ory. Assuming, however, that an aircraft had a nation: 
:ality which could be regarded as "full- blooded" in certain 
circumstances and that each State had sovereign rights in 
the airspace, what would be the position? In some cases 
no difficulty could arise. If an English aircraft carrying 
English passengers was flying between two places in 
England and a crime was committed on board, or a contract 
entered into between two parties on board, only English 
could be applied. For what reason it might be difficult 
to say, whether it was the nationality of the passengers, 
or of the craft, or of the atmosphere through which they 
were passing, which was the determining factor no one was 
bold enough to explain. It would be taken for granted 
that English Law would apply and that English Courts 
would be competent to hear any subsequent judicial 
proceedings, for no other law could possibly have any 
bearing on the matter. But the ease might not be quite 
so simple. Had there been domiciled French passengers in 
a German aircraft flying over England, would the law of 
England have prevalied? It will perhaps be more uonven: 
:ient to consider each case separately. 
Crimes: 
In the example given above - the Frenchman in the 
German aircraft flying over England - numerous different 
circumstances in which a crime could be committed could 
be comprehended. Assuming that one of the crimes 
generally recognised by all civilised States, such as 
56. 
murder, had been committed on board while over English 
territory. One Frenchman had murdered another. If the 
aircraft had been merely crossing England on an inter: 
:national flight, while the crime was committed in 
English territory, that country would have no real 
interest in what happened on board. If the craft first 
landed in Germany, it was to be presumed that that 
country would have jurisdiction, on the assumption that 
the aircraft itself was to be given German nationality 
to the same extent as if the crime had been committed 
on a German ship. This was the opinion of M. Fauchille 
and of the Comité Juridique de l'Aviation. It would 
also meet the case of a crime committed over the high 
seas. Yet, to attribute nationality to such a high 
degree to the aircraft itself might be to make the 
position absurd. It would mean that if the 
aircraft was making a flight between two places in 
England and the Frenchmen came on board in England 
intending to land in that country, and the same crime 
was perpetrated, then the German Courts would have to 
take cognisance of the crime. Nevertheless it was to 
all intents and purposes an English crime, committed in 
England, and one in which Germany had no interest. In 
such a case only the English courts could have juris: 
:diction and the fact that the murder was in an aircraft 
in the airspace must make no difference. It was 
generally recognised that the offender could, and 
would be tried in England. 
The whole matter bristled with complications. The 
crime might be only a crime according to the law of the 
State through whose aerial domain the craft was flying. 
It might be a technical offence - the contravention of 
a Statute - and yet a crime. The aircraft might never 
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land in the State, the laws of which it had contravened, 
and the State whose nationality it possessed might not 
recognise the offence. How was redress to be obtained? 
A case presenting much the same difficulty, but with a 
more serious offence, could also be imagined, - one 
hypothetical yet possible. Taking once again the 
German aircraft with its French passengers over England 
on an international flight, the Frenchman on this 
occasion murdered an Englishman, say by shooting him 
from the moving aircraft. The machine landed in 
Germany. This was aü offence in which the English 
Courts should have jurisdiction but could not the Germar 
Courts equally well punish the offender? In the matter 
of crimes the nationality of the offender had to be 
disregarded, and, accordingly, whatever the crime was, 
be it of a serious or trivial character, there were the 
courts of only two countries which had jurisdiction, 
those of the "State of the Flag" and those of the State 
over whose territory the aircraft was when the crime was 
committed. 
Both had an equal claim to recognition and the one 
could not have absolute jurisdiction to the exclusion 
of the other although this contention was maintained by 
some. The support given to the "State of the Flag" 
theory has already been mentioned. That the law of the 
subjacent State should always apply was open to grave 
criticism largely on account of the difficulty sometimes 
in deciding over what particular State the aircraft was 
flying, especially near the frontier lines between 
various States. Even this difficulty, however, was 
surmounted by its protagonists, and a most ingenious 
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proposal was made by Guibé, (26). He foresaw the 
difficulty of drawing a frontier line in the air and 
proposed rather a volume frontier, within which the two 
States would exercise a concurrent jurisdiction, and 
where it was impossible to decide in what territory a 
crime, or, for that matter, any act, was committed, it 
would be regarded as having taken place in the common 
zone. The State first seised of the act would be 
dompetent to deal with it. Despite such suggestions, 
however, it was evident that a type of joint jurisdict: 
:ion would have to be recognised, if only for conven: 
:ience. The legal reasoning, of course, depended 
entirely upon the nationality to be attributed finally 
to aircraft and on the ultimate agreement on the 
Question of sovereignty, but the correct solution was, 
I think, to be found in the writings of the two eminent 
English authorities, Dr. Hazeltine and Dr Spaight. The 
former wrote (27) "I believe the proper solution is to 
"recognise the full sovereignty of the subjacent State 
"in its entire airspace, thus bringing all crimes 
"committed in that airspace within the jurisdiction of 
"the Courts of the subjacent State itself. To be sure, 
"it is still possible to give the State of the Flag a 
"concurrent jurisdiction in regard to crimes committed 
"on board which do not in any way seriously affect the 
"subjacent States ". At a later stage, one finds a 
similar expression by Dr Spaight, although in a more 
definite form. He maintains (28) that murder and other 
"common law" crimes committed in the air, whether 
(26) Essai sur la navigation aérienne, pp. 224_227 
(27) The Law of the Air 
(28) Aircraft in Peace and the Law, p. 129. 
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affecting persons on the ground or only those within 
the aircraft itself would come under the jurisdiction of 
either the subjacent State or the State of the aircraft's 
nationality; that all acts done in the air by a person 
taken up at one point in a country and set down at 
another, without having crossed the frontier, would be 
treated as done on the ground; and technical infringe: 
:ments of a State's laws would be dealt with only by 
that State. This latter suggestion rather pre -supposed 
an extension of the principle of extradition, in which 
both M. Fauchille and Professor Catellani (29) saw a 
possible solution to many of the difficulties. 
Torts: 
Entering the field of torts, one finds, that, 
differing from the law in regard to crimes, recourse can 
and will be had, to the nationality of the individuals 
concerned, or rather, to the country of their domicile, 
in determining the courts having jurisdiction, for 
there is something personal about a tort, affecting as 
it does the individual rather than the State. It was 
here that the whole question of redress for damage caned 
by an aircraft or by the persons therein found an 
outlet, and the tendency was to regard the matter as 
being readily determined in accordance with the 
existing rules of private international law. National 
courts would decide actions brought before them by 
reference to the law as settled by statute and judicial 
decision. 
The same circumstances as were considered in the 
case of crimes could be taken, in the same order, as 
examples in the case of tort. If the Frenchman 
(29) Droit Arien, p. 152. 
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committed a tort on board the German aircraft while 
flying over England, but without landing, the English 
Courts would not be concerned, but the German Courts 
would not necessarily be competent to deal with the 
offence. Rather would it be the French Courts, the 
courts of the country in which the tortfeasor could be 
served with a writ and it would be tried according to 
the law of France. If the tort had been committed while 
the aircraft was in flight over the high seas it is 
doubtful whether, even in that event, the German Courts 
would have had jurisdiction. That would be the law 
which would be applied had the act been done on board 
a German ship but then an aircraft did not necessarily 
possess nationality to that extent. It was more 
probable that once again the French Courts would have 
to apply French Law. If the tortfeasor could 
competently be brought within the jurisdiction of the 
French Courts by service of a writ then they would be 
competent. Such would be the law in England (30) if 
the tortfeasor could be brought before the English 
Courts, and the common law or the maritime law would 
according to the circumstances of the case be applied. 
In the third example, where an Englishman was 
murdered, England, as the subjacent State, was inter: 
:ested in the offence, and it was decided that both 
the English and the German Courts should be competent. 
Had it been merely a tort, the German Courts would not 
be competent but England, the subjacent State, would 
have an interest, and a very real interest. If the 
(30) cf. Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson, 1886, 
33 L.J.C.P. p. 139. 
Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands 
India Steam Navig. Com. (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 118; 
(1883) 10 Q.B.D. 521. 
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tortfeasor landed or could be brought before the English 
Courts by service of a writ, then they would have juris: 
:diction., In all probbility, however, he might not 
land, and in that case he would be dealt with by the 
French Courts in the same way as though the tort had 
been committed in France and in no way affected English 
persons or property - that is, he would come before the 
courts of the country in /which he could competently be 
cited to appear. There would be this difference. The 
French Courts would have to regard the law of England 
in deciding whether or not a tort had, in fact, been 
committed. 
Questions arising as a result of collisions between 
aircraft fell into the same category but they were 
considered of such importance by the early writers as to 
deserve special mention and were usually treated 
separately. All the possible laws to be applied and 
courts to have jurisdiction found prominent supporters. 
Thus, where there was a collision between two aircraft 
of the same nationality M. Fauchille (31) suggested that 
the law to be applied and the courts to apply it should 
be those of the "State of the Flag", but where the 
colliding aircraft were of different nationalities such 
matters should be determined by the same rules as 
governed collisions at sea. Professor von Bar (32) 
would have applied this latter test in all cases of 
collision. There was but one alternative, that the law 
of the subjacent State should apply and this was the 
(31) Annuaire de l'Institut, 1910, p. 108. 
(32) do. P. 46. 
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theory supported by Dr Guibe (33). Had the 
collision occurred over the high seas he conceded 
that the law of the defendant's State would apply. 
However, there could be no doubt that to obtain 
redress for injury resulting from a collision, the 
injured party, in deciding before what courts his 
action was to be raised, would be guided by the same 
principles as would govern torts generally. 
Contracts and Wills: 
Somewhat similar considerations arose with 
regard to contracts entered into and wills executed 
by persons on board an aircraft in flight. Their 
form and mode of execution, their legal validity, 
and, in so far as contracts were concerned, their 
breach, had all to be taken into account in relation 
to the law by which such form, essential validity, 
or breach was to be determined. 
It was trite law that the law of the country or 
place where a contract is made or entered into, the 
lex loci contractus, governs the form and mode 
of execution, and it must be lawful in that country 
and its performance lawful in the country in which 
it was to be performed. The difficulty was that 
when a contract was entered into between two persons 
in an aircraft in flight, where was it made? Following 
the principles adopted when dealing with crimes and 
torts, when the aircraft was engaged in an internal 
flight, say over England, the contract would be 
regarded as having been made in England, just in the 
same way as if it had been entered into while the 
contracting parties were on the ground. Further, 
(33) Essai sur la navigation aérienne, pp. 339 -340. 
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there would be no real difference if the aircraft 
had been engaged in international flight. Circuml 
:stances would differ slightly, however, if the 
contract was entered into while over the high seas. 
If English law was to be followed, it was probable 
that the courts of whatever State before which 
questions on the contract were brought would inter: 
:pret such contracts made or intended to be performed 
over the high seas in accordance with the laws of 
that State. This could not be taken as definite, 
however, for there was somdhing to be said for 
applying the law of the State of the Flag in such 
cases, so much, in fact, that subsequent international 
agreement all but made this the law. Dr Spaight 
would have applied the law of the country in which 
the contract was intended to be performed, the lex 
loci solutionis. In fact he would have gone further, 
for he would have applied the lex loci solutionis in 
the prior two cases, where the aircraft was flying 
over the territory of a state. (34) There was indeed 
much to be said for such a view which would have 
simplified matters considerably. The breach of a 
contract would be determined by the same principles. 
The form and execution of wills presented 
less difficulty. They must of necessity be executed 
according to the law of the country of the testator's 
domicile. If they deal with heritable, or immovable, 
property they must be executed in such a way as to 
effect a disposal of such property in the country in 
which it is situated. Legal instruments, other than 
(34) Aircraft in Peace and the Law, pp. 127-8. 
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contracts and wills would be executed according to the 
law of the country in which they were made, and, in 
deciding such country, regard would be had to the same 
principles as guided the choice when discussing contracts, 
with this exception, that when the instrument was 
executed over the high seas, it would be more probable 
that the law of the country in which the grantor was 
domiciled, would be the ruling factor governing its 
execution. 
Births, Deaths, and iarriages : 
These topics, although of no real significance, 
were early discussed. Their decision depended on the 
nationality to be given to the aircraft. If it was to 
be treated as part of the territory of a state, 
born 
,analogous to the ship, then a person /onboard would have 
the nationality of the State of the Flag, and a 
marriage solemnised on board would also require to be 
in conformity with the laws of such State. Some of the 
members of the Comité Juridique de l'aviation did in 
fact make such a suggestion with regard to births. 
Indeed, they went further and discussed the question of 
an infant stowaway found on board. The f;omit@ decided 
that such a child should have the nationality of the 
State of the Flag, a decision which was not upheld by 
the Congress. The more common sense course, that 
suggested by Professor de Lapradelle (35), was that 
a child born on board an aircraft in flight should have 
its father's nationality, and that in the case of the 
infant stowaway, domicile should determine its 
nationality. 
It had to be recognised that an aircraft 
(35) R.J.L.A. 1912, pp. 246,247, 263. 
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could have no such nationality and once this was so 
such matters presented little difficulty. The 
question of births occurring on board was the most 
important, and for British subjects, nationality was 
regulated largely by Statute, the effect of which 
was to bring all persons born within the British 
Dominions, or born of British parents outwith the 
British Dominions whose father was at the time of 
birth a British subject, if certain conditions as to 
registration were fulfilled, within the status of 
British subjects. Persons born in an aircraft over 
the high seas would fall within the latter category, 
and thús, for British subjects at least, the question 
lost much of its significance. 
Nationality had even less importance on the 
question of deaths occurring in aircraft and the 
solemnisation of a regular marriage was difficult. 
Marriage, however, was possible to British subjects 
by mere exchange of consent in presence of witnesses 
much on the same basis as the old Scottish irregular 
marriage by declaration de praesenti. 
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Chapter 4. The Pioneers of the Law, continued - Projects for 
Regulating the Use of Aircraft in War. 
In the introductory chapter I referred to the 
fact that the earliest attempts to legislate for 
the regulation of aircraft were, in the main, 
directed towards formulating rules governing their 
use in times of war, and it is true to say that 
until the conclusion of the Great War practically 
all the aerial laws enacted, had been enacted for 
military reasons. Certainly this was so until 
1914. All the national aerial laws were enacted 
for purposes of national protection and the only 
international laws agreed upon, so far as referring 
to aircraft, were intended to cover their gse in 
any future war. Admittedly the references were 
scanty, and much was left undone, but it is in this 
particular branch of the law that the first actual 
international legislation is to be found. 
At the oitset, the aircraft was regarded 
solely as a new weapon of war, and an adjunct to the 
two existing fighting services. It could be used to 
considerable advantage with either service. 
Accordingly, it was to the formulating of a law 
for the use of aircraft in war that the energies 
of the early jurists were first directed, and, 
although in the course of their deliberations they 
touched on the many other matters I have just 
discussed, these were only the outcome of their 
consideration of a war time law. 
In what respect then, did the use of aircraft 
during war require regulation? The question of 
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Sovereignty in the airspace naturally occupied a 
prominent position, but this was of a more general 
nature and I have already dealt with it as one of the 
fundamental problems of all flight. The members of 
the other fighting services were specially identified 
by uniforms and belligerent vessels were distinguished 
in certain respects from peaceful trading vessels. 
If aircraft were to be used in war their crews would 
require in some way to be distinguished from the 
civilian population, that is if they were to have the 
benefit of the rules of warfare for the treatment of 
combatants as opposed to non -combatants. Similarly 
belligerent aircraft would require to bear some 
characteristic marks if civilian -$i =craft were not to 
be mistaken for fighting craft. No more suitable medium 
for espionage could be found than the use of aircraft 
and it was not difficult to foresee how confusion 
might arise which would result in the innocent 
occupants of a civilian machine being treated as spies. 
It was, therefore, essential that there should be some 
regularity of principles by which the fact of whether 
or not the occupants of an aircraft were guilty of 
espionage could be ascertained. The position of neutra 
States must be carefully safeguarded and that of 
neutral aircraft made clear. More important still, 
the question of the use by belligerents of the airspace 
above neutral territory must of necessity receive the 
most careful consideration for the gravity of the 
problem could not be over -estimated. A neutral State 
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would require to be protected from the possibility 
of an armed combat occurring in the airspace above 
it, and, of no less importance, wam the question of 
the treatment to be meted out to a belligerent 
aircraft which, quite innocently, found itself over 
neutral territory, or, was forced into neutral 
territory by the elements, or even forced to land, 
all circumstances which the particular character of 
flight made abundantly possible. Yet one other 
problem loomed dark on the horizon. Under the then 
existing rules of warfare, be it on land or on sea, 
the position of the civilian population had been 
scrupulously safeguarded, although, apart perhaps 
from the possibility of bombardment by heavy 
artillery, the position of the non -combatant 
population was comparatively secure, - secure, at 
least, in comparison with the terrible dangers to 
which it would beexposed with the indiscriminate 
use of aircraft by an unscrupulous belligerent. No 
profundity of thought was required to contemplate 
the complete annihilation of the populace of large 
cities, or, indeed, of the whole civilian population, 
by one short, well planned, aerial attack, with 
weapons, the use of which was prohibited by the 
international rules of warfare in so far as the navy 
and the army were concerned. Here at least was one 
problem crying aloud for solution. 
Consideration must now be given to the way 
in which these problems were solved. The attempts 
at solution may conveniently be divided into two 
classes, the first embracing the references in 
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International Conventions and Declarations, and the 
second, the attempts of and suggestions by the 
individual jurists. This latter class consisted 
largely of attempts to draft International Codes of 
law, and I. intend after discussing the first class, 
to base my consideration of the second on a comparison 
of these Codes, which were all founded on that of M. 
Fauchille, being the most comprehensive and complete. 
From 1794, balloons seem to have been used 
regularly in warfare, but it appears that not until 
the Franco- Prussian War was the first public announce: 
:ment made as to their use and the treatment of 
their occupants. In 1870, Bismarck announced that 
the persons on board captured balloons would be 
considered spies, "comme ceux qui fereient des 
"tentative semblables par la voie ordinaire." 
Two years prior, however, in 1868, came the 
Declaration of St. Petersburg that war was a 
contest between armies rather than people and that 
the only legitimate object of war was to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy. This might be 
conveniently taken as the foundation of the aerial 
war code. So also the further Declaration that the 
use of projectiles weighing less than fourteen 
ounces which were explosive or charged with fulminating 
or inflamatory substance was prohibited, would apply 
to aircraft. In 1874, at the Brussels Conference, a 
Resolution was submitted to remove "individuals sent 
in balloons to carry dispatches and generally to 
keep up communications between the different parts 
of an army" from the status of spies, and in 1880, 
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the Institute of International Law confirmed this 
principle. 
The year 1899 saw the First Hague Conference, and 
although aviation was in its infancy and flight by 
heavier- than -air craft unknown, one finds the following 
Declaration:- 
"The Contracting Powers agree to prohibit for a 
'period of five years the discharge of projectiles 
"and explosives from balloons or by other new 
"methods of a similar nature. The present 
"Declaration is only binding on the contracting 
"powers in case of a war between two or more of 
"them. It shall cease to be binding from the time 
"when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of 
"the belligerents is joined by a non -contracting power." 
The further 1999 Declaration prohibiting generally 
the use of projectiles, the sole use of which was the 
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases would 
also apply to aircraft. 
The second Hague Conference did not meet until 
1907, two ears after the foregoing Declaration had 
ceased to have effect. It, however, confirmed the 
Declaration in all respects, except that it was now to 
remain effective until the close of the Third Peace 
Conference, which never met. Nevertheless the 
Declaration was of little worth as there were many 
abstentions from it and the nations which did not 
adhere reserved to themselves the right to bomb any 
place which could be regarded as "defended: 
While the 1899 Declaration was re- affirmed, the 
Second Peace Conference took still further steps 
towards providing for the use of aircraft in war and 
these are to be found embodied in the Regulations on 
Land Warfare and in the Convention respecting Naval 
Bombardment. Artiele 25 of the Regulations of Land 
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Warfare provided that, "the attack or bombardment by 
"any means whatever, of towns, villages, habitations or 
"buildings which are not defended is forbidden." The 
provisions of the Convention respecting Naval Bombard: 
:ment were to be found in its first article whereby 
"the bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, 
towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is prohibited," 
and in Article 2, which excluded from the prohibition 
"military works, military or naval establishments, depots 
"of arms or war material, workshops or plant, which could 
"be utilised for the needs of the hostile fleet or army 
"and the ships of war in the harbour ". The effect of the 
Articles was to prohibit absolutely bombardment from 
the air of towns, villages, habitations and buildings 
which were not defended, that vks, if the words "by any 
means whatever" occurring in the Land Warfare Regulations 
were taken as applying to aircraft, the construction 
which had apparently been contemplated by the Conference. 
Even then the reference was far from complete, and, as 
was indicated by Dr Spaight, taken literally, it 
succeeded in taking from the combatant airman his only 
means of defence and retaliation if he himself was 
attacked from below. (1) 
The Land Warfare Regulations also made reference 
to espionage, a matter, which, as has been seen, had 
already been touched on in 1874 and again in 1880. 
While not defining who would be guilty of espionage, 
from the air, Article 29 inter alla provided that 
"individuals sent in balloons to deliver dispatches, 
"and generally to maintain communications between the 
"various parts of an army or a territory" should be 
regarded as falling within the class of persons which 
(1) Aircraft in War, p. 31 
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would not be considered guilty of espionage. 
Article 53 dealt with the manner in which land 
forces were to treat aircraft found in invaded territory 
"An army of occupation can only take possession of 
"cash, funds, and realisable securities, which are 
"strictly state property, depots of arms, means of 
"transport, stores and supplies, and generally all 
"movable property of the State of a nature to be of use 
"for operations of war. 
All means employed on land, at sea, or in the air 
"for sending messages, for the carriage of persons or 
"things, apart from cases governed by maritime law, 
"depots of arms and generally all kinds of war material 
"may be taken possession of, even though belonging to 
"private persons, but they must be refit& red, and the 
"compensation to be paid for them shall be arranged for 
"on the conclusion of peace." 
Lastly, by Article 23 (e), the use of arms, 
projectiles, or materials calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering was prohibited. This rule also would 
require to be observed by airmen engaged in aerial war: 
:fare. 
The foregoing provisions indicate the full extent 
of international commitment as to the rules governing 
the use of aircraft in war. The individual writers 
went further, indeed they comprehended a rapid develop: 
:ment of flight and their proposals were far reaching. 
Foremost among these was M. Fauchille who drew up a 
very extensive Code consisting of two parts, a Peace 
Code and a War Code. In the former, the principal 
provision was his declatation of freedom of the air, 
and his whole Code must be considered in the light of 
such an opinion. 
M. Fauchille's War Code (2) was divided into four 
Chapters, and the first of these consisted of one 
Article defining the theatre of aerial war. Warlike 
(2) For prints of this Code and also the others to be 
mentioned see Appendices in Spaight, Aircraft in 
War. 
(3. 
acts could be committed by belligerent States above 
their own territories, the sea bounding their coasts 
and above the open sea. Such operations which 
were likely to cause damage were prohibited above the 
territory of neutral states, at whatever height, as 
also in the neighbourhood of these States, within a 
radius determined by the force of the cannon of their 
aircraft. The authority of the neutral State had to 
be obtained before a belligerent State's military 
or public non -military aircraft would be allowed to 
circulate above such neutral State, but both public 
and private craft were forbidden to remain above a 
neutral country within a certain radius of the 
other's frontier. This latter provision prevented 
a form of espionage by which much valuable information 
of theelemy's movements might be obtained. The 
Article ended by declaring that the circulation of 
aircraft in war time was subject to the same 
restrictions as during peace. 
Along with this Article, may be taken 
Article 19 in the Chapter defining the relations of 
neutrals and belligerents, for in this the rights 
of belligerents in neutral atmosphere are more 
explicitly given. Military aircraft of belligerents 
must not remain in such air space for more than 
twenty four hours, unless prevented by damage or 
weather conditions, and if the aircraft of two 
belligerents happen to be there at the same time, 
twenty four hours must elapse between the departure 
of the one and of the other. Unless there are 
particular circumstances, the order of departure is 
determined by the order of arrival. While in 
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neutral atmosphere belligerent aircraft may not do 
anything to augment their military power and the 
position of7 neutral state must not be prejudiced by 
their presence. The only acts they can do are 
those which humanity cannot forbid and which are 
indispensable for enabling them to reach the nearest 
point in their own or an allied country. The 
Article concludes with the declaration that the 
Hague Convention of 1907 relating to neutral rights 
and duties in Maritime War is generally applicable 
to aerial war. Theprovision that military aircraft 
must not do any act which would augment their military 
power would appear to cover any contingency provided for 
in the first Article prohibiting flight within a 
certain radius of the other belligerent's frontiers. 
Other Codes were proposed by M. D'Hooghe, the 
President of the Comité Juridique International de 
L'aviation, by Professor Von Bar., M. le Moyne, and M. 
Philit, while the only British attempt was that of 
Dr Spaight. M. D'Hooghe's Code was identical in most 
respects with that of h. Fauchille but, unlike 
Fauchille, he was of the opinion that the air was a 
res communie. Therefore, in his Code, while belliger: 
:ent States were required to abstain from acts of 
hostility above the territory and territorial waters of 
neutral States, he declared that the circulation 
of Belligerent aircraft, military or otherwise, could 
not be prohibited. Otherwise he was in agreement with 
Fauchille. Dr Spaight, on the other hand, supported 
the principle of sovereignty, and in his Code, bellig: 
:erent aircraft were forbidden to enter the territory, 
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territorial waters, or atmosphere of a neutral power, 
(Art. II). In the following Article the obligation 
was put on neutral States to use due diligence to 
prevent a violation of this prohibition and to take 
steps to take possession of belligerent aircraft which 
did enter, no matter by what means, or under what 
circumstances, detaining the aircraft until peace. 
The crew were to be interned in the same manner as 
land troops in similar circumstances. One exception 
was allowed to the provisions of these two Articles 
in favour of aircraft permanently assigned to a 
battleship so long as it remained in contact therewith. 
M. Lycklama had suggested that an exception to the 
express prohibition of entry of neutral territory 
and atmosphere should be made in respect of neutral 
ports and territorial waters, but Dr Spaight was of 
opinion that the anomalies which would arise if this 
was to be granted would be so great that neutral ports 
and territorial waters should be regarded as falling 
into the same category as the territory and the 
airspace above it. An aircraft entering a neutral 
port on board a battleship, and being in effect part 
of that ship would of necessity require to be allowed 
entry to neutral ports and territorial waters Fith 
the ship itself, hence his exception in favour of 
such aircraft only. Professor Von Bar made no 
reference to the entry of belligerent aircraft over 
neutral territory but did, in an indirect sense, 
prohibit aerial engagements over neutral territory by 
failing to include it when defining where such 
engagements would be allowed, (Art. 2). M. le Moyne 
(3) Hazeltine -"Law in the Air " - Third Lecture. 
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had a similar provision (Art 2) but went further, for in 
Article 3 of his Code he expressly prohibited the 
aircraft of belligerents from entering the atmosphere 
and territory of neutral States, and his eighth 
Article was almost identical with Dr. Spaight's 
provisions. 
Dr Hazeltine did not formulate a Code, but in the 
course of his Lectures (3) he gave particular attention 
to the question of neutral atmosphere. He naturally 
supported the prohibition of flight by belligerent 
aircraft through neutral atmosphere but he had the same 
difficulty in settling what was to be the position of 
neutral ports and territorial water as had M. Lycklama, 
more especially when the belligerent aircraft entered 
neutral territorial waters from over the high seas. In 
the case of neutral ports he was of opinion that "it 
s, would seem just to accord the same privileges to the 
ozone class of vessels (belligerent air vessels) as to 
,the other vessels (belligerent sea vessels)," that is, 
if they entered from above the high seas. So also 
belligerent aircraft should be allowed passage through 
the airspace above neutral territorial waters. If the 
aircraft approached the neutral ports or territorial 
waters through the airspace above land, Dr Hazeltine 
would have dealt with the craft itself and its crew in 
the same manner as was proposed by Dr Spaight. 
The concluding Declaration in Article 19 of M. 
Fauchille's Code, that the principles of the Hague 
Convention relating to the neutral rights and duties in 
maritime war were generally applicable to aerial war, 
(3) Hazeltine - "Law in the Air" - Third Lecture. 
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caused some difficulty as to whether an aircraft being 
constructed in neutral territory for the use of a 
belligerent would fall under the rules applicable to the 
construction and fitting out of a ship, which a neutral 
State was bound to prevent, or under the category of 
"arms, munitions, or anything which could be utilised 
by an army or fleet" which a neutral State could not 
itself export, but which it was not bound to prevent its 
nationals exporting for the use of a belligerent. Dr. 
Spaight maintained in April 1914 that the principle 
applicable to vessels should be extended to aircraft (4) 
but in his Code produced later in that year he stated 
simply in Article 15, 
"A neutral power is not bound to prevent the export or 
transit, on behalf of either belligerent, of aircraft 
or their parts, materials, accessories, or fittings." 
This change of opinion was caused in view of the 
unnecessary burden which would be cast on a neutral 
State by adopting his former view. Neither Professor 
Von Barnor M. le Moyne make reference to this 
particular matter. 
The Second Chapter of M. Fauchille's Code, 
comprising Articles 2 to 18, dealt with the relations 
of belligerents inter se. Privateering was forbidden 
but private aircraft and their crews could be 
incorporated in the military forces of a belligerent 
provided they carried a distinctive mark of their 
character and were under the control of a duly 
commissioned officer, (Art. 2). Conversion of private 
aircraft -pinto military aircraft was allowed under the 
conditions laid down in the Hague Convention relative 
(4) Aircraft in War, p. 89. 
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to the conversion of merchant ships, and in the places 
defined - the territory or territorial waters of the 
State to which they belonged, the territory occupied by 
the troops of that State, the open sea, and in the 
atmosphere, not being above a neutral State. Such 
aircraft could not be reconverted during the whole period 
of hostilities, (Art. 3). The Code of M. D'Hooghe simply 
provided that conversion might be carried out in any 
part of the atmosphere, such conversion being final, 
(Art. 3) . M. le Moyne and Professor Von Bar were again 
silent. 
Dr Spaight made no provision for M. Fauchille's 
change over, but did provide for the treatment of 
civilian airmen engaging in hostilities. The crews of 
all aircraft engaging in any act of hostilities other 
than those falling under the definition of military 
aircraft, were to be brought before the courts as 
unqualified belligerents and their aircraft might be 
confiscated, (Art. 2). His reason for this was that a 
civilian airman constituted a grave danger to the 
opposing belligerent and should refuse to engage in war 
like duties "unless their machines are taken over by the 
"military authorities and given the service marks, in 
"fact turned into regular military aircraft; the airmen 
"themselves could be commissioned or enlisted for the time 
"and supplied with uniform." (5) 
The Fourth Article of ivi. Fauchille's Code applied, 
so far as possible to aerial warfare, certain sections 
of the Hague Réglement concerning the Laws and Customs 
(5) Aircraft in War, p. 51. 
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of War on Land and the succeeding Article provided that 
in accordance with the Hague Declarations the discharge 
from aircraft of projectiles, the sole use of which was 
the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, or 
of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human 
body, would be forbidden. Dr Spaight, on the other hand, 
merely provided that the various Declarations and 
Conventions would apply to aerial warfare in so far as 
not inconsistent with the provisions of his Convention 
(Art. 3). 
The bombardment by aircraft of towns, villages, 
habitations, and buildings which were not defended was 
forbidden by M. Fauchille (Art 6) and the Hague 
Conventions relating to bombardment by land and naval 
forces was applied to aerial warfare. This matter was 
pre -eminently important because it affected the whole 
civilian population. It was well that it should know 
beforehand its fate in any future war and there was 
considerable controversy as to its position. However, 
the general opinion appeared to be that the rules as to 
naval bombardment, at least, would apply to aircraft, 
that war was war, and that the civilian population which 
was sufficiently unfortunate to be near a legitimate 
object of bombardment would require to suffer the 
inevitable consequences of its position if an attack 
took place. Dr Spaight proposed that the Hague 
Conventions should apply as far as possible, but, as an 
additional safeguard, aerial bombardment must in all 
cases be authorised by the Admiral or General in 
command of the force to which the aircraft was attached, 
(Art.10). 
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In the following Article, M. Fauchille defined 
espionage. 
"Aircraft can only be considered suspected of espionage 
"if, acting clandestinely or under false pretences and 
"thus dissimulating their operations, they obtain or 
"seek to obtain, information above the territory or 
"territorial waters of a belligerent, or above territory 
"occupied by his troops, or, in the open sea, above 
"one of his squadrons or ships of war, and, generally 
"in the zone of his operations with the intention of 
"communicating it to the hostile party." 
In view of its importance, I have thought it advisable 
to give the definition in full. The Article further 
declared that, as a result of the definition, soldiers, 
not in disguise, on scouting duty and individuals 
sent in aircraft to carry dispatches and in general 
to maintain communications were not considered spies, 
thus re- iterating almost exactly the Brussels Draft 
Declaration of 1874. The whole Article follows 
closely, the provisions of the Hague Réglement. M. le 
Moyne had a provision identical with that of Fauchille 
but he ommitted the concluding deòlaration, (Art 6). 
Dr. Spaight, however, was dissatisfied with the 
N 
wording of the Reglement, which he considered 
unsatisfactory, and his Article was more elaborate. 
He applied the same test for espionage (Art. 8) but 
distinguished between private and military aircraft. 
The crew of private aircraft were guilty of espionage 
if they obtained or sought to obtain information with 
a view to communicating it to the hostile party, 
and military aircraft in the same circumstances would 
also be guilty of espionage if they attempted to 
disguise the craft's real character or otherwise acted 
under false pretences. An individual landing from an 
aircraft for the purpose of espionage would be dealt 
with under the rules governing espionage in land 
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warfare and aircraft concerned in espionage might be 
confiscated. 
Seizure of public and private aircraft and their 
subsequent treatment was next provided for. According 
to M. Fauchille, the public aircraft of a belligerent 
state were liable to seizure and confiscation (Art.8) 
while, as regards private aircraft, they could be 
seized by a belligerent State above his own or the 
enemy's territory or territorial waters and above the 
open sea, but must be reetöred at the Peace without 
indemnity. (Art. 9) Here again was another highly 
controversial topic. The provision as to public 
aircraft, though not appertaining to military service, 
was peculiar to M. Fauchille's Code. It was on the 
subject of private aircraft that there was divergence 
of opinion. 
The rule of land warfare was that private 
property was in general exempt from seizure and 
destruction except where military necessity demanded 
this; that of maritime warfare that it was not so 
exempt. Under which of these rules was the aircraft 
to fall? M. Fauchille chose a middle course, that 
private aircraft could be seized but not confiscated, 
although at an earlier stage he had advocated confis: 
:cation also. This was the course directed in 
Article 53 of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations with 
regard to aircraft found in invaded territory, 
although compensation was to be paid for aircraft so 
seized at the Peace, a provision which was applied to 
aircraft found in enemy territory, as opposed to above 
it, by Article 18 of M. Fauchille's Code. M. le 
Moyne followed Fauchille with regard to aircraft 
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found in the airspace (Art. 4) but distinguished 
between private and public non-military craft. Both 
could be seized but compensation would be paid in 
respect of the former. Dr. Spaight approved of 
return without indemnity except in one particular 
case which he considered necessary, namely when 
military necessities demanded their destruction. In 
that case compensation would be payable, (Art. 4). 
Article 9 of M. Fauchille's Code further reserved 
the right to confiscate private enemy aircraft 
performing hostile acts or being employed in a 
military task, a provision followed by Dr Spaight in 
the sixth Article of his proposed Code. 
Professor Von Bar dealt somewhat differently 
with these matters. His Code was short and not in any 
way comprehensive. To him it was sufficient to 
provide that private enemy airships might not be 
captured in the air unless they entered voluntarily 
the atmosphere over the enemy's territory or a zone 
of blockade, or unless it was the case of carriage of 
contraband, (Art. 3). He followed this up by a 
mere declaration in Article 6 that private enemy 
airships were forbidden to enter the atmosphere of 
the enemy State. 
M. Fauchille made provision as to the acquisition 
of neutral nationality by enemy aircraft, (Art. 10), 
the exemption from seizure of aircraft charged with 
scientific or philanthropic missions (Art. 16), and 
the treatment of the sick and wounded (Art 17), but 
these are relatively unimportant and generally 
considered at that time to be outwith the scope of an 
aerial Code. His eleventh Article,that the dhatacter 
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of an aircraft, enemy or neutral, should be shown by 
the distinctive mark which it was entitled to carry, 
met with no opposition and was foliwed in all the 
other Codes. 
The Articles 12 to 15 were of more importance. 
The captain and crew of private enemy aircraft or 
public non -military aircraft were not to be made 
prisoners of war, but left at liberty, and that, 
whether they were subjects of the enemy or a neutral 
State, (Art. 12). That they should be left at liberty 
did not appeal to Dr Spaight. He thought that a 
civilian airman was too valuable an asset of a bellig: 
:erent to be allowed absolute freedom, and suggested 
that at first, at least, such crews should be entitled 
to the privileges of prisoners of war, (Art. 9). 
The destruction of private enemy aircraft or of 
public enemy aircraft was only to be pert .itted under 
the exceptional circumstances of the aircraft acting 
as, in fact, military aircraft, or, resisting the 
legitimate exercise of the right of capture. The 
destruction could not be carried out until after a 
special summons had been made, (Art. 13). M. le Moyne 
had a similar provision to the effect that a captor 
could destroy aircraft opposing the legitimate exercise 
of the right of seizure but only after the non - 
complàíice of a previous summons (Art. 4) . Dr Spaight 
once again went further with his proposals. By Article 
7 of his proposed Code, private enemy aircraft could 
be destroyed if they disobeyed a belligerent's orders 
or his prescribed signal to land. In this he followed 
M. Fauchille, but in two other cases, namely where such 
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aircraft engage in hostilities or espionage, or in 
cases where circumstances are such that a belligerent 
is forced by imperative military necessity to omit 
the signal or warning to land which humanity demands, 
then the aircraft can be destroyed without any prey: 
:ious notice or warning. Such a course he justified 
on the grounds that if civilian airmen ventured too 
far they would require to take the risk of being 
disposed of in the same manner as military crews.(6) 
There was much to be said for this attitude. 
Article 14 made it clear that enemy aircraft 
descending on the territory of a belligerent could be 
captured, and the following Article made very full 
provision for private aircraft of a belligerent being 
in enemy territory at the outbreak of war, and, 
aircraft quitting their last port of departure before 
hostilities and arriving in hostile territory without 
iu 
the knowledge of such hostilies, being seized only 
/\ 
if no days of grace had been allowed for their 
departure from enemy territory, or, if such days had 
elapsed without being taken advantage of. Such days 
of grace were not to be allowed to aircraft, the 
construction of which showed that they were intended 
as war aircraft. Public non- military aircraft were 
to obtain the benefit of any "days of grace" allowed, 
and private aircraft encountered in the airspace, 
even although ignorant of hostilities, were to be 
liable to seizure in the same way as all other private 
aircraft. This was an attempt to apply maritime 
principles and pungent criticism was levelled at the 
Article, not without reason, by Dr Spaight, (7) who 
(6) Aircraft in War, p. 78 
(7) Aircraft in War, pp. 85 -88 
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who maintained that the provisions were quite useless. 
that 
Certainly it would seem /to deny the days of grace to 
aircraft intended for war aircraft in itself takes the 
very foundation away and the whole structure of the 
Article must collapse, for what aircraft is not suitable 
for use as a war aircraft? 
The relations of neutrals and belligerents were 
covered by the Third Chapter of M. Fauchille's Code, 
embracing Articles 19 to 28. Of these, the first has 
already been considered. Under Article 20 aerial 
navigation of neutral aircraft was to be prohibited in 
all parts of the atmosphere dominating the territory 
of belligerent States, as well as within a radius of 
11,000 metres from their frontiers. Of aircraft 
contravening this prohibition, those guilty of 
espionage would be treated as ordinary spies while the 
aircraft of others would be confiscated unless their 
entry was the result of force majeure. To M. D'Hooghe 
this Article was, of course, incompatible and in place 
thereof he provided that the aerial navigation of 
neutral countries remained free, only aircraft guilty 
of espionage being confiscated (Art. 22). The 
corresponding Article of Professor Von Bar was permissive 
in its terms - a belligerent might forbid neutral ships 
to enter the atmosphere overlying his territory, (Art.7) 
while the second part of M. le Moyne's Third Article 
made the prohibition absolute in all cases. M. 
Pauchille's provisions did not appeal to Dr. Spaight, 
especially the provision as to flying within a certain 
specified radius of the frontiers of a belligerent, and 
he accordingly ptoposed that where the frontiers of a 
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neutral State bordered those of a belligerent, the 
neutral power must use all means at its disposal to 
prevent its atmosphere from being used for the purpose 
of obtaining information on behalf of one belligerent, 
of the movements, defences, etc., of the other,(Art.16). 
M. Pauchille further elaborated his provisions in 
the Article which follwed. Where there was a blockade 
with an effective area of more than 11,000 metres 
neutral aircraft might not approach any point in this 
area; neutral aircraft in a blockaded port might leave 
it; and the Rules of the Declaration of London (1909) 
as to blockade would apply in aerial war also. No 
similar provisions appeared in the other proposed Codes. 
The following three Articles all dealt with the 
matter of contraband. Articles constituting contraband 
of war might be confiscated on board neutral as well as 
on enemy aircraft (Art, 22); the rules laid down in the 
Declaration of London (1909) would be followed in 
determining what constituted contraband of war (Art.23), 
and aircraft their distinctive component parts and 
accessories, articles and materials of the special 
character of aircraft stores, would fall under the 
classification of "conditional contraband" confiscable 
only if destined for the use of the armed forces or 
Government Department of the enemy (Art.24). 
M. D'Hooghe had an identidal provision but 
further proposed specifically that postal corresponden 
would in the circumstances given be regarded as 
inviolable. M. le Moyne's only reference was contained 
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in his Ninth Article which was couched in similar 
terms to Fauchille's Twenty fourth, and Professor Von 
Bar's reference was to the effect that the seizure 
and confiscation of neutral airships and their 
cargoes as contraband was forbidden unless when they 
were actually assisting a blockaded coast line or the 
enemy army or fleet in the theatre of war. 
The Declaration of London classed as "conditional 
contraband" "Balloons and flying machines and their 
"distinctive component parts as well as accessories, 
"articles, and materials distinctively pertaining to 
"aerostation or aviation," but viewed conditional 
contraband merely as cargo. Dr Spaight had difficulty 
in making a hard and fast rule covering all aircraft, 
especially those sent by air. Besides, as has been 
seen, he provided that private aircraft could only be 
seized. This being so, no harder rule could be 
applied to neutral aircraft on the way to become 
private property. (8) His Article, therefore, 
proposed that aircraft consigned by a neutral contract: 
:or, by way of the air, to enemy territory could only 
be seized if designed or fitted for use in war, or, 
if not so designed or fitted for use in war, then it 
was proved to be destined for the use of the armed 
forces, or, of a Government Department of the enemy, 
(Art. ;9) Such aircraft could only be destroyed if 
demanded by imperative military necessity, in which 
case compensation would be arranged at the peace. 
Otherwise the seized aircraft must be restored without 
indemnity. 
(8) Aircraft in War, p. 83. 
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By Article 25, M. Fauchille applied to neutral 
aircraft the provisions of the Declaration of London 
relative to unneutral service, and there was to be 
a presumption of such service, justifying capture, 
against neutral aircraft circulating above belligerent 
States. Then by Article 26, neutral aircraft might be 
destroyed under the same conditions as belligerent 
aircraft, and by the immediately following Article, 
Neutral aircraft descending in belligerent territory 
owing to accident or forced descent might be seized and 
confiscated in the cases and subject to the conditions 
specified in his preceding Articles, thus assimilating 
as to treatment, aircraft in flight and also when 
forced to descend. 
Much the same effect was reached by Dr. Spaight, 
who, by Article 20, applied to neutral aircraft the 
provisions operative with regard to belligerent aircraft 
in corresponding circumstances, that is, the aircraft 
themselves would be confiscated, fired upon, dndangered, 
or destroyed in flight in the same circumstances as 
would private enemy craft, and the crew treated in the 
same way as those of other than enemy military aircraft 
engaging in acts of hostilities or being guilty of 
estionage. M. D'Hooghe followed Pauchille except in so 
far as he added an Article providing for "visit ", of 
private neutral aircraft, a provision not made by the 
others on account of the serious difficulties and 
complications which would arise by endeavouring to enforce 
it, and Professor Von Bar only proposed that neutral 
airships must not be fired upon without previous 
warning, and must not be fired upon if compelled by 
accident to land. 
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. Fauchille concluded his proposed rules on 
the relations of belligerents and neutrals by the 
provision that., as regards aircraft belonging to 
the latter in the territories of belligerents, the 
subjects of neutral States would be on the same 
footing as those of belligerent States, (Art. 28) 
Finally, his Code was completed by a Chapter, 
consisting of but one Article, on Aerial Prizes. 
The adjudication of such prizes was to be subject to 
the same rules as maritime prizes; unless the seizure 
of an aircraft or its cargo could be justified, there 
would be a claim for damages, if it was not upheld 
by the Courts,_ or was not maintained; and, where the 
aircraft was destroyed, unless in the circumstances 
where such a course was justified, the captor would 
be bound to indemnify the persons interested, whether 
the seizure was valid or not. While these were 
far -seeing, and, in the light of subsequent events, 
necessary provisions, they were not considered of 
sufficient importance at the time to warrant 
inclusion in the other proposed Codes, except that of 
Professor Von Bar who applied the maritime rules in 
the exceptional cases mentioned in his Code, where 
seizure and confiscation of neutral airships and 
their cargoes as contraband was permitted. 
It will thus be evident that, even before 1914, 
the revision of the rules of warfare occasioned by 
the coming of aircraft had been the subject of a 
fairly exhaustive study by certain of the jurists 
whose solutions of the problem had been worked out 
in considerable detail. The early recognition of 
90. 
the necessity for a unified Code is significant, and 
it is one of the curious variances of history, that, 
while this was so, the law in times of peace obtained 
its Code not many years later, while the rules in times 
of war are, perhaps further than ever before from 
being the subject of an agreed International Code. 
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Chapter 5. The Beginnings of International, National, and 
Municipal Legislation. 
I have so far confined my eOnsideration of 
aviation law to an enumeration of the problems to 
which flight gave rise and the opinions of the 
individual jurists and legal bodies thereon, but it 
must not be assumed that before 1914 no actual attempts, 
had beeh made to legislate for the use of aircraft. 
On the contrary, several years before the outbreak 
of War, States had commenced to enact laws to 
regulate some of the more important matters concerning 
aircraft, and municipalities, also, had begun to 
make regulations. Further, there had been internat: 
:ional agreement on a fair number of questions as 
early as 1910. Some of these have already been 
referred to, but the purpose of the present chapter 
is to summarise, in chronological order some of the 
more important legislation, from which it will be 
more readily seen how far the law in relation to 
aircraft had left the realms of mere theory and 
become an actual and accomplished fact. 
1910 The International Aeronautic Federation must be 
regarded as the first air organisation. It began 
its existence in 1905 and from that date exercised 
considerable authority on aerial sporting events and 
competitions. It was largely on its recommendation 
and by the efforts of the Aero Cluh of France that a 
Conference was called in Paris in May 1910 to 
consider the question of framing an International 
Code of Law for the regulation of Aerial Navigation. 
It was on the vexed question of sovereignty of the 
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airspace that the fate of the Code was decided, for, 
as agreement on this point was not possible, no 
Code could be completed. Nevertheless,.a comparatively 
complete draft Code was formulated and its clauses 
are important as indicating the extent of Internation: 
:al Agreement in 1910. 
At the outset the word "aircraft ", which had 
hitherto been used in a general sense, was given a 
more precise definition. The term was to be regarded 
as comprising "Free Balloons, airships, and flying 
machines" (Art. 1). 
Next, agreement was attained on the matter of 
nationality and registration of aircraft but only 
after a considerable conflict of opinion, and it 
was of a vague and unsatisfactory nature. It was 
left to each country to determine nationality of an 
aircraft on the basis, either of the nationality of 
its owner, or, on his domicile in its territory. It 
was further provided that a State would require that 
the owner, if a national, should be domiciled in its 
territory, and aircraft owned by foreigners domiciled 
in its territory could also be placed on its national 
register. If the aircraft belonged to a corporate 
society or joint stock company, the company's head 
office must be situated in the territory of the State 
on whose register it appeared. (Art. 3) The State 
which conferred nationality on an aircraft was 
required to enter it on a Register, (Art 6), and a 
Certificate of Nationality *as to be issued. (Art 8) . 
It was also agreed that every aircraft must be 
provided with a Certificate of Navigability (Art.12) 
and that the pilot and chief mechanic must be 
licensed (Art 14). Such Certificates and Licences 
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when issued by one State were to be recognised by the 
other contracting States, (Art. 18). 
The Conference having proceeded so far, now 
endeavoured to settle the "admission of aerial navig: 
:ation within the limits of, or above, the territory of 
a foreign State" but, further than this heading, 
agreement could not be reached. Notwithstanding, it is 
interesting to see that despite a failure to obtain 
unanimity on the matter of sovereignty, it was possible 
to agree that "forbidden zones" could be created and 
provision was made for landing, by a pilot finding 
himself over such a zone. (Arts 21 -24). The regulations 
to be observed on departure, on landing, and during 
flight contained little controversial matter, covering 
as they did the documents required to be carried, the 
rules of the air, which had a close resemblance to the 
maritime rules, and the notification of wrecks. 
Provision was made for Customs formalities and trans: 
:portation, the latter being almost entirely confined to 
restricting transportation of passengers and goods in 
the interests of each contracting State. 
Public aircraft were specially provided for. They 
were classified as (a) Public aircraft, defined as 
"aircraft employed in the service of a contracting State 
and placed under the orders of a duly commissioned 
official of that State" (Art 40), (b) military aircraft, 
which were "public aircraft ib military service when 
"they are under the orders of a commander in uniform and 
"have on board a certificate proving their military 
"character ", (Art 41); and (c) police aircraft, being 
1911. 
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"Public aircraft employed in the service of the police, 
especially that of the departments of public safety, 
public health or customs," (Art.47). Such aircraft were 
placed in a special category, and, while the Conference 
could not decide the rights of private aircraft of one 
State in the airspace above the territory of another 
contracting State, the States represented were in no 
doubt at all as to the rights of military aircraft in 
such airspace. Article 44 was explicit in its terms. 
"The departure or landing of the military aircraft of a 
"contracting State in the territory of another State will 
"only be allowed with the latter's authorisation. 
"Moreover, each Contracting State is free to forbid or to 
"regulate as its interests demand, the passage of the 
'Military aircraft of the other contracting States over 
"its territory," 
The forced landing of military aircraft was duly 
safeguarded. 
Lastly, among the final provisions, it was proposed 
that the Convention was not to restrict the freedom of 
action of belligerents or affect the rights and duties 
of neutrals, (Art. 49). 
In 1910, also, there must be noted the Prussien 
Ordnance under which a Pilot had to be licensed before 
undertaking flights over places where the general public 
might be endangered. (1) 
The succeeding year, 1911, brought considerable 
advancement in the field of aviation law and legislation 
of no little importance was enacted. That year saw the 
first legislation in Great Britain, the Aerial Navigation 
Act, 1911, (2) or, to give it its long title, "An Act to 
(1) R.J.L.A., 1910, p. 346. 
(2) I. Geo V. Cap. 4. 
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"provide for the protection of the public against the 
"dangers arising from the navigation of Aircraft." 
It enacted that "a Secretary of State may, for the 
purpose of protecting the public from danger, from time 
to time, by Order, prohibit the navigation of aircraft 
over such areas as may be prescribed in the Order 
The Order could apply to all aircraft generally or to 
certain classes only and the prohibition could be either 
absolute or partial. The person contravening the Order 
was to be guilty of an offence and could be imprisoned 
in the first instance. 
During this year, in America, are to be found fur: 
:ther rules concerning the licensing of pilots, both 
in the Act drafted by the Aero Club of Pennsylvania (3) 
and also in a draft Connecticut Act (4). Further, a 
French Presidential Décret was issued on 21st November, 
1911, based largely on the 1910 Draft Convention. 
Detailed Rules of the Air were given, and provision 
made for customs formalities and the like, but perhaps 
of greatest moment was the statement, "La circulation 
en France des aéronefs militaires étrangers est 
interdite." 
In 1911 a Draft Bill was prepared in Great Britain 
for the Home Office. Although not adopted either by 
that Department or by the Government, the draft Bill 
marked a very definite stage in aeronautical legis: 
:lation. Its preamble was illuminating. "Whereas the 
sovereignty and rightful jurisdiction of His Majesty 
"extends, and has always extended over the air super: 
n :incumbent on all parts of His Majesty's Dominions, 
nand the territorial waters adjacent thereto." 
This left no doubt as to the official British 
(3) R.J.L.A., 1911, p. 247. 
(4) do. do. 
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attitude on the question, and, having laid down 
this principle, the Secretary of State was empowered 
by Order, to regulate aerial navigation over the 
iiritish Islands and territorial waters adjacent thereto, 
and, in particular, to create prohibited areas and 
corridors of entry, and to prohibit, restrict, or 
regulate the carriage of various persons and goods. 
Furthermore, the Act proposed to settle immedi ately 
the equally difficult question of the cujus est solum 
maxim and its application, and purposed enacting as 
f o l hays: - 
"Sect. 12(1) - The flight of an aircraft over any land 
"in the British Islands shall not in itself bpdeemed to 
"be trespass, but nothing in this provision shall affect 
"the rights and remedies of any person in respect of 
"any injury to property or person caused by an aircraft 
"or by any person carried therein and any injury caused 
"by the assembly of persons upon the landing of an 
"aircraft shall be deemed to be the natural and probable 
"consequence of such landing." 
It was further provided that the aircraft itself could 
be seized and detained to pay the damages awarded and 
costs incidental to the proceedings. The section was 
wide in its terms and open to serious criticism. For 
one thing, it took outwith the scope of an action for 
trespass and nuisance all flight, no matter at what 
height and under what circumstances, and could 
conceivably have made the position of the landowner 
intolerable. Nevertheless it was a step in the right 
direction and would have avoided any further discussion 
as to the application of the maxim. The case of Scott's 
Trustees v. Moss (5) must have been in the mind of the 
draughtsman when he inserted the concluding words of 
the subsection. 
(5) supra: 1889, 17 R. 32. 
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It was to the Board of Trade that the control 
of aviation was assigned. While the Secretary of 
State was empowered, by Order, to make such provision 
as might appear best calculated to prevent damage 
and nuisance caused by aircraft, this end was also 
obtained by authorising the Board'of Trade to make 
provision for the certification of the airworthiness 
of the aircraft themselves and of the competency of 
the officers. The Board would further make the 
necessary regulations to prevent collisions in the air. 
These were to be known as "collision regulations ". 
Infringement of such regulations gave rise to some 
divergence of opinion and two alternative solutions 
were given. In the first, where the infringement was 
caused by the wilful default of the "owner or navig: 
:ator" of the aircraft, such "owner or navigator" would 
be guilty of a misdemeanour; and where damage to 
property was caused by the non -observance of such 
regulations, the damage was to be deemed to have been 
occasioned by the wilful default of the person in 
charge of the aircraft, unless it could be proved 
satisfactorily that the circumstances made such 
departure from theregulations necessary. In the 
second, these stringent provisions were relaxed. The 
"person in charge of the aircraft at the time" was 
put in as a third alternative to the "owner or 
navigator "; and, as regards damage to property, the 
onus now lay with the navigator, and all wilful default 
was presumed to be his, but it was provided that 
"if the navigator proves to the satisfaction of the 
"court that he issued proper orders for the observance, 
"and used due diligence to enforce, the observance of 
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the collision regulations, and that the whole 
responsibility for the infringement in question rested 
with some other person, the navigator shall be exempt 
from any punishment under this provision." 
With regard to wreck and salvage, any person 
finding a lost or wrecked aircraft was to report it 
to the police or other proper authority and the 
provisions of the 1910 Paris Convention were followed 
as to payment of salvage. 
British nationality would be given to an aircraft 
only if it was owned by persons having British 
Nationality as laid down in the Act, and only such 
British aircraft could be registered in the manner 
prescribed by the Board of Trade. 
Finally, an attempt was made to lay down some 
rules on the subject of "jurisdiction ". In the first 
place, any offence under the Act was, for this 
purpose, to be deemed to have been committed "In the 
place in or over which the same was actually committed 
or in any place in which the defender may be." In the 
second place, where any person being a British subject 
was charged with having committed any offence on board 
any British aircraft in the air, over the high seas, 
or over any foreign country, or, on board any foreign 
aircraft to which he does not belong, or, not being a 
British subject, was charged with having committed any 
offence on board any British aircraft in the air over 
the high seas, and that person was found within the 
jurisdiction of any court in Isis Majesty's Dominions, 
which would have had cognisance of the offence if it 
had been committed on board a British aircraft within 
the limits of its jurisdiction, that court should have 
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jurisdiction to try the offence as if it had been so 
committed. In the third place, where the offence was 
committed in the air ahoye British territory or territ: 
:orial waters it should be deemed to have been 
committed either in the place where it was actually 
committed or in any place in which the defender might 
be. Indeed a curious mixture of legal principles in an 
endeavour to cast around the delinquent aeronaut the 
widest possible net to make sure that he would be made 
to answer for his crimes if at all possible. 
In Germany, detailed Regulations were issued 
under which the German Airship League was officially 
recognised and became the organ through which licences 
were issued. The Pilots of dirigible and non- dirigible 
airships were required to possess Certificates of 
Competence issued by the Airship League. No provision 
was made for the issue generally of airworthiness 
certificates in respect of the aircraft themselves 
but, if passengers were to be carried, experts must 
have pronounced the craft and its fittings suitable 
for the purpose, and, during the ascent, it was 
necessary to have an official of a recognised airship 
society or local police representative on board. The 
safety of persons on the subjacent territory was 
looked to in the provisions that persons not in 
possession of a Certificate of Competence could only 
fly at specially selected places, or at places where 
the public security would not be endangered. Flight 
was unrestricted to competent airmen outside of 
inhabited places although the police could make 
regulations, and they were warned against flying over 
large towns. They were altogether prohibited from 
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flying over places where there was danger of fire, or 
masses of telegraph and telephone wires, as well as 
over fortresses, and within ten kilometres of such 
fortresses. Persons infringing this latter regulation 
were to be suspected of espionage. 
1912. The year 1912 is important, marking as it does, 
the first attempt at municipal regulations, when \Paris 
Prefect of Police made provisions dealing with flight 
over that city by aeroplanes and dirigible and free 
balloons. Landing within the city of Paris or 
Communes of the Seine Department was forbidden and the 
aircraft referred to must fly at such a height as 
would enable them to land free of buildings. Should 
there be a forced landing the aircraft was to be 
dismantled and removed to the nearest starting ground 
outwith the area. No ballast, other than fine sand, 
was to be dropped overboard. 
In July, Russia established Forbidden Zones, 
being the first country actually to do so although 
the British Act of the previous year had opened the 
door for such areas being defined. At the end of 
the year Austria (6) approved of legislation dealing 
with measures of the police against attempts upon 
the public or private security::.byaerial locomotion 
vehicles, and, in the following month, the prohibited 
areas, which the Ordonnance foreshadowed, were 
announced. 
1913 During 1913, there was further important 
legislation. In Great Britain, an Act (7) was passed 
to amend that of 1911. The powers of the Secretary 
(6) Q.D.I., 1913, Documents, p. 73. 
(7) 2 & 3 Geo.V. cap. 22. 
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of State with regard to prohibited areas was extended 
in two respects. In the first place, to the 
purposes for which such areas could be prescribed, 
was added the defence orsafety of the realm, and, in 
the second place, the possible extent of such areas 
was enlarged to embrace the coast line of the United 
Kingdom and the territorial waters adjacent thereto. 
Further, the Secretary could now prescribe "the 
"areas within which aircraft coming from any place 
"outside the United Kingdom are to land and the other 
"conditions to be complied with by such aircraft." 
Power was also given to compel aircraft flying over 
any forbidden area to land after it had been duly 
signalled to do so. The Act was followed by two 
Statutory Rules and Orders in March and September 
respectively. The former defined the prohibited 
areas and corridors of entry, specified compulsory 
landing grounds, and detailed the procedure to be 
observed by visiting aircraft, while the latter 
prohibited the flight of aircraft over London within 
a radius of four miles of Charing Cross. 
In France, two further Décrets (8) were issued. 
The first was short and dealt with the treatment of 
aircraft in times of national emergency. There was 
to be an absolute prohibition of flight in the 
event of a total or partial mobilisation, and the 
order for such mobilisation would in itself have the 
effect of bringing this prohibition into force. The 
second was longer, and re- iterated to a great extent 
that of two years previous, with the changes and 
additions which the experience gained during that time 
(8) R.J.L.A., 1914, pp. 12-19. 
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demanded. The Service des Mines was the Department 
charged with the issue of Certificates of Navigability, 
and aircraft could only be registered on production 
of such a Certificate. It was provided that once an 
aircraft had been examined and a Certificate issued, 
aircraft of a similar type would be granted Certific: 
:ates of Navigability without examination if it was 
certified that they were exactly the same as that in 
respect of which the first Certificate was issued. 
The letter "F" was to be painted on all aircraft owned 
by foreigners domiciled in France, as well as by 
Frenchmen. Lastly, military aircraft were classified 
in the same manner as in the draft Convention framed 
by the Paris Confeueñce in 1910. They were required 
to be under the orders of a commandant wearing 
uniform and must carry a certificate establishing their 
military character. 
Legislation was drafted in Holland (9), peculiar 
in that it provided for the licensing of pilots but 
not of the aircraft itself, and Regulations appeared 
in Serbia during February and March (10). These 
latter Regulations were wonderfully complete and 
exhaustive and were almost severe in their attempts 
to provide for safety. The Ministers of the Interior 
and of War were entrusted with the task of controlling 
aviation. The formr would grant Certificates of 
Airwotthiness in respect of the machines and the 
latter would issue the necessary Licences to pilots, 
(9) R.J.L.A., 1914, p. 95. 
(10) R.J.L.A., 1914, p. 158. 
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but, still further, was it provided that there should 
be no flight during stormy weather or at night. The 
flight Of foreign military aircraft was prohibited 
both in peace and in war, and all other aircraft 
were forbidden to fly over Serbian territory during 
mobilisation or war unless permitted to do so by 
authority of both Ministers. In addition, foreign 
aircraft could only enter Serbian territory at the 
at 
places and /thetimes fixed by the customs authorities 
and were obliged to land immediately. They could 
only, continue their flight along the routes 
.prescribed by the Police Authorities. 
In America, the State of Massachusetts (11) 
produced an Act intended primarily to provide for 
the public safety, and is important only in so far 
as it is an example of the type of legislation which 
was prevalent in the various American States and 
which was enacted hurriedly and by persons who had 
little knowledge of aeronautics. To the Highway 
Commission of Massachusetts was given the duty of 
licensing aircraft and pilots after examination. 
Aircraft were to be given a registered number which 
was to be painted on them so as to be visible from 
below. Rules of the air were given and certain 
restrictions were put on flight. For instance, 
aircraft were prohibited from flying over an 
assembly of one hundred persons or more; they could 
only fly over cities at a height of over three 
thousand feet and over towns and villages at heights 
over five hundred and a thousand feet according to the 
(11) R.J.L.A. 1913, p. 216. 
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number of the inhabitants; and could only fly over 
buildings, persons, or animals at a height conducive 
to safety. An aviator was liable for injuries 
resulting from his flying unless he could demonstrate 
that he had taken every possible precaution to prevent 
injury. There was to be no landing on public highways, 
public parks, or other public grounds except in cases 
of emergency. As an example of the careless manner in 
which this legislation was drafted there may be quoted 
the case of the first proppective aviator who applied 
for a Licence under the Act. He was informed that, 
as the Act made no provision for constituting the 
necessary examining Board, a Licence could not be 
issued. He flew without one, crashed, and was 
charged with flying without a Licence contrary to 
the terms of the Act. To the court which tried him 
must go the credit of excusing him on hearing his 
explanation. 
The year 1913 was, however, productive of yet 
another type of legislation, the Franco -German Accord 
(12) which marked the first definite stage of 
International Agreement in aviation law. It provided 
for the entry of French aircraft into Germany and of 
German aircraft into France on conditions of 
reciprocity. The main points were that the military 
aircraft of one country could only circulate over the 
territory of the other, or land, on invitation. 
Entry might be allowed in cases of necessity, but in 
that case a distress signal was to be made and a 
landing effected. On this being done the nearest 
(12) R.'.I., 1913, pp. 697 et seq. 
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military authority was to be advised, when the 
alleged necessity would be enquired into and action 
taken in accordance with the result. The Governments 
of the two countries were to advise one another as to 
the distinguishing marks borne by their respective 
aircraft. The entry of other aircraft was admitted, 
except over prohibited areas, on condition that the 
aircraft was licensed and carried the proper identif:.. 
:ication marks, and that the pilot held a certificate 
of proficiency and carried papers certifying his 
nationality, and a passport. The entry of aircraft 
not complying with these requirements would only be 
permitted in case of necessity, in which case also 
they must give signals of distress, and land, in this 
case, however, notifying the nearest civil authority 
of the position. 
1914. Thus far had aviation law developed when the 
year 1914 dawned. The European States were 
nervously regarding every movement of their neigh; 
:bours. War was imminent and aircraft were now to 
be used to an extent, and in a manner in which the 
early jurists in the wildest flights of their 
imagination had never conceived, but before 
progressing further a short recapitulation is perhaps 
desirable. 
Certain characteristics had so far marked 
the first stages of the development of the law. 
Apart from regulations, such as Customs regulations, 
having for their main purpose the compliance by 
aircraft and their crews with the formalities to be 
observed by other forms of transport, and which 
regulations were wholly matters to be decided by the 
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internal legislation of each particular State, its 
development had been influenced, on the one hand, 
by the danger to the States themselves occasioned by 
the use of aircraft as weapons of war, and, on the 
other, by the danger to their inhabitants occasioned 
by the normal incidents of flight. In this latter 
respect all the actual legislation had tended to secure 
safety by certification of the machine and its crew, 
or by one or other of these means,( of the Serbian 
Regulations.\ There was, no doubt, some divergence of 
opinion on the part of the individual jurists, but 
international agreement was not unattainable. So also 
agreement had been reached on the question of national: 
:ity of the craft, the papers it would require to tarry, 
and the distinguishing marks it would need to have. 
Questions of jurisdiction were not, perhaps, so easily 
settled, although in many instances the rules of 
private international law already in existence could 
be invoked. The other outstanding difficulties could 
be met by legislation along the lines of the draft 
British Bill of 1911. 
As regards the first of the two dangers - that of 
the States themselves by the use of aircraft as a 
weapon of war - international agreement seemed still 
impossible. And yet to what did the difference of 
opinion amount? Much had been said of ownership of 
the airspace, of the air as a res communis, and of the 
air as entirely free, but all legislation so far 
enacted had one significant feature. Whatever might 
be the position of private aircraft and other public 
aircraft, the military aircraft of one State were 
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invariably prevented from entering the airspace of 
another. Surely, in itself, an admission of sovereign: 
:ty of some kind. Again, the various enactments 
disclosed an almost universally recognised right to 
each State to prescribe prohibited areas. So too, 
Customs formalities demanded at least fixed landing 
grounds, and even fixed areas of the frontiers- or 
coast lines over which aircraft coming from abroad 
must enter, It might, therefore, be said that all 
freedom of the air amounted to was the right of a 
small class of aircraft, private aircraft, to pass 
over the territory of other States without landing. 
Yet this had so far proved the stumbling block. 
Great Britain, although imposing severe 
restrictions on the entry and landing of foreign 
aircraft, amounting indeed, in the eyes of her critics 
at home and abroad, to prohibitions, was not alone 
in this respect, and the time was now at hand when 
all European nations were to follow suit. On 31st 
July, 1914, a French Décret prohibited flight over 
French territory and territorial waters. Two days 
later by a Home Office Order, the flight of civil 
aircraft over the United Kingdom was prohibited, 
except within a radius of three miles of a recognised 
aerodrome. Almost simultaneously, the frontiers of 
the remaining States were closed, and aircraft, and 
the law in relation thereto had entered a new era in 
their development. 
PART II. 
THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT WAR. 
108. 
CEapter n The Effects of the Great War. 
The hopes and fears of those who had foreseen the 
immense possibilities open to a belligerent by the use 
of aircraft as a weapon of war were early fulfilled. 
Indeed, the German Declaration of War - the letter 
handed by the German Ambassador to the French Foreign 
Minister on 3rd August, 1914, - gave as the reasons for 
declaring War the flagrantly hostile acts committed on 
German territory by French military aviators, their 
violation of Belgian neutrality, their attempt to 
destroy buildings near Wesel, and the throwing of bombs 
by them near Nuremberg. 
Thus aircraft were used in the opening days of 
that long conflict and their continued use had several 
important effects on the proposed Rules of Aerial 
Warfare. The Declaration of War was the signal for a 
general disregard of even the Hague Declarations, as 
it was for the whole International Rules of Warfare. 
Yet out of the turmoil there did emerge certain guiding 
factors for any future aerial war Code which might be 
agreed upon. 
To begin with, the question of sovereignty came to 
be regarded from a severely practical and not merely 
theoretical standpoint and the case for each State 
having complete sovereignty in the airspace ahoye its 
territory usque ad coelum was overwhelming. It could 
not possibly have been otherwise. 
This recognition of sovereign rights usque ad 
coelum had an important bearing on the question of the 
use of the atmosphere superincumbent on neutral States. 
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Each case of the entry of belligerent aircraft over 
neutral territory was at once the cause of a protest 
being addressed to the belligerent concerned, and, as 
in most cases the entry was unintentional, an apology 
and an undertaking to make goad any damage occasioned 
was accepted. Even in such cases, however, Holland 
reserved the right to open fire on belligerent aircraft 
without previous warning as it did when the German 
airship L. 19. was compelled by force majeure to enter 
the airspace above its territory. There was one 
curious incident in this connection when British 
aeroplanes flew over Swiss territory. The British 
Government, while expressing regret, added that that 
was not in itself to be interpreted as a recognition 
by the British Government, one of the most ardent 
protagonists of sovereignty, of the existence of a 
sovereignty of the air. It is difficult to reconcile 
this with the avowed British attitude towards 
sovereignty which had been the cause of the Paris 
Conference of 1910 failing to reach agreement. There 
do not appear to have been many cases of neutral 
aircraft penetrating belligerent atmosphere but in at 
least one case such neutral aircraft were heavily 
fired on. 
The pious resolutions regarding the 
prohibition of various projectiles and the use of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases - the Declaration 
of St. Petersburg and the Hague Declarations - were 
flagrantly broken both in land and aerial warfare, 
and the bombardment of the civilian population was 
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carried out by Germany without regard to any 
existing Rules. The Allied Powers, however, followed 
the Naval Rule that naval and military objectives 
situate in towns were legitimate targets thus 
abandoning the Land Warfare Rule which made bombard: 
:ment of a town conditional on its being defended. 
While the law regulating the use of aircraft in 
t;, 
warfare was this profoundly affected by the advent of 
the Great War, its effect did not end there, and the 
development of the law in times of peace was also 
considerably influenced. In fact it would be 
difficult to over -estimate the impression made by the 
War on the technical development of aircraft, a 
development without parallel in history. In the words 
of a recent Government Report, 
"the ensuing struggle for military supremacy resulted 
"in the forced growth and abnormal development of 
"aircraft" (1) 
so much so, that in the short space of four years, 
what had, at the outset, been a mere weapon of war 
became an all important means of transport and 
communication with almost unlimited possibilities. 
A corresponding growth of aviation law was the 
inevitable result of this rapid development in the 
uses to which flying machines could be put. Although 
it had occupied the minds of the various legislatures 
some little time before it was not until the peace 
that this took effect. If the development of the 
law is to be seen in its true perspective, however, 
and its significance fully understood, an attempt 
must first be made to set forth the exact nature of 
the development of aviation itself. 
(1) Cmd. 4654 (1934), p. 22. 
This was twofold, technical development and 
control. The former was all important for it meant 
that the aircraft became more reliable and could, 
therefore, he used for an ever increasing number of 
purposes. But more than that, the direct effect of 
war was to increase the supply of aircraft and 
personnel until at the peace the belligerent countries 
were left in possession of a large nucleus of this 
new means of transport and communication. The exact 
import of this is perhaps best seen by considering 
for a moment the position in the United States of 
America. In November 1918, America was in possession 
of an overwhelming number of aircraft, the primary 
purpose of which had been to strike the decisive blow 
in the War. With the Armistice their use in this 
direction was no longer required. Instead, they were 
used in the formation of the American air mail which 
has since become world famous. This is a pregnant 
example of the effect of numerical air strength at 
the conclusion of the World War, and, as the position 
was the same in other countries, its repercussion on 
the law must be Qnly too obvious. 
But to digress for a. moment to the matter of the 
control of aviation. Here the effect of the period 
under review is also clearly seen. In August 1914 
the aircraft was the adjunct of the existing fighting 
services. By 1919 it was a third fighting service, 
equal in importance to the navy and to the army, and, 
in Great Britain, under the supervision of a 
Principal Secretary of State. This evolution is not 
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without interest for in it is found the reason for 
aviation law continuing to be sponsored by what is 
principally a War Department. The form it took was 
the result of the conflict between the fighting 
services themselves desiring the continuance of the 
status quo, and the growing demand of a terrorised 
public for complete reorganisation. The first step 
in compromise was taken in February 1916 when a 
Committee was set up under Lord Derby to ensure that 
the manufacture, supply and distribution of material 
fequired was in accordance with the policy of aerial 
warfare laid down by the Government. This experiment 
failed and in May of the same year the Derby 
Committee was superseded by the Curzon Air Board. 
This Board existed solely as a co- ordinating body 
between the two services. Acting on the Report which 
it presented, power was obtained to constitute a new 
Board with executive powers, and, in February 1917, 
this Board came into existence under the Presidency 
of Viscount Cowdray. The growing menace from the air 
increased the public demand for a more drastic 
reorganisation, and, in November 1917, the Air Force 
(Constitution) Act was laid before Parliament, and 
became law that same month. Under it the Air Council 
was constituted and its President was declared to he 
one of the Principal Secretaries of State with the 
title of Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force. 
Inder the Air Navigation Act of 1919 the control of 
civil aviation was entrusted to this Secretary of 
State who then became the Secretary of State for Air. 
Tilts it was that the development of aviation 
started in war, continued under the supervision of a 
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Secretary charged mainly with the control of a 
fighting service, although admittedly under a special 
branch of his Department, and the development of the 
law, national and international, continued to be 
influenced in a similar manner. 
Nevertheless, one must revert to the exceptim0 
technical develópment and numerical increase of 
aircraft fo find the main reason for the legal 
development. While there had been a Pan American 
Aeronautical Conference in 1916, it was not until 
May 1917 that a Committee was set up in Great Britain 
to consider and report to the Air Board with regard 
to 
"(1) The steps which should be taken with a view to 
"the development and regulation after the War of 
"aviation for civil and commercial purposes from a 
"domestic, and imperial, and an international stand: 
":point; and 
"(2) The extent to which it will be possible to 
"utilise for the above purpose the trained personnel 
"and the aircraft which the conclusion of peace may 
"leave surplus to the requirements of the Naval and 
"Military Air Services of the United Kingdom and 
"Overseas Dominions." 
This was known as the Civil Aerial Transport 
Committee and its Report was presented in 1918 after 
the Air Council had been constituted. The first 
Special Committee appointed was entrusted with the 
enquiry into the legal position, and, in particular, 
it was to advise as to policy and necessary legis: 
:lation with special reference to national sovereign: 
:ty and international questions, the necessary 
amendments of the common and statute law as to the 
airspace covering private property, and the 
principles of liability for damages caused by 
aircraft. In effect, it was to consider the very 
questions which had engaged the attention of the 
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early jurists. 
The Committee made an exhaustive enquiry having 
before it the Paris Draft Cònvention of 1910 with 
the observations made thereon by the Sub- Committee on 
Imperial Defence, and the Draft Home Office Bill of 
1911. It confined itself to an examination of these 
documents and made suggestions for their improvement 
and amendment.- The Reports of the Sub -Committee are 
of great interest and have proved of inestimable 
value for they were freely used when the Convention 
of 1919 was being drafted. They contain a mass of 
valuable information and the legal questions receive 
greatest attention. 
While I do not intend to examine these Reports 
in detail, there are some points which I think require 
special consideration. Of these, the attention given 
to the question of sovereignty of the air is of 
paramount importance, for, in the words of the Report 
(2) 
"this question of sovereignty in one upon which 
"agreement between the contracting Powers is vital in 
"the future interests of civil aerial transport." 
It must further be horne in mind that when the 
Committee was appointed the principle of sovereignty 
had already been accepted. Rol;and, writing in 1916, 
was able to state (3) 
"There is now a veritable custom the prohibition 
"issued seems to have been considered quite natural 
"practically everywhere All the elenmts of a custom 
"are here combined; practice, a doctrinal solution in 
"agreement with it, public opinion to support it ". 
As was seen, the Articles relating to this matter 
could not be s ettled in 1910 and did not appear in 
(2) Cmd. 9218 (1918) p. 5. 
( 3) R.D.I. 1916, p. 577. 
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the Paris Draft Convention of that year. The Sub - 
Committee of the Committee on Imperial Defence had 
in 1913 suggested the insertion of five articles by 
which each contracting State was to permit the aircraft 
of other States to fly within the limits of and above 
its territory subject to certain restrictions, and, 
inparticular, the right to forbid the navigation of 
foreign aircraft in so far as this was deemed necess: 
:ary to guarantee its own security or that of the 
lives and property of its inhabitants. In general, 
restrictions were to be applied without inequality 
to the aircraft of every other contracting State. 
In cases of accident, entry or landing which might 
otherwise have been forbidden, were not to be refused. 
These articles were, in principle, accepted by 
the Special Committee of the Civil Aerial Transport 
Committee but in case one State might use its powers 
of restriction more severely that others - in which 
event it could not on that account be differentiated 
against by others - the Special Committee recommended 
that provision should be made whereby any contracting 
State might refuse to accord to any other contracting 
State any facilities which the latter did not itself 
accord under its regulations. 
With regard to the Preamble to the Draft Bill of 
1911 (4) it was suggested that it should be altered 
to read 
"Whereas the full and absolute sovereignty of His 
Majesty extends " 
the words "full and absolute" being additional. 
(41Ante p. 95. 
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While this was all that actually appeared by 
way of proposed legislation, the members of the 
Committees were not slow to give expression to very 
definite views. It is unfortunate that since much 
of the information laid before the Committees was of 
a confidential and secret nature the Reports could 
not be presented to the public in their original and 
Complete form, for, as a result, much valuable 
information on this very question of sovereignty was 
not made public. Notwithstanding this, there is much 
to be gleaned from them. 
Throughout, the conflict between the two schools 
of thought, those asserting sovereignty usque ad 
coelum and those asserting it up to a prescribed 
limit, can be discerned, and the Committee might 
easily have favoured the latter view, had it not been 
for the fact that the worst war in history was being 
waged when it was considering its Report. It was the 
military argument which finally prevailed, but not 
before the Committee had reported that:- 
"from the purely business point of view of the 
"prospects of civil aerial transport in times of peace, 
"the latter view (sovereignty up to a prescribed limit) 
"has much to recommend it." (5) 
However, the balance weighed in favour of sovereignty 
usque ad coelum and the arguments in favour of that 
principle are so convincing as to be unanswerable. 
"To give to foreign aircraft, as a matter of acknow: 
":ledged international law, the right to fly at will 
"over the territory of the State would be to give them 
"undesirable opportunities for espionage, and generally 
"to limit the elementary right of a State to take each 
"and every measure which it considers necessary for 
"self preservation. In time of war, moreover, the 
"doctrine of the "freedom of the air" above a certain 
t 
"altitude would give rise to most embarassing questions 
1ù 
(5) Cmd. 9218 (1918) p. 5. 
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"neutral States.......The case of the upper air 
"presents no true analogy to the case of the high 
"seas outside the limits of territorial waters," 
and again, 
"the experience of the present war has merely served 
"to increase the force of these considerations, and we 
"agree with the Special Committee that the doctrine 
"of State sovereignty in the airspace usque ad coelum 
"on which this country acted before the War and on 
"which, along with neutral countries, it still acts, 
"is sound, and should be adopted as the basis alike 
"of international agreement and of municipal legislat: 
":ion." (6) 
The air space above territorial waters, the Committee 
agreed, should be regarded from the same point of 
view, as that above the territory of the State itself. 
Yet the Report was not altogether unanimous, 
and one finds Mr Frank Pick, who subscribes a 
minority Report, writing, as he declares "in the 
spirit of hope" and deprecating any commitments to an 
avowed policy of sovereignty usque ad coelum. His 
argument is twofold. In the first place the policy 
to be adopted must be one upon which the nations as a 
whole are agreed and the code of laws so decided must 
be applied 
"openly and equally among all nations upon some 
"mutually enforceable sanction" (7) 
In the second place, Great Britain's interest as a 
Great Power and as a commercial and industrial people 
lies towards an international settlement of 
sovereignty. But his arguments are not convincing, 
and, even in the new order of things which he 
visualised - and which the events of a few years have 
shewn to stand on a very insecure foundation - are 
not sufficient to rise above the military reasons 
which caused the majority of his colleagues to favour 
a poliçyof sovereignty usque ad coelum. 
6 cod. 
7 Ibmid. V1T6.P. 5. 
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The provisions of the Draft Bill of 1911 
regarding the rights of private landowners were very 
narrow, being in effect a mere declaration that flight 
itself was not to be regarded as a trespass, while 
saving the existing remedies open to an injured party 
for damage actually suffered. (8) The inadequacy 
of sucha provision was recognised and the Special 
Committee recommended that the Bill should provide that 
no action for trespass should lie except for material 
damage to persons or property, whether caused by flight; 
ascent, or landing, or the fall of objects from 
aircraft; that this action of trespass should include 
one for injury caused by the assembly of persons on 
the landing or ascent of aircraft elsewhere than at 
authorised aerodromes or landing places; that the 
obligation of . the aviator in an action for trespass 
should be absolute, negligence not being a necessary 
element in his liability and "unavoidable accident" no 
defence; and that an action for nuisance should lie 
for damages only, and then only if a breach of flying 
regulations is proved, as well as actual nuisance. 
This was a considerable advance but it was open 
to criticism. In the first plane, it took from the 
landowner any right of property which he might have in 
the airspace usque ad coelum. In fact, unless he 
could prove actual damage to person or property, 
aircraft could fly at will above his land. Even his 
action for nuisance was barred unless he could prove 
a breach of flying regulations With such a provision 
flight would have been as disastrous for the landowner 
(8) Ante p. 96. 
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as would the maintenance of his right of ownership 
usque ad coelum have been to the aviator. 
The Committee was certainly not unanimous 
on the matter, and, while the majority appreciated 
that a nuisance might be caused by regular low - 
flying, they were not in a position to make any 
recommendation as to the limitations of altitude to 
be prescribed by regulation. The very mention of a 
limitation of altitude was offensive to Mr G. Holt 
Thomas who, in a minority report, suggested that 
regulations should only be made to meet the circum: 
:stances as they arose. On the other hand, Mr W. 
Joynson Hicks, as he then was, appreciated the hard: 
:ship which would be occasioned to a landowner by 
unlimited flight at any height. In his reservation 
to the Report, he remarks:- 
"though the whole doctrine of the right of the land: 
" :owner to property in the air to an indefinite height 
"must be curtailed, still, I am clearly of the opinion 
"that the public will demand, and rightly, a limit 
"above which (except under stress of weather) aviators 
"must fly above private property, and that any 
"persistent fl;;ing under this height should be 
"preventable by injunction." (9) 
The majority proposal was certainly a reversal 
of the right of the landowner to the very opposite 
extreme, and is greatly to be wondered at in view of 
the expressed opinion of the General Committee that 
the right of the landowner in the airspace above his 
lands had 
"generally been recognised in English Law to extend 
"usque ad coelum". (10) 
Incidentally, this tends to confirm the opinion I 
have already expressed that the maxim cujus est solum 
(9) Cmd. 9218 p. 24,. 
(10) Ibid. p. 8. 
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ejus est ad coelum usque ad inferos is an integral 
part of the law both of England and of Scotland.(ll) 
There would appear to be no justification for 
depriving the landowner of his rights in the 
airspace above his property to this almost unlimited. 
extent. 
Should damage be occasioned, he is, of course; 
compensated in a certain measure by the provisions 
whereby the aviator is to be liable absolutely 
for such damage. -This was a great advance on the 
common law. The maxim res ipsa loquitur would have 
placed the burden of proof on the aviator, and, 
although there was doubt as to whether the doctrine 
expressed in Rylands v. Fletcher would have applied, 
assuming that it had, vis major or the Act of God 
would have been a valid defence open to him. Under 
the provision proposed by the Special Committee, 
even this defence was denied him. The hardship, 
however, was more apparent than real and any 
argument against the proposals dust surely have been 
fully met by the statement in the Report that they 
would impose on aviators no burden which 
"could not be covered by insurance at reasonable 
"rates." (12) 
The other matters dealt with in the Reports 
are interesting but not sufficiently important to 
warrant inclusion here, with the exception perhaps 
of the particular attention given to methods of 
procuring safety for the ordinary population. Prior, 
to 1914 these had taken the form of licensing pilots 
and certifying the aircraft themselves as airworthy, 
or by one or other of those means. The licensing of 
(11) Ante p. 25. 
(12) Cmd. 9218 p. 22. 
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Pilots called for no comment but the provisions as 
to airworthiness appearing in the draft Convention 
of 1910 were not acceptable. Under that Convention 
each separate aircraft would have required to pass 
tests before obtaining an airworthiness Certificate, 
and this seemed to the Committee to impose a severe 
restriction on the development of aviation. Rather 
than run such a risk they recommended the ensuring 
of safety by providing for the competency of pilots 
by stringent regulations. Accordingly, it was 
suggested that all that was required was the 
certifying of the first of any new type of aircraft, 
and once a Certificate was issued in respect thereof, 
the others, if they were guaranteed to be of the 
same type and construction would not require to be 
specially certified. 
Great Britain was not alone in recognising the 
effect of the rapid development of aeronautics. 
The United States of America was also to the fore 
in attempting to find some unified Code of Law to 
be applied there. The legal position in America is 
peculiar in so far as the position of the various 
States comprising it is concerned, but it has this 
advantage that its vast extent lends itself 
naturally to a development of aviation on a scale 
which is not possible in a country of the size of 
Great Britain. Therefore aviation law in the United 
States was more fully developed at an earlier stage 
than the laws of other countries and judicial 
decisions are not lacking. As I purpose mentioning 
in succeeding chapters, for the sake of comparison, 
certain aspects of American aviation law it is 
well to record at this stage that in May 1916 
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a Congress of the Pan American Aeronautic Federation 
held at Santiago, Chile, succeeded in drawing up 
a fairly detailed set of principles to be observed 
in the development of the law. while navigation 
of the airspace ahoye the American Cohtinent and 
adjacent seas was agreed to be free to all 
Americans and domiciled aliens, it was declared that 
the airspace was State property and States were to 
have sovereign rights in their own airspace. All 
aircraft were to carry a distinctive national emblem 
and to have a nationality, public aircraft having 
that of the State to which it belonged, and private 
aircraft that of their owner, the latter provision 
being specially significant. Even Rules of Warfare 
were agreed upon and aerial warfare was to be 
regulated so as to minimise the danger to non- 
combatants. On its entry into the Great War, 
America put a restriction on civilian flight by 
designating the whole of the United States its 
territorial waters and insular possessions of the 
Panama Canal Zone as a zone of military operations 
and of military preparation, within which flight 
could only be carried out by special license which 
was required for each and every proposed civilian 
flight. 
Bearing in mind the effect of the Great War 
on the development of aircraft, with the resulting 
rapid construction, which left at the conclusion 
of the peace an immense surplus of all types of 
aircraft ready to be adapted to peaceful pursuits, 
the actual development of the law during that time, 
and the changed outlook which war had brought about, 
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it will be readily recognised that international 
agreement on the major legal issues involved was 
within reach when the conflict ended. Not only 
could it be attained, but the position of aviation 
made it essential that it should be attained. The 
prospects of agreement on an International Aerial 
Convention were more hopeful now than they had 
been at any time before. Aviation law had entered 
upon the third stage of its development. 
PART, III 
POST WAR IEGISLAT ION AND DEVELOPMENT 
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The Post War Structure. 
When the Treaty of Peace was signed at 
Versailles in June 1919, the whole outlook of the 
world had changed. The war which was to bring 
universal peace had ended and nations had entered 
upon a new order of things - or, at least imagined 
they had - mach as had been envisaged by Mr Pick 
when he dissented from the Majority Report of the 
Civil Aerial Transport Committee. (1) Sixteen 
years may have brought disillusionment and a strong 
tendency for nations to regard one another's move- 
ments mach as they had done before 1914, hut the 
spirit of peace and goodwill which has characterised 
so many of the acts done shortly after the War must 
be regarded as having had its effect also on the 
provisions which were made for the regulation of 
aviation. it would not be possible to say to what 
extent the development of aviation law was affected 
by the general outlook in 1919, but the fact 
remains that this branch of the law has developed, 
and will continue to develop along lines which are 
peculiar to it alone. The international character 
of flight which I have already emphasised on more 
than one occasion no doubt contributed largely to 
the particular nature of the development of the law 
but it must be conceded that the Great War and the 
change of outlook which followed it made their 
impression. Had there been no war the development 
would have been slow and one is left to wonder 
whether the law would ever have developed along the 
same lines. 
(1) Ante. p.117. 
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Aviation law is now surrounded by a complex 
and elaborate structure and is being moulded and 
developed in a manner in which no other branch of 
the law has developed. Not only does it rest on 
an International Convention, bat a permanent Inter- 
national body exists to gather, and, in its turn, 
to distribute all available information as to the 
particular national laws, rules and regulations as 
they are promulgated, and numerous International 
organisations meet regularly with bat one object, 
and that to discuss and recommend new laws as well 
as to amend the old. In fact, if there existed 
some such organisation as an International Aero- 
nautical Court, aviation law would be a separate 
and complete entity. Even that is under consider- 
ation for the Fifth International Congress on 
Aviation Law held at the Hague in September 1930 
recommended that the various International legal 
organisations should consider the question of 
creating an International Court which would be 
accessible to private individuals and which would 
eventually be able to solve the numerous questions 
raised by the application of the Conventions on 
Private Air Navigation Law. 
The Treaty of Peace itself contained 
certain clauses affecting aerial navigation, and, 
while these are now perhaps of no more than historic 
interest, they should perhaps be mentioned. The Air 
Clauses (Arts. 198 -202) had the effect of prohibiting 
Germany from maintaining a military air force while 
providing for freedom of passage through the air, 
as well as freedom of transit and of landing, being 
accorded to the aircraft of the Allied and Associated 
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Powers until the complete evacuation of Germany had 
taken place. Aerial Navigation was dealt with 
under Part XI of the Treaty (Arts. 313 to 320) which 
applied until 1st January 1933. The underlying 
principle was that until Germany could be authorised 
to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial 
Navigation the rights of the private aircraft of the 
victorious Powers in German air space were to be 
safeguarded and Germany was to obey the various 
Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic which 
were to be laid down in the Convention. 
Concurrently with the Treaty of Peace, the 
Allied and Associated Powers set about framing an 
International Convention relating to the Regulation 
of Aerial Navigation similar to that which had been 
anticipated in 1910 and, with the spirit which 
prevailed, it would have been well nigh impossible 
to fail to reach agreement. So it was that on 13th 
October 1919 the Convention was signed at Paris. 
It came into force on llt h July 1922 in respect of 
fourteen of the signatory States and of Persia which 
had taken advantage of the provisions enabling it to 
notify its adhesion. The Convention is presently 
in force between thirty States and is the basis on 
which the various national legal systems are 
founded. It was expressly provided that in case 
of war the provisions of the Convention should not 
affect the freedom of action of the contracting 
States either as belligerents or as neutrals. (2) 
The Convention is not universally recog- 
nised and there are several notable exceptions. 
(2) Convention of 1919, Art.38. 
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Por example, the United States of America, while a 
signatory, has not ratified it, and Germany, whioh 
could not at the time be a party, has not yet 
adhered, although this would have been possible 
both under Article 320 of the Treaty of Peace and 
the Convention itself, and, having left the League 
of Nations, is not at the moment likely to do so. 
Both countries are important from the point of view 
of aviation, for in both flight has reached a high 
degree of perfection. Nevertheless they are 
observing virtually the same provisions, for, the Pan 
American Convention closely resembles the Paris 
Convention, and under Article 5 of the latter 
provision was made whereby contracting States were 
free to enter into bilateral Conventions with non- 
contracting States. At the present moment there are 
thirty three such Conventions in force, excluding 
those entered into for the sole purpose of permitting 
the operation of certain regular air traffic services, 
and their terms are almost identical with those of 
the Paris Convention. 
The position in Great Britain is that it 
is bound by the Convention of 1919 to which it has 
adhered, and has donc luded bilateral Conventions of 
a similar nature with Germany and Austria, besides 
concluding Conventions with Sweden, Holland, Greece, 
Italy, and Switzerland regarding air transport 
services. The existing national law is to be 
found in the Air Navigation Act of 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 
V. Ch.80) and in the numerous Statutory Rules and 
Orders and Air Navigation Directions issued ander 
that Act. The Air Navigation Act applied to 
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England, Scotland, and Ireland, and by Order 
in Council could be applied to any British Possessions 
other than those mentioned in the Schedule to the 
Act, and to any territory under His Majesty's 
Protection. By Order in Council dated 6th February 
1922 (3) the Act was applied to certain Colonies 
and Protectorates, and by a like Order on 20th 
December 1927 (4) was applied to the Mandated 
Territories of the British Cameroons, British 
Togoland, Palestine, and Tanganyika Territory. 
The various Statutory Rules and Orders applicable 
in Great Britain have, with the necessary modific- 
ations, been applied to these Colonies, Protector- 
ates, and Mandated Territories since 1927. They 
were also made applicable to Guernsey on 14th 
December 1925 (5) and to Jersey on 6th February 
1928 (6). 
The New World furnishes another example 
of a collective Convention for the purpose of 
regulating aviation law and in the United States 
the legal structure has much in common with that in 
Great Britain. The differences in the national law 
where they exist are accounted for by the position 
of the States comprising the United States of 
America for each individual State claimed sovereign 
rights in its own air space, and, therefore, a right 
to enact its own laws. The difficulty appears to 
have been, and still is, to find the exact extent to 
which Federal control could be exercised, but it 
seems to be generally accepted that there is a con- 
current control between the Federal Government and 
each particular State. 
(3) S.R.O.No.121. (1922 ) (6) S. R.0.N0.91(1928 ) 
(4) S.RO0No.1244.(1927) 
(5) S.R.O.No.1583. (1926 )) 
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The position of the South American 
Republics necessitated some unification of the laws 
existing throughout the whole of the American 
Continent similar to that in Europe, and it is not 
surprising, therefore, to find a Pan American Con- 
vention on Commercial Aviation being signed at 
Havana on 20th February 1928, to which Convention 
the signatures of the United States and twenty four 
Latin American States were appended. Of those 
coantries, eleven, including the United States, have 
deposited Ratifications. This Convention, in the 
American Continent, can, for the purposes of com- 
parison, be taken as corresponding to the Paris 
Convention of 1919 in Europe. 
The fact that the Convention was signed by 
the United States and ratified by Congress shows that 
the Federal Government considers that it has 
sovereign rights in the air space over the whole of 
the United States. This is further borne out by 
the Bi- partate Agreements entered into by the 
Federal Government, but apparently a decision of the 
Supreme Coart is awaited to clarify the position, 
since several individual States maintain absolute 
sovereign rights in their own airspace. 
This asserted dual control is further seen 
when one considers the American equivalent to the 
British Air Navigation Act of 1920. It is to be 
found in two sources, the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 
produced by the Government, and the Uniform 
State Law of Aeronautics, prepared by the American 
Bar Association and adopted in whole or in part by 
the individual States. Under the Constitution of 
the United States, the control of Congress is 
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limited to regulating commerce between the various 
States and this limitation is to be found in the 
Air Commerce Act, which, according to its title, 
was intended "to encourage the use of aircraft in 
"commerce and for other purposes." At the same 
time it must not be forgotten that it was only 
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
which rendered legislative action possible by 
Congress. The Act contains little information on 
the many points of law which had been in doubt, 
and the legal principles are found rather in the 
Uniform State Law. The Air Commerce Regulations 
which took effect on 31st December 1926 may be 
taken as the equivalent of the British Statutory 
Rules and Orders and Air Navigation Directions. 
The remaining example of a collective 
Convention is thatooncladed at the Spanish -American 
Conference held at Madrid in October 1926 in which 
Spain and twenty Latin American States participated. 
Of these, five, including Spain, deposited Ratific- 
ations. Except in certain minor respects, the 
text of the Paris Convention was adopted and as 
the differences in the latter have been brought in 
line by a Protocol of 1929, there is, according to 
the declaration of the Spanish delegate to the 
Conference which drew ap the Protocol, no longer any 
reason why the two Conventions should be separate. 
The International Commission for Air Navigation - 
When the Paris Conference of 1910 concluded 
its labours, the following recommendation was added 
to the Draft Convention 
"That the Governments shall study the question how far 
"it would be useful to set up an International Board 
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"for Aerial navigation, and consider what powers 
"should be conferred on such a Board." 
The recommendation did not fall on barren ground. 
It fell on rich and fruitful soil, and, that, to- 
gether with the then prevailing spirit, enabled 
the Paris Convention of 1919 to provide that 
"there shall be instituted, under the name of the 
"International Commission for Air Navigation, a 
"permanent Lommission placed under the direction of 
"the League of illations." 17) 
The composition and powers of the Commission are 
fully detailed in the Article under which it is 
constituted. It is the organisation to which is 
entrusted the whole international control of 
aviation. Its first meeting was held on 11th July 
1922 when the decision was taken to meet at 
regular intervals, and, for the first few years, 
until 1930, the Commission met half -yearly. since 
then it has held annual sessions and has issued 
twenty two Official Bulletins to keep the public 
informed of its activities. It possesses a 
permanent headquarters and a permanent secretariat 
and there is not one single topic connected with 
aviation or aviation law to which it does not give 
attention. The work is performed by six sub -commissions 
of which the Legal Sub Commission is by no means the 
least important. 
The I.C.A.N. - to use the letters by which 
it is generally known - is a composite organisation 
being at one and the same time a Council charged with 
seeing to the application of the Convention and of 
assuring its normal working by proposing to the States 
represented, at the appropriate times, the amendments 
called for by the development of international air 
navigation; a kind of International Parliament with 
(7) Art. 34. 
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power to adapt technical rules to the exigencies 
of air traffic; a Court deciding the differences 
which arise as to the interpretation of technical 
rules; a Consulting Committee giving advice on 
problems submitted to it for examination by 
any particular State; and an organisation for 
collecting and distributing all the intelligence 
which is indispensable to the aviator. It 
is indeed a unique organisation to which there 
is no parallel in the realm of the law, or, 
for that part in any other sphere. 
The statement that the I.C.A.N. is 
a "Court deciding differences which arise as to 
"the interpretation of technical rules" requires 
further explanation. The authority for the 
statement is to be found in Article 37 of the 
Convention which makes provision for settling 
disputes which might arise between two 
contracting States either as to the inter- 
pretation of the Convention, or, as to the 
technical regulations annexed to it. The former 
class of dispute was to be referred to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice when 
established, and, until then, by Arbitration, 
the procedure for which was fully detailed. 
The latter class was to be referred to 
the I.C.A.N. but if doubt existed as to the class 
into which a dispute fell, it was to be decided 
by Arbitration. A slight alteration was 
made by the Protocol of June 1929 in regard to 
the provisions as to arbitration in the first 
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class of dispute. These are still to be re- 
ferred to the Permanent Court, but it is provided 
that if any one of the States concerned has not 
accepted the Protocol of the Court, the question in 
dispute shall, on the demand of such State, be 
settled by Arbitration. 
The actual provision now being discussed 
reads 
"disagreement relating to technical regulations 
"annexed to the present Convention shall be settled 
"by the decision of the International Commission for 
"Air Navigation, by a majority of votes." 
This has the effect of patting the Commission in the 
position of a judicial tribunal with a very limited 
competence. It cannot decide as to the inter- 
pretation of the Convention. That falls to be 
dealt with either by the Permanent Court or by 
Arbitration. It can only adjudicate on disagree- 
ment as to the meaning of technical regulations, 
and then only if there is no doubt as to whether 
the disagreement in any way involves an interpretation 
of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, when it does operate, the 
Court so formed has several interesting features, 
both in ,its composition and in its procedure. M. 
Kroell has written 
"A vrai dire c'est le plus vaste tribunal qui 
"existe." (8) 
The I.C.A.N. is comprised of thirty States, each 
having one vote, and accordingly, the tribunal has 
thirty judges. Bat that is not all, for the 
judges are States themselves, and in this respect 
alone the Court is unique. 
(8) La Fonction jadicaïre de la C.I.N.A., R.A.I. 
No.14. p.444. 
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Its Code of Procedure is to be found in a 
Resolution of the Commission (9) and became effective 
as from 1st June 1923. The first step is that 
each of the States concerned may request that Article 
37 be applied and to do so shall transmit to the 
General secretary a Memorandum explaining the matter 
ind_ispute and informing him of the names of the 
States concerned. This being done, the Secretary 
transmits copies of the Memorandum to such States 
who are allowed three months in which to lodge 
counter Memoranda and any other relevant information. 
As soon as this is done, or at the expiry of three 
months, the whole documents are communicated by the 
Secretary to the other States members of the 
I.C.A.N. 
The matter now comes before the first 
Session of the Commission when a Committee of five 
members is appointed to deal with it, hear the 
representatives of the States concerned, and report 
to the next Session of the Commission, unless in 
cases of extreme urgency, when the whole question 
may be decided during the first Session or at an 
Extraordinary Session called for the purpose. 
The Commission issues its decision to the 
interested States after having examined the Report, 
heard the representatives of the interested States, 
and taken the advice of its Judicial Sub- Commission. 
This phase of the Commission's activities 
is not without interest but so far has not been 
taken advantage of and its value when in operation 
cannot be estimated. The explanation is, no doubt, 
to be found in the other of its multifarious 
(9) Res. No.50. 0.R.2. pp.35 -36. 
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activities - that of an International Parliament 
with power to adapt technical rules to the exig- 
encies of air traffic. So far this has proved 
to be the easier and more satisfactory way of 
settling disputes which have arisen since the dis- 
agreements have invariably been caused by technical 
development which necessitated a different interpre- 
tation being pat on an existing rule or regulation. 
That being so, while a system of law is being 
developed, amendment rather than judicial interpre- 
tation is to be favoured, but the time will come 
when the judicial functions of the I.C.A.N. will 
serve an increasingly useful purpose. 
The Pan American Convention sets up an 
equivalent to the I.C.A.N. by providing that the Pan 
American Union is to co- operate with the Governments 
of the Contracting states to attain the desired 
uniformity of laws and regulations for aerial navi- 
gation in the States parties to the Convention, (10 ) 
but it is a poor substitute for the I.C.A.N. 
"The superiority of the I.C.A.N. over the arrangement 
"set up by the Havana Convention is too obvious to 
"necessitate any defence. Under the Convention of 
"1919, Experts keep that Convention up to date; 
"under the American system of aerial agreements this 
"benefit is denied to the United States Government. 
"Such a denial is an undoubted retardation of our 
"aerial development which could be removed by oar 
"becoming a party to the Convention of 1919." (11) 
Even the provisions for the settlement of disputes, 
be they of interpretation or as to technical rules, 
are inferior to those provided by the 1919 Con- 
vention for disputes cannot yet be referred to 
the Permanent Court and the Pan American Union cannot 
(10) Pan American Convention, Art.32. 
(11) "U.S.Committme nts on International Aerial 
Navigation ", Gibson, R.A.I.,No.11.pp.76w77. 
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undertake in this respect to act as a judicial 
tribunal. All disputes therefore fall to be 
settled by Arbitration ander Article 36 of the 
Havana Convention. 
If the I.C.A.N. was the only organisation 
on which aviation law depended for its development 
it would be well supplied, but it is not, and there 
are several other bodies whose work is devoted 
to this purpose. Since 1919, no fewer than eight 
other International Conferences or organisations have 
directed their attentions to aeronautics and to 
aviation law. Of these two were Governmental, cf. 
the Conferences of International Private Law, three 
were officially recognised by the Governments 
concerned, cf. the International Aeronautic Confer- 
ences, and three were the result of private enter- 
prise, cf. the International Aeronautic Federation. 
In addition two other Governmental, five officially 
recognised, and four private Conferences have 
discussed aviation law in the course of their 
deliberations, the most important, from the legal 
point of view, being the International Law 
Association. 
The Paris Convention - 
The Paris Convention of 1919 is of sufficient 
importance to merit more than a mere passing 
reference. It consists of a main text of forty 
three Articles, divided into nine Chapters, and eight 
Annexes dealing respectively with the marking of 
aircraft, certificates of airworthiness, log books, 
rules as to lights and signals and rules for air 
traffic, the minimum qualifications necessary for 
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obtaining certificates and licences as pilots and 
navigators, international aeronautical maps and 
ground markings, the collection and dissemination 
of metreological information, and customs. In 
conformity with the objects for which it was set up, 
the I.C.A.N. has been diligent in its efforts to 
amend the Convention to meet the rapidly changing 
circumstances, and, in consequence, in the Annexes 
to the Convention, very little of the original text 
remains. Most of them have been completely altered. 
In the main text of the Convention there has 
not been much in the way of alteration although what 
has been is important. I shall now deal with those 
changes, and thereafter consider the chapters of 
the Convention dealing with the rules to be observed 
on departure, when ander way, and on landing, 
prohibited transport, state aircraft, and the final 
provisions. The remaining parts of the Convention 
are considered elsewhere. 
The first changes were actually made in the 
Draft Convention before it was signed, and, apart 
from the mere altering of the position in which 
certain provisions were placed, contained three 
amendments which were of a material nature. In the 
first place, in the original Draft, aircraft engaged 
in flight across the territory of a contracting State, 
including the necessary landings and stoppages, were 
exempt from seizure on the ground that the constitu- 
tion or mechanism of the aircraft was an infringement 
of any patent, design, or model duly granted or 
registered by that State, and every claim for an 
infringement of that kind was to be duly made in the 
country of the origin of the aircraft. As the 
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Convention was signed, the aircraft would only be 
exempt from seizure on 
"the deposit of security, the amount of which in 
"default of amicable agreement shall be fixed with 
"the least possible delay by the competent authority 
"of the place of seizure." (12) 
In the second place, a clause was inserted in the 
Draft defining the jurisdiction to be exercised in 
respect of acts committed on board an aircraft, but, 
as the result of representations made by some of the 
powers, the Article was omitted from the final text. 
The terms of the Article itself will be considered at 
a later stage. (131 In the third place, the time 
limit of one year which was fixed for ratification 
was not included in the convention as signed. 
Further amendments have been made by four 
Protocols. The first of these was mainly concerned 
with the amendment of Article 5 of the Convention 
which provided that 
"no contracting State shall, except by a special and 
"temporary authorisation, permit the flight above 
"its territory of an aircraft which does not possess 
"the nationality of a contracting State." 
The effect of this Article in such a form was a 
severe handicap to aviation, for, unless every State 
adhered, international flight over the territory of 
contracting States would only have been possible to 
the aircraft of non -contracting States after what 
would doubtless have proved to be a slow and tedious 
process of obtaining the requisite temporary 
authorisation. This caused the countries which were 
neutral during the War, and, therefore, not signatories 
of the Convention, to meet at Copenhagen in December 
1919 to consider it and adopt a resolution recommend- 
ing that contracting States should have the right 
(12) Art.18. 
(13j rost. p. 
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to enter into special Conventions with States 
not parties to the Vonvention. The I.C.A.N., 
from the commencement of its activities, discussed 
this problem with the result that the Protocol of 
October 1922, which entered into force on 14th 
December 1926, added the following proviso to the 
Article 
"unless it has concluded a special convention with 
"the State in which the aircraft is registered. 'l'he 
"stipulations of s uc h special Convention mast not 
"infringe the rights of the contracting. parties 
"to the present Convention and mast conform to 
"the Rules laid down by the said Convention and 
"its Annexes. Such special Convention shall be 
"communicated to the International Commission for 
"Air Navigation which will bring it to the knowledge 
"of the other contracting States." 
This made the position much more elastic and the 
proviso has been widely taken advantage of, being 
the authority ander which the thirty three bilateral 
Conventions mentioned above were concluded. (14) 
The Copenhagen Conference had also passed 
a Resolution recommending equal voting rights on 
the International Commission, and, this having been 
given effect to in the second Protocol dated 30th 
June 1923, and which also entered into force on 14th 
December 1926, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Norway 
were enabled to adhere to the Convention. 
The third and fourth Protocols are of a 
more extensive nature and are the direct result of 
Dr. Wegerdt's article published in October 1928, 
entitled "Germany and the Paris Air Convention of 1919 ". 
(15) Following a suggestion made in that Article, a 
Conference was called by the I.C.A.N. in June 1929 
to which were invited, not only the Governments of 
States parties to the Convention, but also the 
(14) Ante. p.12 ?. 
(15) Archiv fur Duftrecht. Vol. III . fax. l . Jan. -Mar .1933. 
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the German Government and the Governments of all 
countries not parties to the Convention. Certain 
suggestions for its amendment were agreed upon and 
these were given effect to by the I.C.A.N. in a 
Protocol dated 15th Jane 1929. A farther Protocol 
was signed on 11th December 1929, and both Protocols 
came into force on 17th May 1933. 
Several Articles were amended but it will 
be sufficient to notice here the farther change made 
in Article 5 which had first been amended by the 
Protocol of October 1922. A new Article has been 
substituted whereby 
"each contracting State is entitled to conclude 
"special Conventions with non -contracting States." 
The provisions of such special Conventions mast not 
infringe the rights of the contracting parties to 
the Convention and 
"in so far as may be consistent with their objects" 
mast not be contradictory to the principles of that 
Convention. The whole purport of the Article as it 
first appeared is accordingly changed. 
The Chapter concerning the rules to be 
observed on departure, when ander way, and on landing 
with which must be taken the relative Annex giving 
the raies as to lights and signals and the rules for 
air traffic, contains little of note and no legal 
principle is involved. Briefly, the maritime 
analogy is followed, both in the rules of the air 
and the documents to be carried by aircraft. A 
log book mast be carried. The authorities have 
a right to visit any aircraft and verify the 
documents carried and the contracting States 
are taken bound to ensure that every aircraft 
carrying its nationality mark will observe the rules 
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laid down in the Annex. 
The succeeding Chapter on Prohibited 
Transport lays down certain restrictions as to what 
may be carried on aircraft, restrictions which are 
to apply equally to national and foreign aircraft. 
While the carriage or use of photographic apparatus 
may be prohibited, and other objects also, if public 
safety demands this, the carriage by aircraft of 
explosives and of arms and munitions of war is for- 
bidden. It is not easy to understand why air 
transport should be hindered by such a limitation. 
Certainly the prohibition of the carriage of 
explosives can be justified on the ground of public 
safety, but little is to be gained by prohibiting 
the carriage of arms of war, such as rifles, by air. 
The Chapter on State Aircraft is more 
important. Military aircraft, and aircraft employed 
exclusively in State service, such as posts, customs, 
and police, are to be classified as State Aircraft. 
All other aircraft are deemed to be private aircraft 
to which the Convention applies, and, of the State 
aircraft, only military, customs, and police aircraft 
are not subject to its provisions. Under Article 31 
"every aircraft commanded by a person in military 
"service, detailed for the purpose, shall be deemed 
"to be a military aircraft," 
and each military aircraft are prohibited from flying 
over the territory of another contracting State, or 
landing, without special authorisation. In such a 
case, the aircraft shall in principle, and in the 
absence of special stipulation, enjoy the privileges 
customarily accorded to foreign ships of war. 
The Final provisions of the Convention are 
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fairly numerous and, for the most part, of a formal 
character, but in one other respect deserve mention. 
The scope and effect of the Convention depended on the 
elaborate provisions which were made for adhesion 
and denunciation, especially the former, since the 
Convention was the work of the Allied and Associated 
Powers just as the Treaty of Peace was. Adhesion 
to the Air Navigation Convention was accordingly 
encumbered with mach the same provisions as was 
adhesion to the League of Nations, depending on 
whether or not a State was a signatory of the Peace 
Treaty and whether or not it took part in the War. 
The Protocols of June and December 1922 have now 
clarified and simplified the position, for, in place of 
the unfortunate Articles, 41 and 42, of the original 
Convention, there appears a new Article 41, to the 
effect that 
"Any State shall be permitted to adhere to the 
"present Convention. 
"This adhesion shall be notified through the 
"diplomatic channel to the Government of the French 
"Repabl i c, and by it to all the signatory or 
"adhering States." 
This Article did not take effect until May 1933, and 
it is greatly to be regretted that this "Charter of 
"the Air" should have continued for so long to be 
stamped with the hall -mark of war, of victor and of 
vanquished. It was indeed a short sighted policy to 
impede the development of an essential branch of 
the International Law in each a manner. 
Apart from the coupling of "naval" aircraft 
ander the heading of State aircraft, a provision 
which has mach to commend it, the provisions of the 
Pan American Convention corresponding to those just 
considered are identical except in so far as altera- 
tion is necessary to snit changed circumstances, 
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for 
"of the forty two Articles of the Paris Convention of 
"1919, a generous majority have been adopted in 
"spirit if not in terms by the Havana Convention." (16) 
The Air Navigation Act 1920 and Orders made thereunder. 
The Air Navigation Act was passed on 23rd 
December 1920, according to its Preamble, for two 
purposes, namely, to make farther provision for con- 
trolling and regulating the navigation of aircraft, 
whether British or Foreign, within the limits of His 
Majesty's jurisdiction, and, in the case of British 
aircraft, for regulating the navigation thereof both 
within such jurisdiction and elsewhere, and, also to 
enable effect to be given to the Convention of the 
previous year. It repealed the Air Navigation Acts, 
1911 to 1919. I have already referred to the Acts of 
1911 to 1914. The further Act passed on 27th February 
1919 giving effect to some of the recommendations of 
the Civil Aerial Transport Committee was a temporary one 
and on its authority detailed Regulations were issued on 
30th April of that year, remaining in force until subseq- 
uently superseded by those issued under the Act of 1920. 
This Act, which does not apply to aircraft 
belonging to His Majesty or exclusively employed in His 
service, although by Order any of its provisions may be 
applied to such aircraft, (19) was mainly an enabling 
Act, matters of detail being left to the Orders in 
Council which would follow it. In particular, it was 
provided that by Order in Council effect would be given 
to the Convention (17) and its provisions could be 
applied to or in relation to any aircraft in or over the 
British Isles or the territorial waters adjacent 
thereto. (18) Further, without prejudice to the 
general powers, the various special provisions detailed 
(16) Bouvé, Air Law Review, Vol.l. p.3. 





in the Third Section of the Act could also be made 
by order in Council. Of these, perhaps the most 
important were the provisions to be made as to the 
conditions of carriage of passengers and goods, 
for supplementing the Convention by general safety 
regulations, and for the imposition of penalties to 
secure compliance with the Order or with the 
Convention. 
Again, several sections of the Act and an 
extensive portion of the Orders issued under its 
authority, fall to be discussed in the chapters 
which follow, but there are three major subjects 
which do not fall readily within the scope of any 
particular chapter and are not dealt with subse- 
quently. These are, the acquisition of land; 
offences and the penalties in respect thereof; and 
the investigation of accidents. 
With regard to the first, the acquisition 
of land, provision is made for two cases, where the 
Air Council is acquiring it and where a Local 
Authority is acquiring it. A Local Authority is, 
in England, the Common Council of the City of London, 
the Councils of Counties and County Boroughs, and 
Urban District Councils, and, in Scotland, County 
Councils and Town Councils. Either the Air Council 
or an authorised Local Authority is empowered to 
establish and maintain aerodromes (20) , and a Local 
Authority may carry on in connection therewith any 
subsidiary business certified by the Air Council to 
be ancillary to the carrying on of an aerodrome. (21) 
For this purpose, power is given to acquire land. 
(20) Sec.8(l)) 
(21) Seo.8( ). Then sale of . petrol and oil has been so 
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In the case of the Air Council this will be by 
purchase or hire (22) and 
"the power of a Secretary of State to acquire land 
"under the Military Lands Acts, 1892 to 1903, shall 
"include power to acquire lands for the purposes of 
"this Act and generally for the purposes of civil 
"aviation, and those Acts shall have effect 
"accordingly with the necessary modifications, and 
"in particular as though references to a military 
"purpose included references to any such purposes 
"as aforesaid." (23) 
In the case of a Local Authority, the acquisition is 
limited to agreement (24), and, for that purpose, 
"the lands Clauses Acts shall be incorporated with 
"this Act except the provisions of those Acts with 
"respect to the purchase and taking of land otherwise 
"than by agreement." (25) 
The provisions relating to Local Authorities, however, 
are largely superseded since a power of compulsory 
purchase of land for aerodromes is generally in- 
cluded in any Bill in Parliament promoted by such 
Local Authorities. 
With regard to offences, the Act makes 
provision for a fine or imprisonment, or both, 
"where an aircraft is flown in such a manner as to be 
"the cause of unnecessary danger to any person or 
"property on land or water." (26) 
The penalty is incurred by the pilot or person in 
charge, and also by the owner unless he can show that 
the aircraft was flown "without his actual fault or 
privity ". The Section may seem severe but some 
such enactment is essential for the protection of the 
unfortunate individuals on the ground below. It 
will be observed that the penalty is limited to the 
case where such person or persons or their property 
are exposed to unnecessary danger, the constitution 
of which will be a matter of proof in each case as 
it arises. Some general principles will be evolved 
(22) Sec.6(1). (24 
(23) Sec.lS. í25 
(26) Sec.lO.(1). 
Sec.8(1) 
Sec.B. ( 5 ) 
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in time to come and there have already been con- 
victions under the Act.. Flight which causes 
unnecessary danger to other aviators is not in- 
cluded. This may be on the assumption that an 
aviator flying in a manner dangerous to other 
aviators would be causing unnecessary danger to 
himself - one which he is not likely to run - 
bat the Section would have been more complete had 
it embraced this offence also. 
The foregoing provisions, it is declared, 
"shall be in addition to and not in derogation of 
"any general safety or other regulations prescribed 
"by Order in Council." (27) 
Those other regulations are numerous and are to be 
found in the Air Navigation (Consolidation) Order 
1923 and the amending Orders. Briefly stated they 
are as follows. 
An aircraft shall not fly over any city 
or town except at such an altitude as will enable it 
to land outside the city or town should its means of 
propulsion fail (28) and, if it is not designed to 
manoeuvre on the water, a machine carrying passengers 
for hire or reward shall not engage in flight over 
the sea or inland waters unless in similar circum- 
stances it would be able to reach land. (29) An 
aircraft cannot carry out any trick flying or 
exhibition flying over any city or town area or 
populous district, nor over any regatta or other 
public meeting unless where this is specially arranged 
for by the promoters of such regatta or public 
meeting, and, following closely the provisions of 
the principal Act, an aircraft shall not be flown 
(27) Sec.10(2). 
(28) S.R.O. No.15O8.(1923),Sec.9(1). 
(29) S.R.O. No.11v2.(1934),See.1. 
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"in such circumstances as, by reason of low altitude 
"or proximity to persons or dwellings or for any 
"other reason, to cause unnecessary danger to any 
"person or property on land or water." (30) 
This section of the Order was discussed in the case 
of Rex V Brie at the Kingston Petty Sessions on 18th 
October 1933, and on appeal at surrey Quarter Sessions 
on 17th November of that year. The offence was 
low flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome and it 
was held that a pilot could not be convicted under 
the section merely because the persons on the ground 
were alarmed, unless it could also be shown that 
there was justification for such alarm. While it 
would not protect a pilot who flew unnecessarily low 
thus causing danger in the event of an error of 
judgment on his part, engine failure, or other unfore- 
seen cause, it would protect an aviator engaged in 
normal flight near an aerodrome even although he had 
to come so low that he caused alarm in the minds of 
persons on the ground. In another case, in the 
Caistor (lines.) Police Court, a conviction was 
obtained against a pilot ander the Section who flew 
low to enable a mother on the ground to take a 
photograph of her daughter who was in the aeroplane. 
As a result of the manoeuvre the mother was struck by 
the plane and killed. The penalty is the same 
whether the offender is charged under the principal 
Act or ander the Consolidation Order. 
Smoking in aircraft is only permitted to 
the extent allowed under its Certificate of Airworthi- 
ness, and it is an offence to smoke in contravention 
of this provision. (31) It is also an offence to 
interfere with the crew or equipment of an aircraft 
(30) S.R.O.No.1260. (19Z5 ) . 
(31) S.H.0.No.743.(1933),Sec.l. 
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or commit any act by any other means to the extent 
of imperilling its safety, (32) as it is to carry 
any person in any part of the aircraft not ddsigned 
for the accommodation of the personnel or passengers.(33). 
So too it is an offence to photograph a 
prohibited area (34) except with special permission; 
for any pilot or member of the crew to be in a state 
of intoxication (35); or for any person to enter or be 
in an aircraft in such a condition (36); and, except 
by special permission, to land by parachute, unless 
in cases of emergency, or to drop anything from an 
aircraft (37) . Thus the Lincolnshire farmer who 
recently in jest dropped an egg from an aeroplane 
was fined for his exuberance. There is, of coarse, 
another aspect of this question of dropping articles 
from aircraft, and that from the point of view of 
sanitation and public health. As flying becomes more 
popular and aircraft are perfected to meet human require- 
ments, the disposal of sewerage produced on board mast be 
carefully regulated as nothing would be more seriously 
detrimental than that any such sewerage should be dropped 
on to the subjacent ground. Under the International 
Sanitary Convention for aerial navigation, recently 
signed but not yet ratified by the British Government, 
aircraft in flight are forbidden to throw or let fall 
matter capable of producing an outbreak of infectious 
disease. 
Further examples of offences, such as piloting 
an aircraft while under seventeen years of age (38) and 
the like are to be found throughout the various Orders 
and Schedules but sufficient have been enumerated to Ehow 
the great diversity of the offences which can be committed 
in connection with aircraft. While it is not yet generally 
(32) S.R.O.No.263. (1927 ) (36) S.R.O.No.1260.(1925) 
Oo.712.(1934 (33) S.R.0No.743.(1933),Sec.2. (37) S.Seca  ), 
(34) S.R.O.No.1508. (1923 ),Sec.l1. 
( 35 ) do. Sec.12. (38) S.R.O.No.905.(3944 ). 
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recognised the offences under the Air Navigation Act,even 
at this early stage, far oatnamber those which even 
the erring motorist can commit ander the Road Traffic 
Act. Bat the penalties are mach heavier, and for 
any offence, no matter how trivial, the penalties 
under the Consolidation Order, on summary conviction, 
consist of a fine not exceeding £200, or imprisonment 
with or withoat hard labour for a period not exceeding 
six months, or to both fine and imprisonment. (39) 
With regard to the investigation of 
accidents, t his is covered by Section 12 of the 
principal Act, by virtue of which the Secretary of 
State may make regulations providing for the investi- 
gation of any accident, and such regulations may 
provide for notice being given of any accident, 
prohibiting access to any aircraft while the accident 
is under investigation, and authorising or requiring 
the cancellation, suspension, endorsement, or 
surrender of any Licence or Certificate, where it 
appears on investigation that this would be necessary. 
A penalty is provided should any person contravene 
any regulations ander the Section. 
The first regulations, which applied to 
accidents occurring in or over the British Islands, 
or which occurred elsewhere to British aircraft 
registered in the British Islands, came into force 
on 12th July 1922, and provided for notice of any 
accident, containing the particulars set forth in the 
regalations, being sent to the Air Ministry after which 
an "Inspector of Accidents" would make a preliminary 
investigation to be known as an "Inspectors 
Investigation ". (40) In more serious cases 
(39) S.H.O.No.1508. (1923 ),Sec .27. 
( 40) S.H.O.No. 650. (1922 ) ; No.381. (1935 ) . 
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where it appeared to be expedient, the Secretary of 
State could appoint some competent person to constitute 
a Court to make a formal Inquiry into the causes of 
the accident. This is known as a "Court Investigation ". 
By the Order of 1st June 1935 the cases in which notice 
need be given are limited and apparently notice of as 
accident occurring to a private aircraft need only be 
given when the accident involves death or serious injury 
to some person, whether carried in the aircraft or not. 
By subsequent regulations power was taken to extend the 
foregoing provisions to the Channel Islands (41) and to 
apply them to Crown aircraft, defined as those belong- 
ing to or exclusively used in the service of His 
Majesty, other than naval, military, or airforce air- 
craft. (42) There is as yet no obligation to notify 
the authorities of any foreign State of an accident 
occurring to an aircraft, registered in that country, 
in or over the British Islands. The obligation to do 
so would rest on the Air ministry and it might even 
be desirable to have a representative of that State 
present at any enquiry held. However, the matter is 
one for international agreement. 
The power given in the principal Act to 
apply Section 3 of the Notice of Accidents Act (43) 
by which the Board of Trade is given power to hold 
a formal investigation has not yet been taken 
advantage of. 
Otherwise, the numerous Orders made under 
the principal Act are - mainly concerned with laying 
down the detailed conditions under which flight is 
permitted. The Consolidation Order and subsequent 
Orders amending it apply to all British Aircraft 
wherever such aircraft may be and to other British 
(41) S.R.O.No.1099.(1925). (42) S.R.O.No.84O.(1930). 
(43) Air Navigation Act,Sec.12(2)(b). 
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aircraft and Foreign aircraft in or over Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. (44) These flying 
conditions may be thus shortly summarised. The 
aircraft mast be registered, certified as airworthy (45) 
and mast carry the prescribed crew who mast be 
licensed (46), and the prescribed instruments and 
documents (47) . Further, if the aircraft is flying 
over Great Britain it must possess the nationality 
of a State which is a party to the Convention or 
with which a special Convention has been entered into, 
it mast observe the provisions of the Ortler as to 
safety and the like, and must not land in or fly over 
any prohibited area at a lower altitude than 6000 
feet. (48) The Schedules annexed, which have 
effect as part of the Order (49) contain detailed 
regulations as to registration and marking of 
aircraft and similar matters referred to in the 
Order, and still further detail is to be found in 
the Air Navigation Directions issued from time to 
time. 
The American Law - 
Comparin g the existing law in the United 
States of America, one finds that the Air Commerce 
Act, the Air Commerce Regulations, and the Uniform 
State Law cover much the same ground as is covered 
by the British Air Navigation Act and relative 
Orders, but the limitations of the Air Commerce 
Act are worthy of note. The Secretary of Commerce is 
charged with the duty of fostering "Air Commerce" (SO) 
which means 
(44 )S.R.O.No.1508. (1923) , 
(45) do. 
(46 )S.R.O.No.1001. (1929) . 
(47 )S.R.O.No.126u. (1925) ; 
(48 )S. R.O.No.1508. (1923) , 
(49) do. 
(5O)Air Commerce Act,Sec. 
Sec.2. 






"transportation in whole or in part by aircraft of 
"persons or property for hire, navigation of aircraft 
"in furtherance of a business, or navigation of 
"aircraft from one place to another for operation in 
"the conduct of a business." (51) 
The regulatory powers of the Secretary of Commerce 
are accordingly very narrow in comparison with the 
powers of the British Secretary of State. Thus, 
apart from supplying aids to air navigation itself, 
he can only provide for granting registration to 
aircraft, the rating of aircraft as to their air- 
worthiness, the periodic examination aid rating of 
airmen, the examination and rating of aircraft 
facilities, and establishment of air traffic rules (52). 
The necessary provisions are made in the Air Commerce 
Regulations, and under the Air Traffic Rules are to 
be found several rules which differ slightly from the 
corresponding British rules. 
For example, whereas in Great Britain 
flight must be at such a height over cities as to 
enable the aircraft to land outside in cases of 
emergency, in the United States flight mast only be 
at a 
"height sufficient to permit of a reasonably safe 
"emergency landing, Which shall in no case be less 
"than 1000 feet" (53) 
bat the provisions as to low flying are not so vague 
as those in force in Great Britain. The minimum 
flying height is fixed at 500 feet 
"except where indispensable to an industrial flying 
"operation, " (54 ) 
although, under the Uniform State Law, the prohibition 
is against flight 
"at such a low level as to endanger the persons on 
"the surface beneath." (55) 
(51) Air Commerce 
(52) do. 








The provisions as to flying over sea or inland 
waters do not appear, bat no flight under 1000 feet 
is to be made 
"over any open -air assembly of persons, except with 
"the consent of the Secretary of Commerce." (56) 
Acrobatic flying which, to avoid any confusion, is 
defined as "intentional manoeuvres not necessary to 
"air navigation ", is dealt with in a somewhat severe 
manner. It is prohibited over cities, towns, or 
settlements, and no person may acrobatically fly an 
aeroplane carrying passengers for hire or reward, 
a regulation which might usefully be adopted in 
Great Britain, since there, the only safeguard in 
such a case is that the person in charge of the 
aircraft must have satisfied himself before commencing 
the flight that every passenger carried in an open 
cockpit, and the pilot, is properly secured by the 
prescribed safety belts. (57) Also acrobatic 
flying over open air assemblies of persons requires 
the consent of the Secretary of Commerce (58) and 
not merely, as in great Britain, the consent of the 
promoters of the gathering. Under the Uniform State 
Law acrobatic flying is prohibited absolutely over 
open air assemblies, as it is over thickly inhabited 
areas. 
So too there is a material difference with 
regard to the dropping of articles from aircraft. 
Under the Air Commerce Regulations 
"except when necessary to the personal safety of the 
"pilot, passengers, or crew, when an aircraft is in 
"flight the pilot shall not drop or release, or permit 
"any person to drop or release, any object or thing 
"which may endanger life or injure property." (59) 
The Lincoln farmer might therefore have fared 
better in America for, while his egg was not presum- 
(56) See.82(H). 
(57) S.R.O.No. 712.(1934),Sec.5. 
(58) Air Commerce Regulations, Sec.82.(I)(2)(b) 
(59) do. Sec.82.(J). 
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ably "an ob ject or thing which may endanger life 
"or property ", it would appear that he was in no 
way liable for the offence since liability rests 
with the pilot, and then only if he has permitted 
the egg to be dropped. Nevertheless it must be 
borne in mind that the Uniform State Law applies 
concurrently in the States which have adopted it, 
and under this the passenger is included for 
"any aeronaut or passenger who ..... within this 
"State drops any object except loose water 
"or loose sand ballast shall be guilty of a mis- 
"demeanour." (60 ) 
Lastly, there is one farther offence 
ander the Uniform State Law which has no parallel 
in Great Britain. It is this, that an aeronaut 
or passenger is guilty of a misdemeanour should he 
"intentionally kill or attempt to kill any birds 
or animals" 
while in flight. The conditions in the United 
States may justify its inclusion bat it seems a 
peculiarly useless provision, having regard to the 
fact that so many restrictions which might have been 
included are not to be found. 
Taken as a whole, American aviation is 
particularly free from regulations, certainly much 
more so than it is in Great Britain. Time will 
show which is the most satisfactory state of affairs. 
In America the development of aviation has evidently 
been the dominating factor. In Britain, the 
characteristic of the rules and regulations is safety- 
safety for the passengers and crew and for the persons 
on the subjacent ground. Considering carefully these 
regulations it is difficult to point to any safeguard 
m v ..... .ii 
(60) Sec .9. 
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which is not really essential, or the observance of 
which will canse undue hardship to the aviator, and 
it may be safely predicted that, rather than finding 
the British regulations, being relaxed, the future 
will see the American law gradually being assimilated 
to that prevailing in Great Britain. 
Chapter, S. 
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The Right to Fly. 
I have already used this title in 
Chapter 2, when considering the two conflicts which 
raged before 1914, the one on sovereignty and the 
other on the application of the maxim cu jus est 
solum ejus est ad coelum asque ad inferos. Then, 
the right to fly truly depended, in International 
Law, on the acceptance of the principle of freedom 
of the air, and in national law, on a limitation 
of the maxim. Now, the right to fly is a privilege 
accorded to the aviator by International Convention 
and national legislation. The character of 
the problem is entirely changed from that which 
M. Fauchille, Dr. Hazeltine, and the other early 
jurists considered. No longer can one debate 
in International Councils as to the acceptance or 
not of the principle of sovereignty. Rather must 
one accept that principle and criticise the extent 
to which innocent international flight is to be 
permitted ander it - a very different proposition 
from that which existed when flight was first 
undertaken - and, in national legislatures, one 
must accept the view that flight is permitted 
and that the maxim cu jas est solum does not 
apply, criticism now being levelled at the 
safeguards to be accorded to the private landowner, 
not as a matter of right, bat by Statute. Accordingly 
under International Law, a consideration of the right 
to fly, at this stage, divides itself into three 
sections, the acceptance of sovereignty, the 
privilege of flight with the restrictions which attend 
it, and the resulting criticism as to the future of 
the right to fly. Under national law, the only 
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matter left is the consideration of the new 
statutory provisions limiting the application of the 
ad coelun maxim. - 
The International Law - (i) Acceptance of Sovereignty. 
The principle of sovereignty had been 
accepted as.a matter of fact at the outbreak of the 
Great War in 1914, and, when, in 1919, the Allied 
and Associated Powers decided on the first Article 
of the Paris Convention that 
"the High Contracting Parties recognise that every 
"Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over 
"the airspace above its territory" 
they were introducing no revolutionary doctrine. 
They were merely adding to the principles of Inter- 
national Law one which had already been recognised. 
True, it was the stress of an unprecedented world 
crisis which forced its recognition, but its 
acceptance remained. Nevertheless, the protagonists 
of the air freedom theory find a vulnerable spot in 
the armour of the principle of sovereignty when they 
point to the facts surrounding its acceptance, and, 
in the light of modern development, it is a matter of 
no little interest to conjecture how the scales of 
the old conflict would have turned eventually had the 
development of the law proceeded along normal lines. 
Under the Convention, the territory of a state over 
which sovereignty is exercised includes 
"the national territory, both that of the mother 
"country and of the colonies, and the territorial 
"waters adjacent thereto." (1) 
The text of the Havana Convention is almost 
identical, 
"The High Contracting Parties recognise that every 
"State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over 





and the Spanish American Convention of 1926 embodies 
the provisions of the Convention of 1919. In 
addition, all the various bi- lateral conventions give 
effect to the same principle. 
The national legislation invariably 
reiterates the principle. Thus the Preamble of 
the Air Navigation Act of 1920 reads 
"whereas the full and absolute sovereignty and 
"rightful jurisdiction of His Majesty extends, and 
"has always extended over the air superincumbent on 
"all parts of His Majesty's Dominions and the 
"territorial waters adjacent thereto," 
the Air Commerce Act of 1926 enacts that 
"Congress hereby declares that the Government of the 
"United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign 
"nations, complete sovereignty of the airspace over 
"the lands and waters of the United States, 
"including the Canal Zone," (3) 
and the Uniform State Law that 
"sovereignty in the space above the lands and waters 
"of this State is declared to rest in the State, 
"except where granted to and assumed by the United 
"States pursuant to a constitutional grant from the 
"people of this State." (4) 
A perusal of the relevant passages of the 
Air Commerce Act and the Uniform State Law leaves one 
not conversant with the American Federal structure 
in some doubt as to who exactly does have sovereign 
rights in the airspace above the United States. 
What is clear, is the fact that, in any event, the 
United States of America accepts the principle of 
sovereignty which at the moment is really all that 
matters. Yet for the sake of clarity and a better 
understanding of the restrictions attending flight 
which are to be discussed subsequently, I may state 
that, while certain States still maintain the old 
doctrine of their sovereign rights - Hawaii and 




assumption by the United States of sovereignty, in 
their adoption of the Uniform State Law - the United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly decided that 
Congress has almost unlimited sovereign powers ander 
the Interstate Commerce Clause, especially with regard 
to air navigation. These powers are so extensive that 
the American Bar Association abandoned the idea of 
drafting an Amendment to the Constitution, which it 
had originally considered necessary, in favour of the 
Uniform State Law. Zollman (5) has summarised the 
position thus , 
"from the viewpoint of foreigners, the sovereignty of 
"the airspace is vested in the United States. So far 
"as citizens are concerned, it is vested in the 
"individual States." 
(ii) The privilege of flight and the restrictions 
erevu. 
Sovereignty being once recognised and 
accepted, the second stage was to accord freedom of 
innocent passage to the aircraft of other States on 
conditions of reciprocity. Indeed, there can be 
no doubt that sovereignty was, and could only be 
accepted on this understanding. However, freedom 
of innocent passage depended on what may be looked 
upon as the third stage, namely on restrictions 
which were consistent with the recognition of 
sovereignty. Accordingly the second Article of the 
Faris Convention was in these terms, 
"each contracting State undertakes in time of peace 
"to accord freedom of innocent passage above its 
"territory to the aircraft of the other contracting 
"States, provided that the conditions laid down in 
"the. present Convention are observed. 
"Regulations made by a Contracting State as to the 
"admission over its territory of the aircraft of the 
"other contracting States shall be applied without 
"distinction of nationality." 
(5) Law of the Air, p.54. 
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The corresponding Article of the Pan American 
Convention did not differ in substance. (6) 
The conditions and regulations referred 
to in these Articles under which freedom of innocent 
passage is permitted are of two classes, the first 
beingcontained in the Convention itself and the 
second in the national legislation which followed 
on it. 
First, as to the conditions appearing in 
the Convention. These are really of two classes, 
the limitation on freedom of innocent passage, and 
the conditions, strictly so called, under which such 
freedom of passage is permitted. Directly flowing 
from its sovereignty, each State was entitled to 
create prohibited areas and no distinction was to be 
made between its own national aircraft and the air- 
craft of other States in the prohibiting of flight 
over such areas. (7). That was as the Convention was 
signed. The protocol of 1929 made two very vital 
additions. As an exceptional measure, and in the 
interest of public safety, national aircraft may be 
authorised to fly over a prohibited area, and, in 
exceptional circumstances, each contracting State 
reserves the right 
"in time of peace and with immediate effect temporar- 
ily to restrict or prohibit flight over its 
"territory or over part of its territory on condition 
"that such restriction or prohibition shall be 
"applicable without distinction of nationality to the 
"aircraft of all the other States." 
These two alterations in themselves materially 
restrict the so- called "freedom" of Article 2. 
An aircraft finding itself over a prohibited 
(6) Art. 4. 
(7) Art. 3. 
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area must give the appropriate distress signal and 
land outside the area. (8) 
The next limitation is to be found in 
Article lb which has also been subject to amendment 
by the 1929 Protocol. Under it 
"every aircraft of a contracting State has the right 
"to cross the airspace of another State without 
"landing." 
This in itself is merely a reiteration of freedom of 
innocent passage. The limitation is in the fact 
that the aircraft mast, daring such flight, follow the 
route fixed by the State over Which it is flying, 
and it will be obliged to land if ordered to do so 
for "reasons of general security." If it intends 
to land it may be required to do so at a fixed 
aerodrome. In addition, the establishment of 
international airways may be made conditional on 
the consent of the States flown over, whether such 
airways purpose landing on their territory or not. 
A further, and very necessary restriction, was made 
by the Protocol of 1929 whereby 
"no aircraft of a contracting State capable of being 
"flown without a pilot shall except by special 
"authorisation fly without a pilot over the territory 
"of another contracting State," 
thus meeting the case of machines operated by wireless 
and under the control of robot pilots, a very modern 
invention, and highly dangerous from the point of 
view of the State flown over. 
Lastly, there was the prohibition of flight 
by military aircraft, already noticed. (9) 
Of the conditions properly so called are 
the following:- every aircraft engaged in 
international flight shall be entered on the Register 
of a contracting State and carry the necessary 
(8) Art.4. 
(9) Ante, p.141. 
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nationality and registration marks (lo) ; it must 
be provided with a certificate of airworthiness (11) ; 
the commanding officer, pilot, and engineers and 
other members of the operating crew must possess the 
necessary licences (12); certain passenger carrying 
aircraft may require to possess sending and 
receiving wireless apparatus (13); and the requisite 
documents mast be carried (14): In addition, there 
are the various prohibitions against the carriage 
of certain defined articles (15) , and it must not be 
overlooked that the conditions enumerated necessarily 
involve the addition of the more detailed regulations 
relating to them contained in the Annexes. 
Second, the aviator is faced with the vast 
accumulation of conditions and regulations imposed 
by the national legislatures. These again fall 
into two classes. The legislation of the 
contracting States first applied the conditions and 
regulations set forth in the Convention, and, in so 
doing, imposed no further obligations on the aviator 
other than those which already he had to observe. 
However, from what I have said, it will have been 
apparent that the contracting States were left 
considerable latitude in creating certain other 
conditions and limitations on the freedom of innocent 
passage, e.g. the right to establish reservations 
and restrictions in favour of its national aircraft 
in connection with the carriage of persons and goods 
for hire between two points in its territory (16) and 
the right to visit aircraft and verify their documents 
on landing or departure (17), besides the rights 
(lo) Arts.6-10. (14) Art.19. 
(11) Art.11. (15 ) Arts.26-29. Ante.p.141. 
(12) Art .12 . (16) Art.16. 
(13) Art.14. (17) Art.21. 
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already mentioned to fix prohibited areas, routes 
to be flown over and aerodromes to land at; to 
regulate the operation of international airways 
over their territory; and to prohibit the carriage of 
any objects it may decide upon. 
Nothing is to be gained by narrating the 
provisions of the British Regulations giving effect 
to those of the Convention, or by enumerating the 
prohibited areas, corridors of entry, or customs 
aerodromes at which aircraft coming from abroad mast 
land. So far, no reservations have been made in 
favour of British aircraft in connection with the 
carriage of persons and goods for hire between two 
points in its territory, and, as regards prohibited 
carriage, only the articles specified in the Paris 
Convention have been prohibited. The trae spirit 
of the Paris Convention mast be that any conditions 
imposed by the contracting States, if additional, 
must be in harmony with those which it lays down, and 
generally speaking it may be said that the British 
regulations satisfy that test. Yet, in certain 
respects, its provisions do appear, at first sight 
to go farther than the Convention would warrant. 
Only in minor respects does the Havana 
Convention differ from the Paris Convention, and, 
of these, two might be mentioned. Whereas the 
Paris Convention makes it permissible for contracting 
States to fix aerodromes at which the aircraft of 
another contracting State entering its territory, with 
the intention of landing, must land (18), the Havana 
Convention makes this obligatory. 
(18) Art.15. 
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"Every aircraft engaged in international traffic 
"which enters the airspace of a contracting State 
"with the intention of landing in said State shall 
"do so in the corresponding customs aerodrome, 
"except in cases mentioned in Article XIX and in 
"ease of force majeare which mast be proved." (19 ) 
The exceptions in Article 19 are 
"postal aircraft and aircraft belonging to 
"aerial transport companies regularly constituted 
"and authorised," 
which may land at inland aerodromes and not at the 
"port of entry ". 
While the Paris Convention makes the 
establishment of international airways conditional 
on the prior authorisation of the State whose territory 
it is proposed to fly over or land in (20), the 
Havana Convention wakes their establishment a right 
ander the Convention. Thas 
"the aircraft of a contracting State engaged in 
"international air commerce shall be permitted to 
"discharge passengers and a part of its cargo at one 
"of the airports designated as a port of entry of 
"any other contracting State and to proceed to any 
"other airport or airports in such State for the 
"purpose of discharging the remaining passengers 
"and portions of such cargo, and in like manner to 
"take on passengers and load cargo designed for a 
"foreign State or States " (21 ) 
The Air Commerce Act was, of coarse, in force 
for two years before . the Havana Convention was signed, 
and, in respect that it is not an Act giving effect 
to the Convention, but rather one, the provisions of 
which were given effect to in the Convention, differs 
from the British Air Navigation Act. Nevertheless 
it contains provision for airspace reservations 
"for national defense and other governmental purposes" 
(22); the entry of the aircraft of a foreign nation into 
the United States on condition that such nation grants 
"a similar privilege in respect of the aircraft of the 
"United States" bat no foreign aircraft are to engage in 
(19) Art.18. (21) Art.21. 
(20) Art .15. (22) S ec .4. 
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interstate or intrastate commerce (23); and power 
to apply the existing laws relating to foreign 
commerce (24) . Lastly, it contains a pecubarly 
interesting definition of "navigable airspace" which 
as ased in the Act means the 
"airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight 
"prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce ander Section 
"3, and such navigable airspace shall be subject to 
"a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign 
"navigation in conformity with the requirements of 
"the Act." (25) 
(iii) The future of the right to fly - 
While at the time the Convention was drawn 
up there was an overwhelming weight of opinion on 
the side of sovereignty, it mast not be imagined that 
its acceptance has given unqualified satisfaction. 
Henry- Couannier considers the first Article in the 
Paris Convention as the "main weak spot in it" (26) 
and he has declared that sovereignty will be accepted 
for a short time only or remain a dead letter in view 
of the ever pressing necessity to yield to the 
requirements of international air navigation. The 
fact that the Convention was produced at a time when 
the trend of opinion was in favour of anything which 
would assure everlasting peace mast be recognised, 
bat it is not possible to gaage just to what extent 
Article 1 is the result of such public opinion. It 
may be that the normal evolution of the law would 
have resulted in a different Article, but, on the 
whole it is safe to assume that the principle of 
sovereignty would have triumphed eventually. What- 
ever may be conjectured, we mast accept sovereignty 
as an accomplished fact, but, having done so, can 
(23) Sec.6.(c). 
(24) Sec . 7 . 
(25) Sec a°. 1p
(26) Elements Créateurs du Droit Aérien (Paris 1929) 
p.144. 
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we say that it will continue to be accepted? Will 
it not indeed be accepted for a short time only or 
become a dead letter yielding to the requirements 
of international air navigation? That is the 
question we must now consider. 
Henry- Coaannier visualises two distinct 
sets of circumstances and er which the principle of 
sovereignty will be rejected. The first, that which 
would cause it to be rejected after a shorttrial, 
is obviously based on the view that its acceptance 
was urged as a result of the distorted opinion which 
held sway at the conclusion of the Great War. This 
is altogether an erroneous view, and, if it is the 
only foundation for suggesting that sovereignty 
will be accepted for a short time only, it can be 
disregarded at once. The more accurate estimate of 
the effect of the Great War is, I submit, that it 
hastened on the acceptance of a view which was 
gradually gaining ground, and which, sooner or later, 
would have been accepted. The need for national 
security was in itself sufficient to enforce its 
acceptance. 
That the development of aviation will cause 
sovereignty ultimately to become a dead letter is 
perhaps a more substantial argument. In fact, should 
the principle be accepted only for a short time, it is 
in the development of international aviation that the 
reason for its rejection will be found. In this 
respect I find more substance on which to base 
arguments. The principle of sovereignty has now 
been accepted by International agreement for fifteen 
years, and, for the first time, its protagonists and 
antagonists can substantiate their views, not as the 
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early jurists on legal theory, bat on the actual 
working of an international legal system ander which 
States are recognised to have sovereign rights in 
the atmosphere above their respective territories. 
The future of the principle of sovereignty, therefore, 
depends on the successful working of this system 
and the answer to the question whether sovereignty 
will yield to the requirements of International air 
navigation is simply this - has the Paris Convention 
stood the test of practical operation? 
Like all other Conventions, it has its 
critics, and some, such as Henry -Coaannier, advocate 
its complete rejection on the ground that the 
acceptance of sovereignty is contrary to the whole 
spirit of the development of flight. The majority 
of its critics, however, do not find fault with its 
acceptance of sovereignty. Rather do they find 
objection in the conditions imposed on "innocent" 
flight, conditions which they maintain are repugnant 
to the very idea of freedom of flight. Those 
conditions, we have already seen, are of two kinds, 
the first, contained in the Convention, and the 
second, those which, within limits, the contracting 
States were allowed to impose. Altogether, these 
conditions, were they the maximum which could be 
imposed, severely limit commercial and private 
aviation, and there are many very sound reasons why 
they should be considerably relaxed. They are 
not, however, all that have been imposed. 
In Great Britain there is the prohibition 
against a person being in or even entering an aircraft 
while in a state of intoxication. This is a very 
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laudable provision and may not cause any undue 
hardship to the aircraft of other contracting States 
although it may not be appreciated by them. That is 
not the point. The fact remains that it is not a 
condition appearing in the Convention and it does not 
seem to be authorised under any of the Articles 
which leave the contracting States free to impose 
conditions. If that is so, on what authority can 
Great Britain be justified in subjecting the aircraft 
of other contracting States to such a condition? 
In itself, it is a regulation of minor importance, 
bat it is an example of a type of restriction 
imposed over and above those already envisaged 
by the Paris Convention, a type which is beginning 
to operate as a very severe handicap on commercial 
and private aviation. 
The attention of the I.C.A.N. has recently 
been called to the position, since in several 
countries, before a flight in their airspace by the 
aircraft of another country is permitted, prior 
notification mast be given of such intention. In 
some cases even, prior authorisation mast be obtained 
and Roumania has asked for the opinion of the 
Commission on the following question, 
"si, par une large interprétation de l'article 2, 
"second paragraphe, un Etat contractant pourrait 
"prendre unde disposition par laquelle il subordon- 
nerait le survol des aéronefs ressortissant aux 
"autres Etats contractant, à une autorisation qui 
"devrait être obtenae prélablement pour chaque 
"aéronef á part, même si l'obtention de cette autori- 
sation n'était subordonnée qu'a une simple formalité 
"comme, par example, de communiquer á. la legation de 
"l'état que l'on veut survoler, les dates et 
"caractéristiques de l'aéronef, les noms du personnel 
"de bord et des passagers, la date et le séjour 
"probable du survol, les noms des aérports sur lequels 
"on a l'intention d'atterrir et le bat du voyage." 
In the Convention no direct answer can be 
found, and we are forced to examine its provisions 
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as a whole to find the answer - in particular, 
Articles 1, 2 and 15. 
The first Article lays down the principle 
of sovereignty, and in the second, this is followed 
up by the declaration by which contracting States 
undertake to accord freedom of innocent passage 
provided the provisions laid down in the declaration 
are complied with, adding 
"Regulations made by a contracting State as to the 
"admission over its territory of the aircraft of the 
"other contracting States shall be applied without 
"distinction of nationality." 
To declare that states have complete and exclusive 
sovereignty in the airspace above their territory 
taken by itself, means one thing only, that a State 
is free to impose whatever conditions it may desire. 
That being so 
"the regulations made by a contracting State as to the 
"admission over its territory of the aircraft of 
"the other contracting States ", 
which regulations must be applied without distinction 
of nationality, must mean that a State has a free 
hand to impose any conditions it may consider 
essential, and that, in addition to imposing those 
laid down in the Convention. Indeed, to carry the 
argument to its logical conclusion, a state need 
not, inthese circumstances, even impose the 
conditions laid down in the Convention. Farther 
it means that in the Convention 
"no ruht of innocent passage is averred or recog- 
"nise 
and that 
"Article lb in declaring the right of foreign air- 
"craft to cross the airspace of another State merely 
"makes trans -state flight by foreign aircraft 
"legal." (27) 
Adopting that view, the question submitted by 
(27) Bouvé, Development of Conduct in Air Navigation, 
1 Air Law Review, p.27. 
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Roumania would be answered in the affirmative, 
bat, I think wrongly so. 
The other side of the argument is that 
the real principle laid down in the Convention is 
to be found in Article 2, i.e. freedom of innocent 
passage, and that the second paragraph thereof 
must be regarded in that light. The Convention 
lays down the full extent of the restrictions to 
be imposed on innocent flight and the answer to 
the Roumanian enquiry is accordingly in the 
negative. 
That such is the sound answer I do not 
doubt, but the line of reasoning is not to be found 
in either of those extremes. The Convention 
accepts sovereignty and it must be interpreted in 
that light. To that extent States can do what 
they like in their own atmosphere in the direction of 
closing it to air navigation in the "exceptional 
"circumstances" allowed for in Article 3, paragraph 3, 
bat, so long as it is not closed, they accord the 
right, in the sense of "privilege" of innocent passage 
under Article 2. They do not accord a similar 
right to land, only to fly over their territory. 
Article 15 is a mere repetition of Article 2 for the 
purpose of declaring the limitations which are to 
apply to that privilege granted by the latter. This 
right of freedom of innocent passage is a contractual 
one and its character in that respect must not be 
forgotten. The purpose of the Convention was to 
enable innocent of "inoffensif" international flight to be 
carried on between States which had already recognised the 
doctrine of sovereignty. The draughtsmen of commercial 
contracts are careful to embody in the deed of contract the 
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fall extent of the conditions to be observed by, 
and the restrictions to be put on each of the 
contracting parties. The terms of the contract 
are reduced to writing for the very purpose of 
ensuring that the parties know where they stand and 
will not at a later date be subjected to additional 
conditions and hardships. Why should an Inter- 
national Contract be r egarded otherwise? The Paris 
Convention enabled commercial and private aviation 
to be indulged in on the conditions and restrictions 
to which it gave effect and on these only. It was 
not the intention of those who drew it ap that 
further conditions and limitations should be added 
at the pleasure of each and every State, for 
then the Convention would have served no useful 
purpose. It was their intention that no greater 
restrictions should be pat by contracting States 
on the aircraft of other contracting states than 
were imposed on their own nationals. Hence 
the insertion of the second paragraph of Article 2, 
which is no more than a declaration of equality 
of treatment. To read into it the meaning that it 
enables contracting States to impose unlimited 
restrictions on international flight is to give it a 
meaning without reason or common sense. 
It would therefore seem that the Legal 
Sub -Commission of the I.C.A.N. has given the only 
possible answer to the question submitted to it by 
deciding that no rule to the effect that a contract- 
ing State makes conditional on a special and prior 
authorisation flight over its territory by the 
aircraft of the other contracting States could be 
laid down by virtue of the second paragraph of 
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Article 2 and the first paragraph of Article 15, 
even if the issue of the authorisation in question 
is dependent only on a simple formality consisting 
for example, of communicating before the flight, to 
the diplomatic or consular authorities of the country 
flown over, information with regard to the aircraft, 
crew, cargo, and, in general, with regard to the 
journey the said aircraft desires to make. 
It must always be remembered, of course, 
that the official decision of the I.C.A.N. is by no 
means binding. Such a decision could only come 
from the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
or, as the result of an Arbitration, since the matter 
is one of interpretation which is regulated by 
Article 37 of the Convention, but it is difficult to 
see how the Permanent Court could differ. 
Having taken the view that conditions, 
other than those appearing in the Convention or 
expressly authorised by it, are ultra vires and illegal 
in the sense that they constitute a breach of the 
Convention I have disposed of the first class of 
critics. Their objections being upheld by the 
that organisation must now address itself to finding 
the remedy. The next criticism is levelled at the 
conditions which are permitted, and emanates principally 
from those persons who are interested in the commercial 
side of aviation. Their whole grievance can best 
be gleaned from the Reports of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, which body is sufficiently 
representative of their interests. It is 
Article 15 of the Convention to which objection is 
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taken, but, on this occasion, the concluding para- 
graph, which, as amended by the 1929 .erot000l now reads 
"every contracting State may make conditional on its 
"prior authorisation the establishment of internation- 
"al airways and the creation and operation of 
"regular international air navigation lines with or 
"without landing on its territory." 
It must be clearly distinguished from the point 
raised by Roumania which dealt with a prior authoris- 
ation being obtained for flight by private aircraft. 
Regalar international air lines are compelled by 
Article 15 to obtain the consent of the States to be 
flown over before commencing operations. 
A provision such as this gives Henry - 
Couannier just cause to lament the acceptance of sover- 
eignty. It is a provision which can, and has been 
used to hamper materially the development of aviation. 
There may be some justification for making conditional 
on prior authorisation the landing of a regular air 
line in an intermediate country. There can be none for 
making cross country flying without landing conditional 
on such prior permission. It tends to tie up the 
whole international commercial aviation and Great 
Britain felt the effect very considerably when, on 
failing to obtain the necessary authority, her Imperial 
air lines were forced to make wide detours, with the 
result that valuable time is lost and the cost of 
transportation increased. 
Has the Paris Convention in so far as it 
contains the acceptance of sovereignty stood the test of 
practical operation? Put in another way has the 
result of its operation been such that a declaration 
of freedom of the air rather than of sovereignty is now 
demanded? Once again we are faced with the question. 
The need for national security is as imperative 
to-day as it was in 1919, and, from that point of 
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view, the time is not yet ripe to reverse the 
order of things, and declare freedom of the 
air space. The International Law Association 
at its Meeting in Vienna in 1926 went so far as to 
recommend that the principle of air sovereignty 
contained in the Paris Convention should be embodied 
in any International radio convention, and the fourth 
Congrès International de la navigation Aèrienne, 
meeting in Rome in 1927 confirmed the principle of 
sovereignty and resolved 
"que chaque Etat a le droit soit d'interdire certaines 
"zones a la navigation, soit d'indiquer les routes 
"d'entrée, de traversée et de sortie." (28) 
The tendency of these not unimportant resolutions, 
therefore, is towards enlarging rather than minimising 
the exercise of sovereign rights. 
However, full cognisance mast be given 
to the defects which have become apparent in the 
Convention, especially in Article 15, the working of 
which has caused hardship in practice. But the 
remedy is to be found rather in extending the privilege 
of freedom of innocent flight introduced by the 
Convention than in reversing the principle on which 
it is based. Great Britain, one of the strongest 
protagonists of sovereignty in 1919, was, by 1929, 
at the Conference called to consider the amendments 
required in the text of the Convention, urging a 
greater right of flight, a choice of routes, and a 
more liberal interpretation of Article 15. The 
same note was struck by the International Law 
Association at its New York Conference in 1930 when 
it urged that all States should co-operate in 
bringing about a comprehensive international agree- 
(28) R.A.I., No.l.p.37. 
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ment for the control and conduct of air navigation 
and that each contracting party shoald undertake in 
time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage 
above its territory to private aircraft of other 
contracting parties provided that the conditions 
laid down by the Convention were complied with. 
Lastly, the International Chamber of Commerce, at its 
Conference held in Vienna daring May and June 1933, 
after having the benefit of several exhaustive 
Reports from its Committee on Air Transport and from 
individual members, passed a comprehensive resolution, 
on the narrative that freedom of passage constituted 
a necessary element in the development and progress 
of international air navigation services, to the 
effect 
"(a) that the formation of international air lines 
"should be free and that it should not in future be 
"dependent upon obtaining previous sanction from the 
"State flown over; that in consequence Article 15 
"of the Convention of 1919 be amended to that effect; 
"(b) that at least until Article 15 of the Convention 
"of 1919 has been amended, the right to make the 
"formation of international lines dependent upon the 
"previous sanction of the State flown over should 
"only be exercised exceptionally." (29) 
SStich was the recommendation of the repre - 
sentatives of thirty five States and fifty five 
International organisations. It cannot be regarded 
lightly. The conclusion, therefore, mast be that 
the Paris Convention needs no radical alteration. 
Rather does it require a more liberal interpretation, 
even amendment, to make fxedom of innocent passage a 
reality instead of a mere pretence as at present. 
There is no reason to believe that the future will 
see sovereignty becoming a dead letter. The 
conflict is surely ended, and sovereignty has 
triumphed. 
(29) R.A. I. , No.9. p.277. 
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The National Law 
The present position of the maxim cups 
est solum ejus est ad coelum usque ad inferos may 
now be shortly stated. Whereas, in International 
flight, the sovereignty of States in the airspace 
above their territories to an unlimited extent was 
recognised and flight was thereafter permitted, in 
the national law, the position was reversed. The 
unrestricted right of flight is first recognised and 
the rights of the landowner in the airspace above his 
property ad coelum have been reduced to the minimum 
consistent with safety to his person and property. 
The Air Navigation Act makes this assertion in 
unqualified terms - 
"No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in 
"respect of nuisance by reason only of the flight of 
"aircraft over any property at a height above the 
"ground, which, having regard to wind, weather, and 
"all the circumstances of the case is reasonable or 
"the ordinary incidents of such flight, so long as 
"the provisions of this Act and any Order made 
"thereunder, qnd of the Convention, are duly complied 
"with." (30) 
The effect of this section is to link trespass and 
nuisance together so far as concerns aviation, and, 
at first sight, is to lay to rest any question as 
to the application of the maxim, but that is so only 
to a limited extent. It only applies to aircraft 
which have complied with all the provisions of the 
Act, no matter how trivial, and to aircraft covered 
by the Act or relative Orders. In any other case 
the immunity could not be invoked and presumably the 
success of an action for trespass or nuisance would 
in such cases depend on the effect of the maxim at 
common law. The meaning of a height which is 
reasonable in the circumstances will in all probability 
(30) 6ec.9(1). 
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be the subject of judicial interpretation in time 
to come. 
The British Act proceeds on the assumption 
that if a landowner does not have complete ownership 
of the airspace above his property there is sufficient 
doubt to necessitate Statutory enactment. In the 
United States of America it has been considered 
advisable to insert in the Uniform State Law a pro- 
vision that every landowner does own the airspace 
above his property, 
"the ownership of the space above the lands and 
"waters of this State is declared to be vested in 
"the several owners of the surface beneath subject 
"to the right of flight described in Section 4." (31) 
In at least one State, the proviso as to the right 
of flight is not inserted. The fourth Section 
referred to states that 
"flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of 
"this State is lawful unless at such a low altitude 
"as to interfere with the then existing use to which 
"the land or water, or the space over the land or 
"water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted 
"as to be immediately dangerous to persons or 
"property lawfully on the land or water beneath." 
The provisions of the Uniform State Law have mach to 
recommend them and are perhaps better than the pro- 
visions of the Air Navigation Act. They are 
clearer and more concise and are not likely to give 
rise to such difficulty of interpretation as the 
British Act which has caused an unnecessary compli- 
cation by coupling in one Section the trespass and 
nuisance provisions with those relating to damage 
caused to third parties on the surface. There is no 
real necessity to make the harsh enactment as to the 
conditions of the Act being complied with - a 
provision which is more applicable to the second part 
(31) Section, 3. 
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of the Section than to the first. - If this is to 
remain, then a declaration along the lines of the 
third Section of the Uniform State Law would have 
prevented a lengthy discussion as to the application 
of the maxim ca jas est solum which must arise in 
any action of trespass against a party who has failed 
to comply with the provisions of the Act, or of the 
Orders made thereunder, or of the Convention. 
The British Law has not thought it necessary 
to make any reference to the entry of aircraft on 
the landownerTs property. There can be no doubt 
that this would constitute a trespass and be illegal 
but the Uniform State Law has declared that 
"the landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters 
"of another, without his consent is unlawful, except 
"in the case of a forced landing." 
This would not be the position under the English Law 
since an aviator making even a forced landing would 
be guilty of trespass. 
Whatever may be the law, it is desirable 
that, so far as possible, it should be uniform, and 
that each State should adopt the same principle in deal 
ing with trespass and nuisance. The International Law 
Association affirmed this necessity at its meetings 
at the Hague in 1921, and again at Stockholm in 1924, 
and suggested that no action should lie for trespass 
by reason purely and solely of the flight of any 
aircraft over any property at a reasonable height, to 
be fixed by Convention. The main difficulty would 
be in determining what height to be agreed upon, but 
the most feasible solution would be to leave it at 
a "reasonable height ", "reasonable" being interpreted 
much on the lines of the fourth Section of the 
Uniform State Law. 
Cbapt9 
-179- 
Lamage caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the 
Surface. 
Of all the questions arising out of 
aviation, the matter of damage caused by aircraft 
is the one of most widespread interest since it affects 
every individual without exception, and the laws to 
be enacted have in view the interest not merely of 
aviation but of the whole populace. The matter is 
accordingly one worthy of detailed consideration. 
It has three aspects - prevention of damage, liability 
therefor once it has been occasioned, and the 
indemnification of the injured parties. 
The Paris Convention takes steps to 
prevent damage by providing that every aircraft en- 
gaged in international flight shall be provided with 
a Certificate of Airworthiness (1) and that the 
commanding officer, pilots, engineers and other 
members of the operating crew shall be provided 
with Certificates of Competency and Licences issued 
or rendered valid by the State whose nationality the 
aircraft possesses. (2) The Certificates issued 
by one contracting State in accordance with the 
regulations laid down in the Convention shall be 
recognised as valid by the other contracting States. (3) 
The Havana Convention has similar requirements. (4) 
The old controversy has thus been settled by the 
adoption of the dual system consisting of certification 
both of machine and of personnel, the only course to 
adopt. 
The requirements necessary before an air- 
craft is certified as airworthy or a pilot as 
(1) Art.11. (3) Art.13. 
(2) Art.13. (4) Arts. 12-14. 
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competent are in a high degree technical. They 
are to be found in the Annexes to the Convention (5 ) 
and in the Schedules annexed to the British Orders 
in Council (6) . They are subject to continual 
alteration as aviation develops but their object is 
to ensure that, as far as human foresight can make 
it possible, an accident will not be the result 
of a faulty machine or incompetent pilot, and the 
standards set in each case are consistently high. 
In addition, in Great Britain, safety is farther 
ensured by providing for the periodical overhaul 
and inspection, and even detention of passenger 
or goods carrying aircraft which the Secretary of 
State has reason to believe are in a condition unfit 
for flight, and the examination before every flight 
of aircraft carrying passengers or goods for hire or 
reward. Although there are repeated protests that 
those regulations are hampering the development of 
aviation, they are being used to good effect, for, 
of the accidents investigated by the Air Ministry 
since the Regulations were enforced, only a very small 
percentage were traced to defective aircraft. 
Once damage has been occasioned, the 
liability therefor is now regulated in Great Britain 
by the Air Navigation Act, 
"where material darn ge or loss is caused by an 
"aircraft in flight, taking off, or landing, or by 
"any person in any such aircraft, or by any article 
"falling from any such aircraft, to any person or 
"property on land or water, damages shall be recover- 
"able from the owner of the aircraft in respect of 
"such damage or loss without proof of negligence or 
"intention or other cause of action as though the 
"same had been caused by his wilful act, neglect or 
"default except where the damage or loss was caused by 
"or contributed to by the negligence of the person by 
"whom the same was suffered." (7 
(5) Annexes B. and E. 
(6) Schedules 2 & 5. S.R.O.No.15O8.(1923). 
(7) Sec.9. 
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The section further provides that where 
damages recovered from and paid by the owner 
arose from the action of another person or 
servant, application may be made to join such 
person as defendant, or, if not, the owner may 
take separate action against such person. 
Where the aircraft is bona fide demised, 
let, or hired out, references to the Owner 
under the Section shall refer to the person 
to whom the aircraft has been demised, let, 
or hired out. 
What is the effect of this section 
and what principle of liability does it 
introduce? prof. t'tua it maintains that the 
principle of absolute liability is introduced (8). 
Wingfield and Sparkes (9) ,and Holdsworth (10 ) 
on the other hand consider that it merely 
introduces a presumption of negligence against 
the owner of the aircraft. However, since 
the Section proceeds on the Report of the Civil 
Aerial Transport Committee, and, in view of the 
terms of that Report (11), it would be more 
accurate to say that it combines the maxim 
res ipsa loquitur and the Rule in Rylands y 
Fletcher. Yet, the recent Report of the 
Committee on the Control of Private Flying 
and other Civil Aviation. Questions is quite 
definite that the Section imposes absolute 
liability for material damage or loss caused 
to any person or property on land or water. (12) 
(8) Law of the Air, p.68. 
(9) Law in relation to Aircraft, p.14. 
(10) Law of Transport, p.147. 
(11) Ante, p.120. 
(12) C md. 4654 (1934) . p.49. 
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Damage caused "in flight ", taking off, 
or "landing" may not be easily defined. "Taking 
off or landing" is presumably intended to cover 
the whole movements of the aircraft from the 
time when the propellor is set in motion with 
the intention of "taking off" to the time when 
the engine is stopped on the completion of 
the flight. The Section was considered in 
the English Case of Cubitt Gower, decided 
in the Kings Bench Division in October 1933 
but not reported. There, the plaintiff had 
taxied his aeroplane oat into the aerodrome, 
and, while it was stationary awaiting a passenger, 
it was run into by the defendant's aeroplane 
which was taxi -ing prior to a "take off ". The 
plea that the plaintiff had caused or contributed 
to the accident was repelled and a decision 
was given in his favour without his having to 
prove negligence. The facts of the case 
clearly fell within the category of damage 
caused by an aircraft "taking off ", but, assuming 
that the defendant's aeroplane had been taxi -ing 
from one side of the aerodrome to the other, 
not at the conclusion of a flight and with 
no intention of "taking off ", the position would 
have been entirely different. It seems 
inevitable that in such circumstances the 
Plaintiff would have required to prove 
negligence on the part of the defendant, and, 
had the collision been the result, say of a 
violent gust of wind causing the defendant's 
aircraft to swing round, he would not have 
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succeeded. Had the defendant been taxi -ing 
prior to a take off this latter defence would 
have been of no avail. 
It would also appear that before liability 
under the Section can be applied, the damage or 
loss caused must be "material". This leaves a 
very wide latitude to the Courts, and, in a way, 
will cause considerable hardship. Before an 
injured party can succeed he has to show that 
his damage or loss is "material ", and the result 
must be that in those cases where the loss or 
damage is slight - probably the more numerous 
cases - he will be ander the burden of proving 
negligence. 
It is evident, therefore, that there 
are still cases in which recourse will require to 
be had to the principles of the common law in 
deciding the liability for damage caused by 
aircraft. Apart from the cases mentioned, 
the Act would not apply to 
"aircraft belonging to or exclusively employed 
"in the service of His Majesty" (13) 
or to aircraft which do not possess the nationality 
of a State party to the Paris Convention or 
to a special Convention and which did not hold 
a special and temporary authorisation. 
The effect of a contravention of 
any of the provisions of the principal Act or 
(13) Air Navigation Act, Seo.18(1). 
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Orders made thereunder in questions of civil 
liability has also been raised. In other 
words, if the injured person is debarred from 
pleading the Act and is also unable to prove 
negligence, can he claim damages on the ground 
of a contravention of the Act or Order? In 
England the breach of a statutory rale is prima 
facie evidence of negligence bat the statutory 
enactment is not the exact measure of an 
individual's duty. The leading case is 
Philips y Britannia Laundry (14) where a wheel 
came off a lorry going along a road and damaged 
the plaintiff's van. The plaintiff could 
not prove negligence but founded his claim 
on a Statutory Regulation whereby a penalty 
of £10 was imposed for failure to keep a motor 
car and its fittings in such a condition that 
they would not be in a position to cause damage 
to persons using the road. On the assumption 
that it was unlikely that the legislature 
intended to impose an absolute duty, the 
Court held against the plaintiff, and, if this 
is the law, the person suffering loss and 
damage as a result of articles falling or 
being dropped from an aircraft could not 
found on a contravention of Section 9 of the 
Air Navigation but would require to prove 
his case in the ordinary way. 
(14) (1923) 2 K.B. 841. 
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The Uniform State Law provides that 
"the owner of every aircraft which is operated 
"over the lands and waters of this State 
"is absolutely liable for injuries to persons 
"and property on the land or water beneath, 
"caused by the ascent, descent, or flight 
"of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling 
"of any object therefrom, whether such owner 
"was negligent or not, unless the injury is 
"caused in whole or in part by the negligence 
"of the person injured or of the owner or 
"bailee of the property injured." (l5) 
Like the rest of law, the section only applies 
to aircraft designed to manoeuvre on land, sea- 
planes and flying boats being expressly 
excluded, and parachutes do not appear to fall 
within its scope. The section is more concise 
than the British Act in respect that it clearly 
states that absolute liability is to be the 
rule and all injuries to persons or property 
are covered. Whether "ascent" and "descent" 
are capable of such a wide interpretation as 
"taking off" and "landing" is to be doubted and 
it could be that "ascent" and "descent" would 
not cover the period of taxi -ing, on the ground, 
being limited to the actual ascent and descent 
while in flight. It is also specially 
provided that the owner or lessee will be 
liable for damages caused by a forced landing, 
for which he is not liable ander trespass, 
as provided by Section 5. (16) 
In Great Britain, where an aircraft 




out for a period exceeding fourteen days, 
the person to whom it is so demised, let, or 
hired oat comes in place of the owner in 
questions of liability for daaages. Under 
the Uniform State Law, on the other hand, 
both owner and lessee are liable and may be 
sued jointly or either or both of them may 
be sued separately. The liability of an 
aviator who is not the owner or lessee is 
limited to the consequences of his own 
negligence. 
From what I have just said,it will 
be seen that an aviator would be subjected to 
different principles of liability according 
to whether he was flying over Great Britain 
or the United States. Indeed, he would be 
subjected to different principles of liability 
as he flew over America from one State to 
another, for only seventeen States apply the 
Uniform State Law, two have special laws, 
and the remainder apply the common law. In- 
ternational flight over the various countries 
in Europe is subject to the same difficulty 
and a cursory examination of the laws operating 
in some of the European countries will 
serve to show the difficulty with which an 
aviator is faced. 
In Italy, the state of the law is 
not definitely ascertained but it appears that 
when anything is thrown from an aircraft, 
the principle of absolute liability is 
applied, whereas if anything falls from it 
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the defence of force majeure could be pleaded. 
In all other cases the common law rules apply. 
The owner and commander of the aircraft are 
jointly liable with the author of the damage 
and in certain circumstances where the owner incurs 
liability without, in fact, having caused the 
damage, he is freed from payment of any further 
damages should he elect to hand over the air- 
craft to the injured person. 
In France the law is similar to that in 
force in Great Britain except that the defence of 
contributory negligence is only open if the accident 
causing the damage occurs at an s.erodrome. It 
has been decided that liability begins from the 
moment the propellor is started. The person liable 
is the "operator" of the aircraft, and the weight of 
opinion is in favour of defining "operator" as the 
person who is benefiting materially by the use of the 
aircraft, although in another section of the law it is 
provided that the owner and hirer are jointly 
responsible unless the hirer is entered on the Register; 
a provision which is quite without reason if the 
"operator" is to be taken as the person who is bene- 
fiting by the using of the aircraft. That is, 
unless one holds that the owner who has hired an 
aircraft is also "benefiting materially" by its use, 
an interpretation Which is quite feasible. 
The Polish Law presumes that when an 
accident occurs there was fault on the part of the 
owner of the aircraft and also that such fault on his 
part was the direct cause of the accident. The 
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owner is the person responsible unless in the case 
of hire, where the hirer is registered as such in 
the Register of Aircraft, and also in the case of 
theft. The Aviation Law only applies to damage 
caused by "accident" and any action caused by 
other means, for example by normalflight, mast be 
brought under the Civil Law and negligence proved. 
The owner will be liable for the fault of the pilot 
or other officer acting on his behalf. It has been 
decided that under the Aviation Law, the responsibi- 
lity of the owner begins the moment the aircraft is 
under the control of one of the forces necessary to 
support or propel it in the air. 
Lastly there is the German system, which is 
strictly limited in its application. The under- 
lying principle of the Air Navigation Law is that 
a person who puts in circulation a dangerous object 
is responsible for any damage caused by his so doing, 
and there can be no excuse, bat the law is only 
applied within certain narrowly defined limits. There 
mast be injury to the life or health of persons, or 
damage and destruction of things, and such injury or 
damage must result from an accident which occurred 
daring the "operating" of the aircraft, that is, 
when it was under the action of the motive forces 
necessary to suspend or propel it in the air. The 
person responsible is he who defrays the cost of the 
aircraft's maintenance, uses it, and thereby makes a 
material gain. The defence of contributory 
negligence can be pleaded but only to a very limited 
extent. 
While a comparative study of the various 
legal systems on this all important question of 
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liability for damage is of great interest to the 
lawyer, it is not so to the aviator, for the fact 
emerges that he has no idea what is to be his 
liability should he be involved in an accident which 
caused damage to persons or property on the surface 
below. If there is any branch of the law which 
cried aloud for some measure of uniformity of 
principle, it is this, and at its Conferences at the 
Hague and later at Stockholm in 1924, the International 
Law Association resolved, on the narrative that the 
various laws relating to damages should be uniform, 
that in the event of any loss or damage whatsoever 
to persons or property on land or water caused by 
aircraft, the owner and charterer should be jointly 
and severally liable, without proof of negligence, for 
such loss or damage, provided that the damage or loss 
was not caused or contributed to by the negligence 
of the person by whom the same was suffered. The 
aircraft alleged to be responsible for the damage or 
loss should be subject to immediate arrest and 
detention until such security had been given as might 
be required by the Court. However, it has 
fallen to the International Conferences of Private 
Aerial Law to produce a Convention for the purpose 
of unification of the law. This Convention, which 
was really the work of the offspring of the Confer- 
ences, the Comité International Technique d'Experts 
Juridiques Aériens (C.I.T.E.J.A. ), was finally 
approved at the Third Conference held at Rome in 
May 1933. The purpose of the Convention was the 
unification "de certaines régles relatives aux 
dommages causes par les aéronefs aux tiers ä la surface," 
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and was a combination of two questions dealt with 
by the C.I.T.E.J.A. - the liability for damage, and 
the security to be furnished by an operator of an 
aircraft for each damage. In other words, not only 
was liability considered, bat also indemnification, 
the third aspect of damage. It is important to 
bear in mind that the Convention is only intended to 
apply to damage caused by aircraft of one contracting 
State flying over the territory of another contracting 
State (Art.20 ), and, as a result, does not purport to 
regulate damage caused by national aircraft of a 
contracting State while in flight over their own 
national territory. 
(i) The liability imposed - 
Under the Convention, which has been signed 
by twenty States, including Great Britain, a person 
who suffers loss or damage as a result of the flight 
of aircraft has a right to reparation provided he 
shows, first, the damage, and, second, that the air- 
craft caused it. Included under this is the 
damage caused by articles falling from aircraft, or 
caused by any person on board, unless in the case of 
an intentional act done by a stranger to the aircraft 
outwith the operation thereof, and without the 
operator or his officers being able to prevent it. 
An aircraft is in flight from the commencement of 
rising operations to the conclusion of landing oper- 
ations (Art.1). Contributory negligence is 
pleadable as a defence (Art.2). 
(ii) The persons liable - 
The operator of the aircraft - he who has 
it at his disposal and uses it for his own account- - 
i s the party against whom damages mast be claimed (Art .4 ) 
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although he himself has recourse against the author of 
the damage (Art.7 ). When the name of the operator is 
not officially disclosed, the owner is liable until 
the contrary is proved. If he has taken reasonable 
steps to prevent it, the operator is not liable for 
damages caused by a person operating the aircraft 
without his consent (Art.5) , and where the damage is 
the result of a collision between two or more 
aircraft, the operators are jointly liable (Art.6) 
(iii) The prosecution of the claim - 
The action may be raised in the Courts of 
the defender's domicile or in the Courts of the county 
where the damage was occasioned (Art.16), thus applying 
the rules of private International law presently 
applicable. Claims mast be enforced, or, at least, 
notified, within six months of the date of the accident 
(Art.10), and actions prescribe within a year unless in 
the case where the pursuer shows that he had no know]e dge 
of the identity of the defender, in which case the time 
limit runs from the date on which he became aware of 
the identity. In any event actions prescribe in 
three years (Art.17) . 
At this point it may be convenient to revert 
for a moment to the German Air .Navigation Law. The 
Law is dated 1st August 1922 and Section 23 thereof 
limits the liability of the operator in the case 
of death or wounding of persons to 25.000 marks of 
capital or 1.500 marks of annual income, and if 
several persons are injured, the cumulative amount 
claimable between them must not exceed 75.000 marks of 
capital or 4.500 marks of annual income. In the 
case of things destroyed, the liability is limited 
to 5.000 marks. As a counter part to this limited 
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liability, the holder must show that he has effected 
an insurance for the maximum sum indicated, or has 
furnished a Bank security. The Insurance Company 
must be authorised in the Reich and the Policy mast be 
in such terms that it will remain in force in the case 
of a change of holder during the whole duration of 
the Insurance contract. The necessity for this 
Ìnsurance is Bach that the aircraft will not be 
registered until the authorities are satisfied as to 
the existence of the Insurance. 
The significance of this digression on the 
German Law will be apparent. To begin with it 
brings as to the third aspect, that of the indemnifi- 
cation of damage, and, since the system has been in 
operation from a fairly early date and does not seem 
to have given rise to any very great agitation for 
its alteration, it is not surprising to find that it 
is followed closely in the Convention drawn up by 
the C.I.T.E.J.A. The Convention must not be 
regarded as a pioneer effort. Under it, the 
operator . is liable in damages for each accident 
to the extent of 250 francs per kilogram of 
weight of the aircraft, within the limits of 
600.000 francs minimum and 2.000.000 francs maximum. 
Of the sum found due, one third is apportioned 
to damage to property and the remaining two 
thirds to persons, subject to the maximum of 200.000 
francs for each person (Art.8) . Where several 
persons are injured, and the total sum payable 
exceeds the limits, each sum is reduced proportionally 
to a sum which will not exceed the limit (Art.9 ). 
In addition, where different parties sue in different 
Courts, the defender can state before each his total 
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claims to be met by him so that the maximum limit 
of his liability may not be exceeded (Art.11). 
Following the German Law, the counter part 
of this is an obligation to effect an insurance to 
the extent of the liabilities under the Convention, 
(Art.12) . As an alternative to this Insurance 
there may be a cash deposit in a public treasury or 
authorised Bank, or a guarantee given by an authorised 
Bank. The nature, extent, and duration of the 
sureties mast be stated officially by certificate, or 
on one of the documents carried, and this proves the 
position of the aircraft with regard to its obliga- 
tions under the Convention, (Art.13). 
This insurance, or the alternative, must 
be effected before flying over the territory of the 
other contracting States (Art.12) and, incidentally, 
will raise another question. As we have seen the 
Paris Convention, Article 2, second paragraph, lays 
on a State the burden of applying equality of treatment 
as to the conditions to be imposed on aircraft flying 
over its territory, and, if the States parties to that 
Convention are identical with those parties to the 
Rome Convention, no difficulty will arise. But what 
if this is not the ease and some of the States parties 
to the former do not ratify the latter? It would 
mean that some States were subjected to a system 
of compulsory insurance while others were not. This 
provided an additional argument against the view that 
the equality of treatment mentioned in Article 2 of 
the Paris Convention is to be the means of intro- 
ducing additional conditions, for, if this was so, 
then States which had not ratified the Rome Conven- 
tion might nevertheless find that before engaging in 
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International flight, their national aircraft would 
require to be covered by insurance to the extent of 
the liability under that Convention. 
The last provision of the Rome Convention 
to which I desire to draw attention is that contained 
in Article 14. Under this Article, the operator 
cannot avail himself of the provisions limiting 
his liability, first, if it is proved that the 
damage is the result of gross negligence or fraud 
on the part of the operator or his officers, unless 
he shows that the damage arose from a fault of 
pilotage or navigation, or if caused by his officers 
that he took all useful measures to prevent it, and, 
second, if he does not furnish security or furnishes 
insufficient security. 
To date, the Rome Convention has not 
received the necessary five ratifications to enable 
it to come into force, and it is in connection with 
this latter Article that the hitch occurs. There is 
unanimity of opinion on three points, viz : - that the 
liability to be imposed on the aviator should be 
absolute, subject to the defence of contributory 
negligence; that his liability should be limited and 
known beforehand; and that there should be some system 
of compulsory third party insurance. It is really 
immaterial on whom liability is held to rest if a system 
of compulsory insurance is accepted. 
Once more we are faced with the difficulty 
in reconciling the conflicting interests of the 
development of aviation and the security to third 
parties.. If we regard the security of 
third parties as the predominant interest, the 
question reduces itself into how that is to be 
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effected with the least impediment to the develop- 
ment of aviation, and it is in this spirit that 
we find the International Congress in 1927 recom- 
mending compulsory third party insurance and a 
system of limitation of liability, which 
"tout en conciliant les intergts opposes ne soit pas 
"un impeehement au développment de la navigation 
" aérienne." (17 ) 
Now, perhaps, the greatest loophole in the system which 
has been evolved is the fact that a person may elude 
any system of insurance and the injured person finds 
himself without recourse. This has happened under 
the German system. It will happen under the Conven- 
tion. It is not enough to say, as in Article 14 
that the liability is unlimited in the ease of gross 
negligence for it is to be presumed that the insurance 
would then be ineffectual; it is more pointless to 
make it unlimited when an insurance has not been 
effected, for it means that where the liability is 
unlimited the injured person has less chance of 
recovering anything. It is for this reason that the 
International Air Traffic Association has suggested 
to the C.I.T.E. J.A. that it should consider Article 
14 in more detail. Until it is made clear precisely 
what is to be covered by the insurance the 
Convention will not be ratified. Several States 
have taken the view that the insurance to be effected 
must cover any unlimited claim under the first part 
of Article 14, and, before it is ratified, it should 
be provided that, even if liability is unlimited 
as falling under the Article, the injured party is 
covered by insurance to the extent of the limits 
r17) RA.i., No.l. p.35. 
v1.96- 
under Article 12. 
"Third party insurance to be satisfactory from the 
"public standpoint must be both comprehensive and 
"complete. It mast give the third party protection 
"irrespective of the omissions or misrepresentations 
"of any individual or the financial shortcomings of 
"the insurer. Briefly, the policy of insurance 
"must be incontestable and indisputable on any 
"grounds so far as repudiation might affect an 
"injured third party." (18) 
This, the statement of the Committee recommending the 
introduction of a system of compulsory insurance in 
Great Britain, sets forth admirably the ideals to be 
looked for in such a system. The Air Ministry has 
accepted the recommendation, and only legislation is 
awaited to put the system into operation. 
One concluding observation falls to be made. 
Aircraft may in some countries be seized in security 
for damage which they have occasioned. For example, 
under the Uniform States Law, the injured person, or 
owner or bailee of the injured property, has a lien 
on the aircraft causing the injury to the extent of 
the damage caused by it, or by objects falling from 
it. (19) 
At the Rome Conference on Private Aviation 
Law a Convention was also signed to regulate this 
matter. The provisions of the Convention were to 
apply to seizure in security, which is any act, 
whatever it might be called, whereby an aircraft is 
seized in the interest of a private individual by 
the intervention of agents of the law or the public 
administration for the benefit of a creditor or 
proprietor, where the seizure is effected without 
a judgment perviously obtained in the usual manner or 
some equivalent title for execution. In cases where 
a creditor has a right by law to detain an aircraft 
(18) Cmd .4654 . (1934 ) . p.52 . 
(19) Sec .5. 
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without the consent of the operator thereof, such 
detention is to be regarded as seizure in security 
for the purposes of the Convention. The acts 
envisaged would be, for example, the Scottish proc- 
edare of arrestment of the dependence of an action. 
The effect of these acts of seizure has 
been to cause serious hardship in many cases where'an 
aircraft has been detained. The matter has been 
considered by the International Law Association, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and the Inter- 
national Air Traffic Association, with a view to 
exempting certain classes of aircraft from such 
seizure, and, in the case of other aircraft, for 
ensuring their speedy release on furnishing sufficient 
securities. If the Convention is given effect to, 
there would be exempted from seizure in security, 
aircraft used exclusively in the service of the State, 
including postal aircraft, but excluding commercial 
aircraft, aircraft used in a regular air transport 
service with the necessary reserve aircraft, and 
every other aircraft used for the carriage of goods 
or persons for reward when it is ready to start 
on such a journey, unless in the case of seizure for 
a debt incurred for the journey it is about to make, 
or incurred during the journey, (Art.3) . In cases 
where seizure is permitted, the aircraft will be 
released as speedily as possible on security being 
found for the debt or damages claimed, or, for the 
value of the aircraft, if it is the lesser amount. 
These provisions woald not apply to aircraft seized 
in Bankruptcy proceedings, or for breaches of customs, 
penal, and police regulations, (Art.7 ). 
If there is in force an International 
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system of compulsory third party insurance, there 
would appear to be no reason why, when the fact 
of the insurance has been verified, an aircraft 
which has been seized in security for damage caused 
by it should not be released and allowed to proceed 
on its journey. The International Air Traffic 
Association has recommended the C.I.T.E.J.A. to 
consider inserting such a condition in any supplement- 
ary Convention to the Rome Convention, and the 
Pédération Aéronaatique Internationale made a some- 
what similar suggestion at its Conference at 2ari s 
in 1932. 
chapter ,10 . 
-199- 
Carriage by Air. 
On the subject of carriage by air, it 
had been felt that the existing rules concerning 
carriage by land and by sea could be adapted without 
much difficulty, and, no doubt due to this, 
it has been possible to agree on a fairly 
comprehensive Code of regulations governing 
International air carriage. 
The Paris Convention dealt with carriage 
in two Articles, by providing that each contracting 
Mate should have the right to establish reservations 
and restrictions in favour of its own national 
aircraft in connection with the carriage of persons 
and "goods for hire" between two points in its 
territory,(Art,16), and, that if it diet impose such 
reservations and restrictions, it might be subjected 
to similar reservations and restrictions in any 
other contracting State, even although the latter 
State did not itself impose the reservations 
and restrictions on other foreign aircraft,(Art17). 
Arising out of the text of these Articles, two 
questions arise. 
In the first place, the words "two points 
"in its territory" have been interpreted indifferent 
ways by different States. They must be con: 
:sidered in the light of Article 1, under which the 
territory of a State is to be understood as including 
the national territory, both that of the mother 
country and of the colonies, and the territorial 
waters adjacent thereto, and Article 40, under which, 
as amended, the territories of rrotectorates or 
of territories administered in the name of the League 
of Nations, are for the purposes of the Convention, 
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to be assimilated to the territory of the Protecting 
or Mandatory States. The result has been that 
States have made reservations and restrictions in 
favour of its national aircraft in connection with 
carriage between "two points in its territory" which 
are separated by many thousands of miles, and some: 
:times by many intervening States. The I.C.A.N. 
has endeavoured to restrict the conception of air 
cabotage under article 16 but has found it impossible 
to do so owing to the diversity of the opinions 
submitted to it by the Governments of the contracting 
States. It has, therefore, had to be satisfied 
with recommending these States not to invoke Article 
16 of the Convention in the case of carriage between 
two points geographically far apart, both belonging 
to their territory, when the two points nearest 
together of these two regions could not be connected 
normally by a flight without intermediate landing. 
This would give greater freedom to air transport 
services, and while the solution depends on the goodwill 
of the States concerned, it must not be forgotten that 
a State which was not prepared to regard the recom: 
:mendation would, in all probability, find that it 
was refused the prior authorisation which it must obtain. 
(under Article 15) from the intervening States over 
whose territory the flight would require to be made 
before establishing a regular air service between two 
points in its territory. 
Although the Legal Sub- Commission eventually 
proposed a new text - one which was not unanimously 
approved - whereby "territory" was to mean the 
geographical entity represented by home territory, 
Frotectorates, Colonies, territories under mandate, 
and Dominions, taken separately, thus excluding all 
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possibility of cabotage one with another, the 
Commission, at its Session held at .Lisbon in June 
1934, finally contented itself by recommending the 
contracting States to invoke 4rticie 16 only with 
extreme reserve and with care to safeguard to the 
greatest possible extent the(spirit of liberty and 
equality of treatment contained in the Convention. 
In the second place, there has been some 
ambiguity in interpreting the words "transport 
"commercial", translated in the English text as 
"carriage for hire". The Legal Sub.Commission has 
also considered this question, and the Commission at 
its Lisbon Session, approved of a new text under 
which the phrase "carriage of goods for hire" is 
replaced by the more elaborate phrase or provision, 
carriage of things 
"(a) for hire or reward (of any kind whatsoever) ; 
"(b-) even without remuneration if the transport is 
"effected by an air transport undertaking, save, in 
"the case of such undertaking, the transport 
"necessary for the proper working of the air services 
"which it carries out." 
This amendment will probably be made in the next 
Protocol of Amendments to the Convention. 
The corresponding provision of the Havana 
Convention is similar to the present Article of the 
Paris Convention except that "merchandise" is used 
instead of "goods" and the contracting states can 
apply the reservations to "other remunerated aero: 
"nautical operations wholly within its territory ", 
(Art.22.). 
The First International Conference on 
Private Aviation Law which met at Paris in 1925 pre: 
:pared a draft convention "relative á la responsibilibé 
'tiu transporteur dans les transports internationaux par 
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"aéronefs." The text was submitted to the Govern- 
ments concerned for favourable examination and the 
C.I.T.E.J.A. having considered it in detail, it was 
possible for the twenty three States represented at 
the Second Conference held at Warsaw,in 1929, to sign 
a Convention "pour l'unification de certaines règles 
"relatives au transport aérien international." This 
Convention was ratified by Great Britain and its 
provisions given effect to in the Carriage by Air 
Act, 1932. (1) It came into force as far as that 
country was concerned on 15th May 1933 (2) and has 
been extended to the Channel Islands and the Isle of 
Man, and to the Colonies, Protectorates, and Mandated 
Territories specified in the Schedule to the relative 
Order in Council. It is now operative between 
eighteen States, including the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (3). 
The Convention applies to all international 
carriage of persons, luggage, or goods performed by 
aircraft for reward, as well as to gratuitous carriage 
by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking, 
(4) . The test of carriage being international is, 
that if it commences in the territory of one contract- 
ing State, it mast at least have an intermediate 
stopping place in the territory of another contracting 
State, if its termination does not happen to be in 
the territory of a different State from that in which 
it commenced. The Convention also applies to 
carriage performed by the State or legally constituted 
public bodies, provided that otherwise it can be 
regarded as international carriage falling within 





its provisions (5) . However, there is a Protocol 
to the Convention whereby any adhering State may 
declare at the time of its ratification that this 
provision is not to apply to 
"international carriage by air performed directly by 
"the State, its colonies, protectorates or mandated 
"territories or by any other territory under its 
"sovereignty, suzerainty, or authority," 
and the United States of America has taken advantage 
of the Protocol. The Convention does not apply to 
carriage performed ander the terms of any Internation- 
al Postal Convention. 
(i) Documents of Carriage 
The most important fact about the Convention 
is the limitation of the liability of the carrier by 
air, but that is only effective if the conditions of 
the Convention have been complied with. Thus the 
carrier by air is bound to deliver certain documents 
of carriage. In the case of passengers, he must 
deliver a ticket (6) and for their luggage he must 
deliver a luggage ticket, except in the case of the 
objects of which the passenger takes care himself (7). 
Certain particulars have to be given on each of these 
documents, and the luggage ticket must be issued in 
duplicate, one part for the passenger and the other 
for the carrier (8). In the case of carriage of 
goods, a document, to be known as an "air consignment 
"note" (9) has to be prepared in triplicate, one for 
the carrier, which will be signed by the consignor, 
one for the consignee, to be signed by the carrier 
and the consignor and to accompany the goods, and the 
remaining part to be signed by the carrier and handed 









(10) Art.6.(1) & 6.(2). 
The absence, irregularity, or loss of any of these 
documents of carriage does not affect the existence 
or validity of the contract of carriage, which shall 
continue to be subject to the rules laid down by the 
Convention, but, if the carriage has been entered 
into lacking the documents, or, in the case of the 
luggage ticket and air consignment note, lacking 
certain vital particulars, the carrier is debarred 
from availing himself of the provisions of the 
Convention limiting his liability. 
The air consignment note is an interesting 
document, and, at first sight, seems to resemble the 
Bill of Lading used in the case of carriage by sea. 
This latter document has always been regarded as a 
symbol of the goods themselves and its transfer had 
the same effect in law as the actual delivery of the 
goods. It is unique in this respect, and the question 
may arise as to the effect of the air consignment 
note, whether there has been created another document 
which can be regarded as a symbol of the goods to 
which it relates. I feel it would be difficult to 
give it that effect. According to the Convention, t 
air consignment note is prima facie evidence of the 
conclusion of the contract of carriage, of the 
receipt of the goods, and of the conditions of car- 
riage (11) . The Convention is, after all, for the 
purpose of unifying the rules of international air 
carriage and I submit that in the air consignment 
note it merely produces a document for that 
purpose. There is nothing in the Convention to show 
that the document was intended to be regarded as a 
symbol of the goods to which it relates with the 
results which follow the recognition of the Bill of 
(11) A.rt . ll. 
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Lading as such a document. Indeed, the provisions 
of the Convention point in the opposite direction 
for although the consignee is in possession of his 
part of the air consignment note, his right to 
the goods does not arise until they have arrived 
and he hands the note to the carrier. In exchange 
therefor he is entitled to get delivery of them (12), 
but, until that time, the consignor has full right 
to do just what he pleases with the goods. 
"subject to his liability to carry out all his 
"obligations under the contract of carriage, the 
"consignor has the right to dispose of the goods by 
"withdrawing them at the aerodrome of departure or 
'destination, or by stopping them in the course of 
"the journey on any landing, or by calling tor them 
"to be delivered at the place or destination or in 
"the course of the journey to a person other than the 
"consignee named in the air consignment note, or by 
"requiring them to be returned to the aerodrome of 
"departure."(13) 
True, it is also provided that the foregoing provisions 
are not to affect either the relations of the consignor 
or the consignee with each other, or the mutual 
relations of third parties whose rights are derived 
either from the consignor or eonsignee(14), but, 
taking the Convention as a whole, it would appear that 
the air consignment note is only a document of carriage 
for the purpose of regulating the liabilities of the 
carrier, nothing more, and could not be used to 
transer the goods, as, for example, by way of pledge, 
(ii) Liability ci the Carrier - 
In discussing the laws which would be 
applied to carriage by air under the common law, we saw 
it had been concluded that a carrier by air might 
be either a common carrier or a private carrier 
according to the existing rules for determining 
that question, that he could limit his liability, 





aircraft was "airworthy" in the sense that a 
ship must be seaworthy (lb) The Companies, 
members of the International Air Traffic Association 
have supplemented the Warsaw Convention by 
agreeing on certain detailed conditions concerning 
the contract of carriage by air, to cover not only 
international carriage under the Convention but also 
national and other international carriage. These 
conditions, which are known as the new conditions, 
came into force at the same time as the Convention 
itself and superseded the old conditions which had 
been observed by the Companies prior to that date. 
These old conditions, which, as used by Imperial 
airways Limited, provided that the Company was not a 
common carrier and did not accept liability as such, 
were considered in the case of Asian IF imperial 
Airways (16) when a parcel of gold was lost from an 
Imperial Airway's machine on a journey from Bagdad to 
London, there being nothing to show how the loss had 
occurred. Mackinnon gave judgment for the defend: 
:ants, holding (a) that while a carrier by air could 
be a common carrier, in this case there was no 
doubt that the defendants were not common carriers 
and were therefore only liable for negligence;(b) 
that they could take steps to limit their liability; 
and (c) that there was no implied warranty of 
airworthiness which would make it incumbent on the 
defendants to provide a bullion room. All that was 
required was to provide an aeroplane fit to fly and 
to use reasonable care and skill to see that it was 
safe for the carriage of the plaintiff's goods. 
in contrast, there is the American case 
of Curtiss-Wright Flying Service Inc. Tel Glose G.C.A. 
(lb )nte ,p.46. 
(16)(1933).4 T L.1i.415 . 
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decided in 1933, and the iew Zealand case, mentioned 
by .fir, of .Mt Nair of strand v Dominion Air Lines, 
decided in 1931. In the former, it was found that 
an aircraft carrier was a common carrier and not 
able to limit his liability to 10.000 dollars in a 
claim by a widow whose husband was killed in an 
accident to the defendant's aircraft in which he was 
a passenger, and which was the result of negligence 
on the part of the pilot. This is an extension to 
the case of passengers, of the principle applied to 
in England to the very limited class of common carriers 
of goods, and, in view of the decision in Asian Imps 
serial Airways, the carrier by air who adopts the rules 
of the international Air Traffic Association is, in 
England, to be regarded as a private carrier. in 
Strand y Dominion Air sines, the detendants were held 
not to be absolved from liability to the represent: 
natives of a passenger who was killed while travelling 
"entirely at his own risk", on the grounds that this 
did not protect them from a breach of the Aviation 
Act or the implied condition that the aircraft was 
airworthy and that the pilot held the certificate 
required by the law for the carriage of passengers. 
Under the warsaw convention, the carrier is 
liable to make reparation in three cases; for damage 
sustained in the event of death or wounding of a pass: 
:enger, or any other bodily injury suffered by a 
passenger, if the accident took place on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations 01 
embarking or disemtar king (17), a liability which, in 
the United Kingdom, is declared to be in substitution 
for any liability of the carrier in respect of the death 
of that passenger either under any Statute or at common 
(17) Art.17. 
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law (18) ; for damage sustained in the event of the 
destruction, or loss of, or damage to luggage or 
goods sustained during the carriage by air - 
carriage by air having a very wide meaning (19); and 
lox damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by 
air of passengers, luggage, or goods (20) . 
As against this absolute liability the 
carrier, besides the provisions limiting his 
liability, can avail himself of three defences, under 
each of which he is exonerated from liability, 
namely, when he proves that he or his agents have 
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damages or 
that it waL impossible to do so; in the case of goods 
and luggage, if he proves that the damage was occas: 
:ioned by negligent pilotage or negligence in 
handling the aircraft or irnavigation, and that in 
all other respects he or his agents have taken all 
necessary measures to avoid the damage(21); and where 
he proves contributory negligence (22). 
The limits of the carrier's liability 
are 125.000 francs for each passenger and 5.u00 francs 
per passenger for objects taken in charge by that 
passenger. In the case of luggage or goods the 
liability is limited to 250 francs per kilogram 
unless a special prior declaration of value has been 
made (23). however, the carrier cannot avail him: 
:self of the provisions excluding or limiting his 
liability if he, or his agents acting within the 
scope of their employment have been guilty of wilful 
misconduct, or default which is equivalent to wilful 
(18) Carriage by Air Act,úec.l(4). (21) <,rt.20. 
(19) Art.18. (22) Art.21. 
(20) Art. 19. (23) _.rt.22. 
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misconduct (24). Neither can he make provisions 
whereby he is relieved of his liability or other: 
:wise lowers the limits thereof(25). 
Under the Convention, therefore, a carrier 
by air is at one and the same time a common and a 
private carrier. je is a common carrier in so far 
as his liability is concerned since he cannot limit 
it or exclude it. xet he is a private carrier in 
the sense that he may refuse to enter into any 
contract oz carriage (26). The conditions seem to 
meet with fairly general approval although the 
international congress of Aerial ivavigation has 
suggested a slight modification to the effect that if 
a carrier has taken out an accident insurance with an 
authorised company to the extent of 125.000 francs for 
the benefit of any passenger he should be exonered 
from further liability in respect of such passenger 
under the .onvention, excepting, of course, his 
liability under Article 25. 
(iii) Enforcement of the claim - 
The Defendants, in the case of death 
of the person liable, are those legally representing 
his Estate (27) and the Carriage by Air Act has 
made special provision as to who will be the 
plaintiff, in the case of the death of a 
passenger (28) , the liability being enforceable for 
the benefit of such of the members of the passenger's 
family as sustained damage by reason of his death. 
"Members of the ffamily,' is given a wide meaning and 
includes any of the next-of-kin, as well as illegit: 
:imate and adopted children (29). 
(24) Art. 25. (27) Art.27. 
(25) Art.23. (28) Sec.l.(4). 
(26) Art.33. (29) Schedule II.Sec.l. 
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Article 28 of the Convention enacts that 
actions may be brought, at the option of the plaintiff 
"in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
"Parties, either before the court having jurisdiction 
"where the carrier is ordinarily resident or has his 
!'principal place of business, or has an establishment 
"by which the contract has been made, or before the 
"court having jurisdiction at the place of destination ". 
Where a State has not availed itself of the provisions 
of the Protocol, it is to be deemed to have submitted 
to the jurisdiction of any court in the United Kingdom 
in which any action is brought to enforce a claim for 
carriage undertaken by it (30) with the result that 
the rules of such court may determine how the action 
is to be commenced and carried on. 
Actions prescribe two years from the date 
of arrival at the destination, or from the date on 
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the 
date of which the carriage stopped.(31) 
(30) Carriage by air íß,c t ,Sec . 2 . 
(31) Art.29.(1). 
9,pter, , 11 . 
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Collisions; 4reck and salvage. 
It was inevitable that a Code of iiules 
of the air would have to be drawn up, which would 
require to be of a specialised and highly technical 
nature since aircraft could operate in a vertical 
as well as in a horizontal direction, and, unlike 
motor cars or ships, could not stop or reverse to 
avoid a collision without serious results to the 
aircraft themselves and to their occupants. These 
rules of the Air are to be found in Annex L. of the 
.saris convention, and under Article 25, contracting 
States undertake to ensure that every aircraft 
carrying its nationality mark will comply with them. 
Schedule IV of the jonsolidation Order gives 
effect to these ¡toles with regard to British 
Aircraft(1) . 
While the rules themselves, being of a 
technical nature, are not the appropriate subject or 
discussion in a legal treatise, there are several 
matters arising out of their application which are 
suitable for consideration. In particular, those 
questions whether, once a collision has occurred, the 
rules /of negligence to be applied in determining 
questions of liability will be the common law rules 
or the maritime rules, and in what cases, if any, 
the Courts possessing Admiralty Jurisdiction will be 
considered the appropriate tribunals before which 
claims can be decided. 
'faking first, collisions between aircraft 
while in the air. These may be either over land or 
territorial waters, or over the high seas. In 
America, the uniform State Law has provided that 
liability for damages caused by a collision on land 
(1) S.:K.O.No.1508(1923). 
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or in the air shall be determined by the rules 
applicable to torts on land(21. coordingly when 
both parties are negligent, the loss will lie where 
it falls, and there will be no question of apportion: 
:ing it as would be 131 the case under maritime law. 
There is no such express enactment in L4reat Britain 
but while as we have seen both Dr.tiazeltine and Dr. 
6paight would have applied the principles of maritime 
law, I can see nothing to indicate that in such cases 
any but the common law rules would be applied. 
The case of Cubitt y Gower supra can be taken as 
affirming that where the collision occurred between 
two aircraft on land the common law rules of negli: 
:gence would be applied and the position would be the 
same if the collision occurred in the air. The only 
difference, ii 'it took place over the sea, would be 
that a Court having Admiralty Jurisdiction would be 
the proper tribunal to hear the claim. Although the 
secretary of state is empowered to confer jurisdiction 
on any Court exercising Admiralty jurisdiction in 
respect of proceedings taken to enforce any claim 
under the &ir Navigation Act or any other claim in 
respect of aircraft (3) he has not yet done so, and 
such claims will, in the ordinary course, be deter: 
:rained by Courts having common law jurisdiction. 
The principle of absolute liability imposed 
under Section 9 of the Air Navigation Act cannot by 
any stretch be applied to collisions between air: 
:craft, unless, as in the case of Cubitt y Gower, the 
collision is between one aircraft which is "taking off" 
and another which was statiónary. It is interesting 
to conjecture what would have been the positionin 
that case if both aircraft had been in the act of 
(3) 10 & 11 Geo.V.Ch.80.Sec.14.(2) 
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"taking off tT or one "taking off u and the other 
"landing". They would both be on the ground and it 
would seem that the common law rules of negligence 
would be applied to the collision. In such a case, 
if one was in breach of a statutory provision that 
would be prima facie evidence of negligence. however, 
in many cases of collisions, particularly those in 
the air, it may be difficult to determine who was to 
blame, and it is conceivable that in those circum: 
:stances, the rules laid down by Lord Birkenhead in 
"The Volute" (1922. 1 A.0 .129) should be applied, 
the effect being that where events are so intermixed 
that there is not sufficient time to distinguish 
which act was first and which was last, the case must 
be decided on broad principles, by asking who really 
caused the accident. 
As we have also seen a collision will not 
necessarily occur in the air, or between two airerat 
on land. There is another type of aircraft that 
devised to manoeuvre on water - and the collision 
may be between two such aircraft, or between one such 
aircraft and another object, probably a ship. Assuming 
that the collision is between two aircraft manoeuvering 
on the water, would the position be different from 
that already discussed had they been manoeuvering on 
land or would the law maritime - the principles of 
which are the same in England and in Scotland. -apply? 
Neither in the definitions of "ships" in the Merchant 
Shipping Act or in the authorities discussed in the 
Gas Float Whitton No.2.(1896 L.R.Jrob.Div.42) could 
it be said that an aircraft designed to manoeuvre on 
water was a "ship" but the Consolidation Order enacts 
that 
"every aircraft manoeuvering under its own power on 
"the water shall conform to the hegulations for pre: 
";venting Collisions at ea, and for the purposes of 
"these hegulations shall be deemed to be a steam 
"vessel."(4) 
(4 )$.h .O.No.lb;p8. 01923 ).Sched.IV. 6ec.49. 
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Does this make any change on the common law? That 
is as tar as the Order goes, and, as it does no more 
than provide for an aircraft being regarded as a ship 
for the limited purpose of conforming to the 
regulations for preventing collisions, it cannot be 
said that it has the effect of attracting the law 
maritime to the case of a collision between two air: 
:craft manoeuvering on the water. Accordingly, the 
common law rules would be applied in this case also. 
The same principle would apply in the case where an 
aircraft manoeuvering on water collided with any 
other moveable object, other than a ship. Prof. 
I!Nair, commenting on the effect of the Order, remarks 
"I do not think an aircraft becomes a steam ship for 
"any other purpose, such as that of attracting the 
"admiralty procedure in rem."(b) 
regard an 
"a vessel 




While there is a tendency in America to 
aircraft as 
within the jurisdiction of admiralty when 
fulfillment of its functions as a traveller 
and has put aside for the time being its 
and capacities as a traveller through the 
this is quite contrary to the Air Commerce Act, which 
expressly enacts that the shipping Laws of the United 
States, including any definition of vessel or vehicle 
found therein, and including the rules for the pre: 
:vention of collisions, shall not be coAtrued as 
applying to seaplanes or other aircraft, or to the 
navigation of vessels in relation to seaplanes or other 
aircraft(7) . Confirmation of the view taken by 
Zollman is to be found in the Uniform State Law under 
which a hydroplane while at rest on water and while 
being operated on or immediately above water shall be 
governed by the rules regarding water navigation; 
(5) Law of the Air, p.100. 
(6) Zollman, Law of the Air, p.44. 
(7) Sec.7. 
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while being operated through the air, otherwise 
than immediately above water, it shall be treated 
as an aircrait.(8) r,ctually there is no real 
conflict between the two for it is quite apparent 
that the purposes served by the Uniform Mate Law is 
precisely that served by the British Order, and the 
law maritime would not be applied to a collision 
between two aircraft, or hydroplanes, while on the 
water. The fact that they are governse by the 
rules relating to "water navigation" does not other: 
:wise make them ships for the purposes of maritime 
law. 
in the case of collisions between ships, 
the law allows the owner to arrest the ship, and, by 
so doing, to establish jurisdiction against it i.e. 
an action in rem. That being so, where a ship 
collided with an aircraft on the water, an action 
in rem would lie against it although it would not 
against an aircraft in the converse case, since an 
aircraft is not a "ship ". In both cases liability 
would require to be apportioned under the maritime law. 
Before leaving the subject of collisions, 
mention must be made of the work of the G.I.T.E.J.À. 
The uomite has been actively engaged in preparing a 
draft Convention for the unification of certain 
rules relative to aerial collisions, and embracing 
every collision between two aircraft in motion. The 
damage caused by one aircraft to another aircraft in 
motion would be covered by the Convention even although 
there had been no actual collision. The draft 
was approved by the Comite at its Berlin Session 
in September 1934 and is now in course of 
(8) Sec.l. 
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being submitted to the various Governments for 
their observations thereon with a view to having 
it signed at the next Conference of Private 
international Aerial Law. The result of the con; 
:vention would be to limit the liability of the 
operators of the colliding aircraft, in respect of 
damage to the aircraft themselves, to the various 
sums detailed in the convention; to passengers 
$ r fra luggage and goods carried, to the same detailed in 
the Warsaw Convention; and to third parties on the 
surface, to the sums detailed in the Rome convention. 
But, more important, liability would be determined 
according to rules analogous to maritime law, and, 
where both aircraft were equally negligent, the 
liability for the damages suffered will be equal, 
otherwise liability will be apportioned in accordance 
with the degree of negligence attributed to each. 
Only in the case of accident, or (three majeure will 
the damage lie where it falls. 
Finally, an attempt is made to settle the 
vexed question of jurisdiction arising out of 
collisions between aircraft. it is proposed that 
actions will be competent in the territory of the 
High contracting Jfarties, at the choice of the Plain; 
;tiff, either in the courts of the country of the 
defendant's domicile, or of the country where the 
collision occurred, or, if either of the aircraft 
involved in the collision has been seized, in the courts 
of the country where it has been so seized, if 
the domicile of the defendent or the place where the 
collision took place is not in the territory of 
one of the contracting parties, then the action may be 
brought in the courts of the country where one or other 
of the aircraft is registered. 
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ùirecke and salvage 
The application to aircraft of the 
principles of maritime law in relation to wrecks 
and salvage which had been foreshadowed prior to 
1914, was put into effect both in the saris ionvention 
and in the Havana, Convention. The former provided 
that 
lwith regard to the salvage of aircraft wrecked at 
"sea, the principles of maritime law will apply, in 
"the absence of any agreement to the contrary, "(9) 
and,apart from a slight transposition of the 
words, the provision of the latter is identical. 
The air ivavigationAct provided in ,bection 
11 that 
"the law relating to wreck and to salvage of life or 
"property, and to the duty of rendering assistance 
"to vessels in distress (including the provisions of 
"the merchant hipping 4ets, 1894 to 1916., and any 
"other li,ct relating o those subjects) shall apply to 
"aircraft on or over the sea or tidal waters as it 
"applies to vessels, and the owner of an aircraft 
"shall be entitled to a reasonable reward for salvage 
"services rendered by the aircraft to any property 
"or persons in any case where the owner of a ship 
"would be so entitled," 
and by Order in council the necessary modifications 
and exemptions could be made in applying these pro: 
:visions. This was done in 1921 when various 
sections of the merchant shipping Acts, as amended by 
the Order (10), were applied to aircraft. It was 
f?rther provided that courts having Admiralty Janis: 
:diction should have jurisdiction over claims under 
section 11 and the jurisdiction so conferred may be 
exercised either by proceedings in rem or by proceed: 
:ings in personam. The definition of a "wreck" 
is extended to include "any aircraft or any part 
"thereon or any cargo thereof found lying derelict." 
It will be seen that no mention is made of salvage of 
(9) Ar t . 23 . 
( 10)S.H.O.No.1286.( 1921). 
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wrecked aircraft on land and the_persons rendering 
assistance in such cases are still at the mercy of 
the owners of the wreck for recompense for their 
services. 
Section 11 of the Air 1avigation Act was 
discussed recently when the master and crew of a 
steam trawler claimed salvage for rescuing a sea: 
:plane with valuable cinematograph equipment off crape 
Dan, Greenland, in the aheriff Court of Aberdeenshire 
at Aberdeen (11). In that case the Sheriff Substitute, 
whose judgment was affirmed on appeal by the sheriff 
Principal, held that the claim was incompetent both 
at common law and under the sir lavigation Act. He 
held, on the authority of the Gas . loat Whitton No .2. 
supra that a seaplane is not a "ship" within the 
meaning of the Merchant Shipping Lets or decided 
cases, and, that the action was incompetent under 
section 11 of the Air Navigation Act, since that Act 
only applied, according to its :preamble, to 
"aircraft, whether British or Foreign, within the 
"limits of His Majesty's jurisdiction, and 
the case of British aircraft both within 
"such jurisdiction and elsewhere." 
Greenland was outwith His Majesty's jurisdiction, 
and, as the aeroplane was American and not nritish, 
the pursuers were not entitled to the benefit of 
Section 11. 
At the same Session as it submitted the 
draft Convention relating to collisions, the 
c.I.T.i.J.A. also submitted one for the unification 
of certain rules relative to the assistance and 
salvage of aircraft. The object of the convention 
is to make it obligatory on the commander of an 
( 11) Watson # R.C.A.Victor.Uo . 1935,bl b.L.ri. 93. 
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aircraft or captain of a ship to render assistance, 
on the understanding that for so doing they will 
be suitably recompensed, but, whereas a captain of 
a ship would only be bound to render assistance to 
every person in the sea in danger of being lost, 
either on an aircraft or as the result of an accident 
to an aircraft, the commander of the aircraft has 
to render assistance, hot only to persons in danger 
of being lost in the sea, but also to every person 
in danger of being lost, or in danger of being lost 
following an accident to an aircraft " quel que 
"soit le lieu ou elle se trouve.94 This is an 
endeavour to embrace the cases of hardship presently 
existing where salvage services are rendered to air: 
:craft wrecked on land, and where there is no recom: 
:pense legally due, but, as the International Air 
Traffic Association has very truly pointed out, the 
salvage of aircraft in deserted localities should 
be made the subject of a separate draft differentia: 
:ting the principles of the Brussels Convention. In 
any event the Comite is not altogether sure of the 
position since it has requested its Rapporteur to 
examine in what way a greater precision or limitation 
could be arrived at for such an obligation. 
Where assistance has been rendered in 
terms of the obligation incumbent under the Convention 
the salvor is to be indemnified for expenses use: 
:fully and necessarily incurred, as well as for any 
damages a staineu during the operations, to the 
extent of 12b,000 francs per person saved, but the 
sum to which he is entitled must not exceed the 
value of the aircraft before the accident, 
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accident, this value being calculated on the basis 
of 250 francs per kilogram of its weight. In addition,, 
if the aircraft or its cargo is salved, there will 
be further remuneration calculated on the basis, 
first, of the success obtained, the efforts and 
accomplishments of those rendering assistance, the 
danger run by the aircraft or ship assisted, by its 
passengers or equipment, by its cargo, by the salvors, 
the time employed, the expenses and damages sustained, 
the risk undertaken by the salvors, and the value 
of the material hazarded by them, due regard being 
had to special appropriation where it exists of the 
salvors property for salvage purposes; and, second, 
of the value of the things saved. In no eircum: 
;stances is the remuneration to exceed the value of 
the goods salved at the conclusion of the salvage 
operations. 
The draft is imperfect in many respects. 
For instance, while the obligation to render assis; 
; tance to persons is absolute, it appears that no 
special remuneration is to be given for saving them, 
only the actual outlays incurred in so doing. It 
would be equitable to allow some additional remuner; 
ration under this heading, and an addition of ten 
per cent. is the suggestion of the International Air 
Traffic As6oeiation. Experience has shown that consid; 
;enable public money can be expended searching for 
reckless individuals who undertake risky and foolhardy 
flights for no other apparent purpose than that of 
losing themselves. The obligation to render assis: 
:tance would rest on aircraft in flight or ready to 
start on a flight, but these cases, more often than 
not, necessitate prolonged organised searches and 
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aircraft have to be called from aerodromes and 
make special flights. In such cases, it would only 
be right that the persons saved would require to 
pay some special additional remuneration to their 
rescuers for the time and trouble taken in locating 
them. 
The International Air Traffic Association 
at its Session at the Hague in 1934 suggested that 
the time was not yet ripe for such a Convention as 
had been drafted and that it would be desirable to 
postpone consideration of it meantime. This may 
or may not be the case, but the necessity for a 
Convention seems to be more urgent in the case of 
assistance to persons with wrecked aircraft on land 
and in deserted areas, as there are special consider: 
:ations affecting such assistance. The maritime 
rules relating to wreck and salvage can quite easily 
be adapted, and work well, in the narrowly defined 
limits within which they can be applied. Rather 
should the C.I.T.E.J.A. confine its attentionsto 
a Convention which will cover the cases, far more 
numerous, which are not covered by the maritime 
rules, and where, at the present time, the salvor 
who has rendered valuable services has no right 




Nationality and Registration - the Law in the Air. 
When the question of jurisdiction and of 
the law of the air was discussed in a previous 
Chapter (1) it was seen that a decision as to what 
law was to be applied to crimes, torts, and the 
like committed in the air, depended largely on a 
solution of the question of what nationality was to 
be attributed to an aircraft. It was also seen that 
Ì 
when the Diplomatic Conference met in Paris in 1910 it 
decided that nationality was to be attributed either 
on the basis of the nationality of the proprietor or 
the country of his domicile (2) . 
In common with other problems, the matter 
of nationality was speedily it not satisfactorily 
solved in 1919, in the Paris Convention, which pro: 
:vided that to enjoy the benefits under the convention 
aircraft must possess the nationality of a contracting'. 
State (Art.5 ), and aircraft were to possess the 
nationality of the State on the Register of which 
they were entered in accordance with the provisions 
of the Annex to the Convention (Art.6). it was also 
laid down that aircraft could only be registered in 
a contracting state if they belonged wholly to.the 
nationals ofthat State, and, with regard to a Company; 
it could only be registered as owner if it possessed 
the nationality of the State in which the aircraft 
was registered, if the President and two thirds at 
least of its .uirectors had the same nationality, 
and if the Company otherwise satisfied all the Condi: 
:tions laid down by the laws of that State (Art.7.). 
An aircraft could only be registered validly in one 
State (A,rt.8.).- 
These provisions, however, were not adopted 
(1) Ante,p.51. 
(2) Ante 
, p :2. 
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in their entirety, either in the Spanish- American 
Convention or in the riavana Convention. 
The former allowed contracting States to make 
certain reservations by rrotocol it the foregoing 
provisions were in any way contrary to the provisions 
of their own national laws. The latter adopted in 
principle, the Sixth and seventh Articles of the 
,Paris Convention, but, in deciding in what manner 
nationality was to be attributed, it provided that 
the registration of aircraft shall be made in 
"accordance with the laws and special provisions of 
"each contracting State." (3) 
fl'or reasons to be considered later, the 
provisions of the Paris Convention which had been so 
readily agreed upon began to find adverse critics and 
gave rise to difficulties, with the result that at the 
Conference called to consider the revision of the 
text of the convention they were brought under re: 
:view. The German delegate, Dr.Wegerdt wanted 
Article 7 altered so that nationality would be deter: 
:mined in accordance with the country of the domicile 
of the proprietor of the aircraft. The French and 
Dutch representatives desired no change, but the 
British, Belgian, Canadian and Spanish delegates were 
in favour of some alteration. On this occasion, it 
was the view of the American representative which was 
accepted and the saris Convention was, by the 1929 
Protocol, assimilated to the Havana Convention, 
Article,7, as now in force, reading 
"the registration of aircraft referred to in the last 
"preceding Article shall be made in accordance with 
"the laws and special provisions of each contracting 
"State ". 
The result of this is simply that the controversy 
which existed prior to 1914 is, after the lapse of 
( 3 ) Art .8. 
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a quarter of a century in the same position as it 
was then, except, perhaps, that there are now new 
voices to be heard in the discussions. 
Once again the old question is asked, is 
the aircraft to be assimilated to the ship io-r the 
purpose of conferring nationality? That was the 
position under the :saris Convention as originally 
framed. The aircraft, like the ship had the 
nationality of its owner and could only be registered 
in the State of which he was a national. Now 
States are free to do as they please and the pro: 
;tagonists of the view that registration of an air: 
;craft should not be dependent on the nationality of the 
owner have lost no time in bringing forward their 
arguments that registration, and accordingly, 
nationality, should depend on domicile. Chief 
among those is M.Pittard, the Swiss representative 
on the C.I.T.E.J.A., and at the Budapest Session of 
the Comite he gave a detailed exposition of his views 
the substance of which is simply that an aircraft has 
more the characteristics of an automobile or loco; 
;motive, or even a boat engaged in river navigation. 
The automobile, under the uonvention of 190 and that 
of 1926, must carry the sign of the State in which it 
is registered if it is to engage in international 
journeys. Under the Geneva convention of 1930, 
boats engaged in river navigation do not possess a 
nationality such as is possessed by ships engaged in 
navigation on the high seas, but must be registered 
in some State, and it is the owner who selects the 
State in which he desires his boat to be registered 
when it is qualified to be entered in more than one 
State. That being so, should not an aircraft be 
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subject to a somewhat similar regime in this matter 
of registration and the conferring of nationality? 
According to M.Tittard, an aircraft cannot be re: 
:garded, like the ship, as a part of the territory 
of a State. It is no more than a means of communi: 
:cation and transport which the State has no more 
than an interest to regulate, and registration should, 
therefore, depend not on nationality, but on the 
domicile or residence of the orner. He sums up by 
saying 
"Comme nous le verrons dane la suite de cet exposé 
"si nous abandonnons le critère de nationalité pour 
"prendre celui de domicile, nous supprimons la 
"difficulté qui naît de la difference de nationalite 
"entre les diverses personnes qui ont des driots sur 
"l'aéronef." 
One of the reasons for giving a full - 
blooded nationality to a ship is that when it is on 
the high seas it can be regarded as a part of the 
territory of a state to which it belongs, and, that 
being so, it is under the protection of that State 
and subject to its laws. To this very forceable 
reason, M.Giannini(4) adds several political and 
economic reasons, such as protection of national 
construction, trade, and national defence. These 
political and economic reasons, he maintains, apply 
with equal force to aircraft, especially in view of 
securing that, in the event of an armed conflict, 
all the resources of air power, air construction, 
and material will be at the disposal of the state. 
This he maintains makes it imperative that a State 
should only give its national protection toMaircraft 
owned by its own nationals. Therefore, nationality 
should continue to be attributed on the same basis 
(4) La Nazionalita Degli Aeromobili - hevista 
Aeronautica, Anno VII.No.8.1931.(iX) 
-226- 
as it was attributed under the original seventh 
Article of the Paris Convention. 
While political and economic reasons are 
not properly the subject of a legal argument, they 
do give weight to the argument first advanced for 
attributing nationality to a ship - a reason which, 
it is submitted, applies with equal cogency in the 
case of aircraft - that while on the high seas a 
ship is, and must be subject to the laws of the State 
whose flag it flies. The automobile and the locomotive, 
the boat engaged in river navigation, are at all 
times within the territory of a State. An aircraft 
may be, and most of the time will be, within such 
territory, but it can also engage in flight over the 
high seas. Then it must be subject to the laws of 
the State whose flag it flies and must have a 
nationality. This is an unsurmountable obstacle in 
the way of classifying the aircraft with the auto: 
:mobile and the boat engaged in river navigation. 
It is true that while an aircraft is in flight over 
the territory of any particular State, it is within 
the jurisdiction, and subject to the laws of that 
State, but when not within the jurisdiction of any 
State, it is subject to the laws of the State of the 
Flag. 
However, it was not for this that the Paris 
Convention was altered to enable States to attribute 
nationality to aircraft other than those owned by 
their nationals. The provision had given rise to 
a very severe limitation which was not foreseen when 
the Convention was signed. as between nationals of 
States parties to the Convention no real difficulty 
arose. A Frenchman living in England who purchased 
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an aeroplane there could not register in England, 
since he was not a national (5), but he could engage 
in flight over Great Britain under the Convention 
if he registered the aircraft in France. But, 
assume that the purchaser of the aeroplane was not 
a national of a State party to the Convention or of 
a State with which a special agreement had been 
concluded. What was the position then? Simply 
this, that being unable to register the aircraft in 
Great Britain, he was precluded from flying his own 
aeroplane, and, as a result, precluded from purchasing 
one, a position, it might be argued, which was prey: 
Oicial to the development of the aircraft industry. 
Similarly, there could be the spectacle of an 
Englishman living in France and purchasing an aero: 
:plane there which would require to be registered in 
Great Britain. The result would be that, while the 
aeroplane might never see Great Britain at any time 
or ever be in the airspace above British territory,it 
would nevertheless be subject to all the rules and 
regulations contained in the British Orders in 
Council. 
Companies, also, are faced with the same 
difficulties since before a Company can be registered 
as the owner of an aircraft in Great Britain it must 
be registered and have its principal place of busi: 
:ness in fits Majesty's Dominions, and the Chairman 
and at least two thirds of the Directors must be 
British bubjects or persons under His majesty's 
protection (6), this in conformity with the old 
provisions of the convention. 
(b) S .K.O . No .1508 . ( 19 23 ) . Sche d . I . ( l ) . 
(6) do. do. 
`,m 
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Now, contracting States are free to alter 
these requirements to suit their own convenience. 
Can any change safely be made and would such change 
be in the best interests of the States concerned? 
The international chamber of Commerce has recommended 
States to discard the principle that registration 
of an aircraft is dependent on the nationality of 
its owner since 
"l'acquisition et l'exploitation d'aeronefs par des 
"etrangers sont ainsi rendues difficiles. "(7 ) 
and if states decide to maintain nationality as the 
prerequisite to registration, then, in the case of 
Companies or corporations, the nationality thereof 
should be determined by its "siege social" since 
"il ne semble pas justifie' de determiner la nationa- 
";lite d'une Societe d'apres la nationalite de ses 
"membres et de ses administrateurs. "(8) 
The League of rations Air Transport co- operation 
Committee, in view of the fact that states are now 
free to settle each for itself the conditions under 
which aircraft are to be registered, consider it 
should be possible to register aircraft, the owners 
of which are foreigners settled in their territory. 
The Committee, therefore, 
"expresses a hope that the rule based on the effective 
"domicile of the owner, subject to any rules laid 
"down by the national law concerning duration, will 
be uniformly adopted for this registration. it 
"being admitted that each aircraft must be registered 
"in one country, and in one country only, these 
"uniform rules should allow the possibility of 
"registering aircraft belonging to national companies 
"having some foreign capital or directors." (9) 
Since all ;states were not parties to the 
Paris convention, there is also the actual legisla: 
:tion of States not bound by'it, from which infor: 
:mation may be gleaned. r'or example, under 
Argentine Law, aircraft kept for four months in the 
(7) H.A.I.,N0.24.220. 
(8) do. p.219. 
(9) k.A.I.,£do.4.p.156. 
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country must be registered on the Argentine xegister 
and so become Argentine national aircraft, and, 
while under the Law of chile, only nationals may be 
registered as owners, the foreign owner of a busi: 
:ness house established in the country, or the 
foreigner who carries on a profession or trade, is 
assimilated to nationals for the purpose of the 
registration of aircraft owned by them. 
While there is much to be said for M. 
Eittard's opinion that 
"il est conforme au dr@it et a logique de soumettre 
,!1.' individu et Ses; biene aux lois du pays dans 
"lequel ils se trouvent" 
it is more than likely that States will not exercise 
the right which they now possess to alter their 
national laws in this respect, for there are obvious 
advantages in only registering aircraft owned by their 
nationals, especially from the aspect of national 
defence and requisition in times of war. The 
difficulties noticed can easily be remedied by a 
more general adhesion of States to the .Zaris Convene 
:tion, but, if this is not possible, special bilateral 
agreements could be entered into if desired. It is 
unfortunate that the uniformity of principles which 
was attained in 1919 has had to be swept aside, but 
no doubt in the future, when more experience has been 
gained, the whole matter of attributing nationality 
will again be the subject of international agreement9 
There is one other topic, closely akin to 
nationality and registration, namely the proposal to 
set up an Aeronautic Register, made by the C.I.T.E.J.A 
which adopted the text of a draft Convention for this 
purpose in 1931. It is the culminating blow to 
those who desire aircraft to remain strictly moveable 
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property, like the automobile, the transfer or pledge 
of which is effected by simple delivery or "handing over' 
The purpose of such a Register, which 
might be that on which aircraft were entered 
under the Paris Convention, or a separate Register, 
is the publication of the ownership of and real 
rights affecting every aircraft. The proprietor 
would be responsible for furnishing the necessary 
particulars which would be entered on the 
Register kept by each State, and every aircraft which 
was registered and acquired its nationality according 
to the laws it laid down for that purpose, would 
require to be entered.. Every incumbrance or real 
right which affected the aircraft would be noted. 
Transfer could only be effected after the new 
owner's name had been entered on the Register, and 
if a national of a different State acquired the air: 
:craft, it would only be removed from the Register of 
the first State ,after a Certificate had been obtained 
from the second State with a copy of the completed 
entry in the new Register. If there were incum: 
:brances affecting the aircraft noted in the Register 
of the first State, these would also be noted in the 
Register of the second, and the transfer would only 
be made subject to such incumbrances. A third party 
would not be bound by any real rights or encumbrances 
affecting the aircraft which did not appear on the 
Register. 
The Convention has not proceeded further 
than the draft stage and will require to be consi: 
:dered with great care before it is adopted. The 
result of its being put into force would be that 
the sale or pledging of aircraft would be fraught with 
difficulties which might seriously hinder the develo}xnent 
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of aviation as a whole. Apart from that, however, 
there seems to be no real reason why aircraft, and 
in particular, small private aircraft, should be 
shackled with such restrictions on their sale and 
delivery. The proposals are not, of course, 
altogether novel, for in France, since 1924, it has 
been the law that the transfer of aeroplanes could 
only be effected by writing and did not bind third 
parties until the transfer had been noted in the 
Aeronautic Register(10). In Italy, entry on the 
Register proves ownership (11), and in France (12) and 
in Finland(13) pledge is only effected by "une 
inscription hypothecaire" according to the law 
dealing with the pledge of ships. Nevertheless, it 
would be regrettable to have aircraft regarded other 
than as "moveables" for the purposes of sale and 
transfer and to that extent there is no reason why 
they should not be assimilated to motor cari, the 
sale and transfer of which is a comparatively simple 
matter. The position would be particularly difficult 
under the proposed Convention if States continued 
to make entry on their Registers conditional on the 
owners of aircraft being nationals, since under the 
Convention, only aircraft so registered could be 
entered in the Aeronautic Register. This would 
mean a further impediment on sale and purchase for 
it would not be easy for the foreign purchaser to 
acquire a valid and indisputable title. 
The law in the air -- 
There has been little in the way of 
development in the matter of the laws to be applied 
INV 
(10) Art .12 of Law of 31st May 1924. 
(IL) ñoyal Decree 23 Aug.1933; Ordonnance 11 Jan.1925 
(12) Art.13 of Law 31st May 1924. 
(13) Law of 15 June 1928. 
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to acts committed on board aircraft while in flight. 
The first draft of the Paris convention contained 
the following Article 
19 Legal relations between persons on board an 
"aircraft in flight are governed by the law of the 
"nationality of the aircraft. 
"In case of crime or misdemeanour committed by one 
"person against another on board an aircraft in 
"flight the jurisdiction of the State flown over 
"applies only in case the crime or misdemeanour 
"is committed against a national of such State 
"and is followed by a landing during the same 
"journey upon its territory. 
"The State flown over has jurisdiction 
"(a) with regard to every breach of its laws for the 
public safety and its military and fiscal laws, 
"(b) in case of a breach of its regulati.s concert 
" :ning air navigation." 
This Article, which was numbered 23 in the original 
framed 
Convention, was /in all -embracing terms and it 
gave more competence to the State of the Flag than 
had previously been suggested, but, as it was not 
possible to obtain unanimity, it was omitted from 
the Convention ultimately signed and ratified. 
Each Country has embodied clauses 
giving jurisdiction in its own national laws, and, 
as has been seen, the conventions and draft 
Conventions, on particular branches of the law have 
each specified the Courts which are competent and 
the laws they are to apply for the purposes of 
such Conventions. 
As regards aircraft to which the Air 
Navigation Act and Orders thereunder apply it is 
merely provided that any offence under the Act or 
Orders is, for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, 
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to be deemed to have been committed in any place 
where the offender may be for the time being (14) . 
The Uniform State Law is more explicit (15 ) 
"all crimes, torts, and other wrongs committed by or 
"against an aeronaut or passenger while in flight 
"over this State shall be governed by the laws of 
"this State; and the question whether damage 
"occasioned by or to aircraft while in flight over 
"this State constitutes a tort, crime, or other 
"wrong by or against the owner of such aircraft shall 
"be determined by the laws of this State." 
The most interesting and illuminating 
discussion on this branch of the law in recent times 
is to be found in the Reports of the Seventh 
úonference of the áan American Union which met at 
Montevideo in December 1933 and adopted certain 
principles on the penal law in the case of delicts 
committed on board aircraft. 
Two projects were put before the Confer: 
:ence(16), one by M.Ramiro Fernandez, the delegate 
representing Guatemala, and the other by Dr.Moreno 
the Argentine delegate. The former tended towards 
the competency of the State of the Flag, and the 
latter, whose project was taken as the basis for 
discussion, inclined more towards the principle of 
sovereignty, and, where possible, gave competence to 
the subjacent state. Finally, the Conference adopted 
five articles. Under the first, every act committed 
on board an aircraft while it is on the ground falls 
within the competence of the courts of that State, 
the laws of which will be applied; and, in the second, 
an aircraft which is on the high seas, outwith the 
boundaries of any state, is subject to the "Law of 
the Flag ". These principles were recognised by the 
(14) 10 & 11 Geo.V.Ch.8O. Sec.14 (1). 
(15) Sec.7. 
(16) Diario of the Conference. 1vo .18. of 22 Decm.1933. 
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Congres internationaux d'Aviation of 1912 and 1922, 
and by the International Law Association at Buenos 
Aires in 1922 and Stockholm in 1924. The suggestion 
that the law of the State of the .lag should apply 
when an aircraft is over the high seas confirrns,what I 
have maintained throughout, that, tO Ouch an 
extent, an aircraft must possess a nationality which 
will follow that of its owner . 
The next Article provides for the act 
committed in an aircraft while in flight over the 
territory of a foreign state. Such an act falls 
within the jurisdiction of that State ii the air: 
;craft makes its first landing there. Otherwise 
the State in which the first landing is made is 
competent but the law of the subjacent State would be 
applied. Where the identity of the subjacent State 
is in doubt the law of the Flag will be applied. 
The pilot of an aircraft is obliged to land at the 
first aerodrome known to him after a delict has been 
committed on board. Where damage has been occasioned 
to persons or property in the subjacent state, that 
State would be competent and its laws would be applied 
thus differing from the provisions of the Rome 
Convention in respect that under that Convention the 
courts in the country of the offender's domicile 
would-also be competent. The concluding principle 
adopted was that a state which did not admit of 
extradition of its nationals would be bound to punish 
an offender returning to its territory after having 
committed on board an aircraft any act which would 
be an offence under its own laws. 
The international Law Association, in 
1922 and again in 1924 took a somewhat different 
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view, inclining rather towards the assimilation of 
aircraft to the existing International Law as to 
the jurisdiction of States over ships in their 
territorial ..waters, and the application of the 
principle of "exterritoriality" to aircraft. it 
was resolved by that Association that the perpetrator of 
crimes or delicts committed on board aircraft should 
be judged and punished in accordance with the 
following principles. if he was in a public air: 
:craft he would be dealt with by the courts of, 
and according to the laws of the State of the Flag. 
He would be tried and punished according to the same 
rules if he was on board a private aircraft, unless 
where his offence concerned a violation of the laws 
of the subjacent state relative to public security or 
the military or fiscal laws; in the ease of a breach 
of its laws relating to air navigation; and where the 
acts committed on board had a repercussion in the 
territory of that State. in these cases, the 
offender would be subject to the laws and juris: 
:diction of the subjacent State. the international 
Law Association thus adopted more the provisions of 
the rejected Article 23 of the raris convention. 
The principles adopted by the Jan American 
Union may not be perfect. Indeed, their deficiencies 
have been fully recognised by ivu.Gutierrez, the 
Rapporteur. idoreover they were prepared to meet 
the conditions in the American Continent, but, be 
that as it may, they could be applied equally well 
in other parts of the world. They embody the 
principles which were more or less recognised before 
1914. Altogether, they are to be preferred to those 
of the international Law Association which has erred 
-236- 
in following the analogy of the sea in circumstances 
in which a comparison is not appropriate. If a 
State is to have sovereign rights in the airspace 
above its territory then it must be conceded that it 
has jurisdiction over all persons in such airspace. 
Especially is this so where the civil 
jurisdiction is concerned. It is not tenable to 
maintain, as the .Paris Vomvention would have main: 
;twined, that 
"the ]egal relations between persons on board an 
"aircraft in flight are governed by the law of the 
"nationality of the aircraft." 
True, while the aircraft is over the high seas, that 
must be the position, but, while it is over the 
territory of a state, the most convenient, and, 1 
submit, the true legal position, is that embodied 
in Article 8 of the Uniform State Law, 
"all contractual and other legal relations entered 
"into by aeronauts or passengers while in flight 
"over this state shall have the same effect as if 
"entered into on the land or water beneath." 
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chapter ,13 . Customs. 
I have not yet considered at length the 
customs regulations necessitated as a result of the 
use of aircraft because they call for an examin; 
ration of detailed technical Rules and Regulations 
rather than for an exposition of law. 
The .Paris Convention (1) set forth certain 
general customs regulations to be observed by air: 
;craft and these were embodied in the British Order 
in Council along with the special customs rules to 
be observed in Great Britain (2). As far as it is 
possible, persons and goods on aircraft will be 
subjected to the same customs formalities as are 
persons and goods entering a country by sea or by 
land, but aircraft present characteristics by which 
they lend themselves readily to the evasion of 
customs formalities. An attempted evasion of 
customs duties is an offence, no matter how it is 
committed, and as such is liable to heavy penalties 
under existing laws, but the use of aircraft is 
fraught with danger to the Authorities. It has 
therefore been enacteú that ii any person is convicted 
of an offence under the customs regulations in 
respect of any British aircraft 
(l) Annex H. 
(2) .R.O.No.1518.(1923) Scheds. VIII and ix. 
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registered in Great Britain, the Secretary of State 
may cancel or suspend the Certificate of Registration 
of that aircraft( 3) , thus making a breach of the 
customs regulations by air a very serious offence 
for which the offender will be liable not only to 
the heavy penalties surrounding the offence, as such, 
but also to the further penalty of losing the use of 
his machine. 
The Annex of the Paris Convention dealing 
with Customs must be regarded as experimental, and 
since its inception it has been the subject of much 
discussion, not only by the I.C.A.N. but also by 
many other organisations, among which the work of the 
International Air Traffic Association is outstanding. 
The result has been that in 1933 the I.C.A.N. approved 
of a new text of Apex H, but, unlike the other 
Annexes which can be altered and amended by the 
Commission itself, the amended Annex H will require 
the 
to be/subject of a Protocol, and may not enter 
into force for some considerable time. Little is 
to be gained by examining the original Annex and the 
proposed amendments in detail. Indeed such a 
comparison is difficult, inasmuch as the amended 
Annex is virtually a new one, so many alterations 
having been made, particularly in the wording of the 
text, to avoid ambiguity and clear up difficulties 
which had arisen in its.application. Apart, however, 
from such detail, there are some general principles 
arising out of the peculiar characteristics of air: 
:craft which I can conveniently discuss. 
it is of the essence of customs regulations 
that all aircraft entering or leaving any particular 
d3 ) S.h.0.110 .15+08.( 1923) .bec .23. 
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country must do so in a way in whìçh some manner of 
supervision over their coming and going can be 
exercised. as the law stands at present, aircraft 
axe obliged to cross the frontier between certain 
points fixed by the contracting States, but, if the 
new Annex is adopted, such a course will only be 
necessary if the States, in their own discretion, 
decide to fix points of entry and departure. It is 
only to be expected, however, that States will 
continue to make fixed points of entry as otherwise 
it would be difficult, to say the least of it, to 
exercise any form of control. So also, aircraft 
must only depart from and land at aerodromes which 
are "customs aerodromes", that is, at aerodromes at 
which provision is made for customs formalities, 
but it is now suggested that Mates may relieve 
certain categories of aircraft from the obligation of 
departing from or landing at these aerodromes. An 
example of the type of aircraft which could be 
exempted under such a provision is the aircraft en: 
:gaged in some sporting competition or air race, 
when there would, ih ordinary circumstances be no 
question of customs duties on goods carried. 
While it is an easy matter to make such 
regulations as these, it is not always so easy to 
observe them, and this is particularly the case with 
aircraft. They may, for reasons quite outwith their 
control, be driven off their course, and so be unable 
to cross the frontier of a State at the designated 
crossings. Similarly, they may, for identical 
reasons, be forced to land at aerodromes other than 
customs aerodromes, and even in parts of the country 
far removed from any aerodrome. Such instances, if 
country mast do so in a way in which some manner of 
supervision over their coming and going can be 
exercised. Js the law stands at present, aircraft 
are obliged to cross the frontier between certain 
points fixed by the contracting States, but, if the 
new Annex is adopted, such a course will only be 
necessary ii the States, in their own discretion, 
decide to fix points of entry and departure lt is 
only to be expected, however, that States will 
continue to make fixed points of entry as otherwise 
it would be difficult, to say the least of it, to 
exercise any form of control. Lo also, aircraft 
must only depart from and land at aerodromes which 
are "customs aerodromes", that is, at aerodromes at 
which provision is made for customs formalities, 
but it is now suggested that ;tates may relieve 
certain categories of aircraft f .. the obligation of 
departing from or landing at these aerodromes. An 
example of the type of aircraft which could be 
exempted under such a provision is the aircraft en: 
:gaged in some sporting competition or air race, 
when there would, in ordinary circumstances be no 
question of customs duties on goods carried. 
While it is an easy matter to make such 
regulations as these, it is not always so easy to 
observe them, and this is particularly the case with 
aircraft. They may, for reasons quite outleith their 
control, be driven off their course, and so be unable 
to cross the frontier of a State at the designated 
crossings. they may, for identical 
reasons, be forced to land at aerodromes other than 
customs aerodromes, and even in Parts of the country N,\ 
far removed from any aerodromee Euch instances, if ; 
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they are bona fides, can be provided for but. the 
complications arise in respect that these are the 
very means used to break the law. The problem then 
arises as to how far wilful law breaking can 
be prevented without causing uncalled for hardship 
to the law abiding operators of aircraft who are 
compelled through circumstances outwith their control 
to break the law. Under the existing law, when, by 
reason of a case of force majeure, an aircraft 
crosses the frontier at a point other than that 
designated, it must Irand at the nearest .customs 
aerodrome on its route, and if forced to land before 
reaching such aerodrome, the nearest police or customs 
authorities must be informed. The force majeure must 
be "duly justified" and, in the case of a forced 
landing, departure can only be made by permission of 
the Authorities informed, and the aircraft must proceed 
to the customs aerodrome which they shall direct to 
carry out the formalities of customs clearance. Very 
little change is proposed in these rules, but the 
phrase "force majeure" disappears to be replaced by 
"causes outside control ", giving a little more latitude 
to the aircraft acting bona fides. 
Nevertheless, while there is little change 
suggested, the provisions do not altogether meet with 
the approval of the International sir Traffic Associ: 
ration and were fully dealt with by Major Belmont, 
the Legal idviser of Imperial a irways,Liuiited, in the 
heport prepared by him for, and adopted by the Associ: 
ration at its Hague Session in 1934. The suggestion 
made there is that some distinction should be made 
between Companies operating regular air lines and 
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other classes of traffic. In the case of the 
former it creates no little disorganisation of the 
service for an aircra.tt failing to cross the iron; 
:tier of a state between the points fixed, for causes 
outwith the control of the pilot, to be compelled to 
land at the nearest customs aerodrome. In the 
opinion of the Association there is no reason why 
the aircraft should not proceed to the aerodrome at 
which it normally intends to land. The same purpose 
would be served by its so doing. In many cases of 
forced landings it is almost impossible to communicate 
with the nearest customs authorities and police 
officials are difficult to find. Considerable delay 
might be occasioned before the requisite authorises; 
;tion to proceed could ..be obtained, and, in the case 
of companies operating regular air lines, it might 
be more convenient to make the commander of the air; 
;craft respónsible. 
in respOflse to the recommendation of the 
International Air Traffic Association, the special 
Committee of the I.C.A.N. for the study of customs 
questions, taking into account the special guarantees 
afforded in customs matters by companies operating 
regular air lines, as well as the desirability 
in the development of air navigation that customs 
formalities should be moderated as far as 
possible, has now proposed to the commission that 
further facilities should be made in the new Annex 
whereby an aircraft could cross the frontier at points 
other than those designated and that it should be 
possible to resume flight after a forced landing 
without waiting the authorisation of the customs or 
police authorities. 
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The next matter of importance is the 
case of air transit from one State to another where 
the journey has to be made over the territory of a 
third State. 
, What interest is that third State to 
have in the aircraft or goods which it carries which 
merely passes over it, or, perhaps lands in it, in 
the course of a journey to another State? The 
existing rules distinguish two cases, aircraft 
crossing without landing and those landing in the 
course of transit. in the former case the aircraft 
merely makes its presence known by signals and pro: 
:ceeds on the prescribed route, landing, it is to be 
presumed at the nearest customs aerodrome, if it 
enters at the wrong point, although this is not 
clear. Under the new annex this latter contingency 
is expressly provided for. in the case where a 
landing is effected, this must be at a customs aero: 
:drome, the name of which will be entered in the 
Log nook, and the customs authorities will make an 
examination of the papers and cargo. tdo material 
change is to be made, but there is some amelioration 
since the formalities are to "be reduced to the 
"minimum required by the circumstances." but even 
this does not satisfy the international air Traffic 
Association because 
"it would appear that the transit state concerned 
"should not require any formalities in connection 
"with goods which are merely passing through the 
"State in transit, whether such goods remain in 
"the aircraft or are unloaded and reloaded into the 
"same aircraft or into another aircraft, "(4 ) 
This is a far reaching development which will not 
readily find sympathy in many European Sstates.s, but, 
viewed in the cold light of reason, there is actually 
nothing to prevent its adoption. 
(4) M.K.Beaumont's report. 
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Lastly, there is the general question of 
the customs duties to be imposed on aircraft them: 
:selves, their component parts, and the liquid fuel 
which they carry, on landing in another State. it 
is recognised, that, in principle at least, aircraft 
landing in foreign countries are liable to customs 
duties if they exist, but if they are to be re -ex: 
:ported, they shall have the benefit of the existing 
regulations as to bond or deposit of the taxes. 
ouch labour has been spent on this particular 
subject and the League of Nations has made an 
exhaustive study of the question of the exemption 
of liquid fuel carried in aircraft, and which is not 
mentioned in the annex, but in thé end left the 
matter in the hands of the i.C.A.N. 
The proposed new =annex is more elaborate 
in its treatment. if aircraft are to be exported 
they will be entitled to temporary admission free of 
duty under the conditions contemplated by the 
customs regulations in each of the contracting ;Mates, 
who will endeavour to reduce their formalities to a 
strict minimum, especially as regards aircraft 
belonging to regular air lines. Spare parts and 
material imported for repair will be similarly 
treated and; on arrival, the fuel and lubricants 
contained in the ordinary tanks of the aircraft will 
be admitted free of customs or other duties. 
This exemption will not apply to any quantity un: 
;loaded. The expression ' °ordinary tanks" may prove 
misleading, as in certain cases of long distance 
flights the whole passenger space of an aircraft is 
used as extra or additional tanks for fuel. whether 
these are to be regarded as "ordinary tanks,' is not 
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The xtules of Aerial Warfare. 
Since the conclusion of the Great War, 
aircraft have figured prominently on the Agendas 
of Conferences concerned with disarmament, and 
much has been said as to their Ase in future wars. 
The terrors which their use would a use have not 
been minimised, and strenuous efforts have been 
made to restrict the operation of aircraft in time 
of war. 
The Arms Conference held at Washington 
during 1921 and 1922 concluded that it would not be 
practicable to impose any effective limitations upon 
the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either 
commercial or military, except in the single case of 
lighter -than -air craft. Notwithstanding this, the 
nations of the world have been assembled together at 
a Disarmament conference at Geneva since 2nd j ebruary 
1932, with apparently the same object in view, - 
the limitation of the use of aircraft for warlike 
purposes - and with the same result. The only 
difference is that, so far, the Disarmament Conference 
has not been sufficiently frank to admit that effective 
limitation is impracticable. The conference 
itself has been productive of many amazing suggestions, 
mainly by the French Delegates, which would have a 
very profound effect on the whole structure of aviation 
law, both in peace and in war, were they ever to 
become effective. The establishment of an Interna- 
-tional -sir korce under the control of the _League of 
Rations, an international .Police Air r'orce, also 
under the control of the League, and the Inter: 
;nationalisation of civil Aviation as a whole, all of 
which have been suggested, would have severe 
repercussions. The Internationalisation of Civil 
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aviation, in particular, would mean that the 
Paris Convention and all that has followed it would 
be worthless, but that and other similar suggestions 
are so impracticable as to be impossible, and, there: 
:fore, unworthy of further consideration. 
While that is,so,regard must be had to 
the idea underlying such suggestions namely the 
necessity for protecting the civilian population and 
it is to this end that the United Kingdom Delegation, 
in fe bruary 1933, suggested that the General 
commission of the Conference should constitute a 
committee of the principal air Powers 
-to examine the possibility of the entire abolition 
"of military and naval machines and of bombing from 
"the air, combined with an effective international 
"control of civil aviation." 
Lord .Londonderry, the British Secretary of State for 
Air, informed. the Conference that any scheme for the 
abolition of military aircraft must be so framed as 
to prevent all possibility of the resources of civil 
aviation being used for military purposes in the 
event of an outbreak of hostilities. In effect, he 
was stating that no such scheme could be produced. 
The abolition of military and naval aircraft would 
greatly simplify the laws governing the use of air- 
craft in times of war, bat, if that is to depend on an 
effective means of preventing civil aircraft from being 
used for warlike purposes on the outbreak of 
hostilities it would be unwise to cease considering 
the Rules of Aerial Warfare. It is safer to assume 
that aircraft will continue to be used for warlike 
purposes and consider, as did the. Washington Arms 
Conference, that 
"it is necessary in the interests of humanity and 
"to lessen the chances of international friction 
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'that the rules which should govern the use of aircraft 
"in the war should be codified and be made the sub: 
*;jest of International Agreement." (i ) 
The Washington Arms Conference, on the 
recommendation of the Committee on Aircraft, decided 
to set up a Commission representing the United States 
of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and 
Japan, to consider whether the then existing 
International Law covered adequately the use of the 
new agencies of Warfare introduced since the Second 
Hague Conference in 1907, and, if not, what changes 
should be made in the law of nations in consequence 
thereof. The Netherlands Government accepted an 
invitation to participate in the discussions and the 
Uommission.of ,Jurists met at the Hague in December 
19E2. After protracted discussions, an exhaustive 
Report was presented consisting or two main parts, 
the first dealing with the Control of Radio in 
Time of War, and the second with the Rules of Aerial 
Warfare which I shall now consider. In doing so 
it has to be borne in mind that the object of the 
Commission, which had the assistance and advice of 
experts in International Law, and in land, naval, 
and aerial warfare, was to report to the States 
represented. They, in their turn, would confer as 
to the acceptance of the Report and the course to be 
adopted to secure its recognition by the States not 
represented at the conference. So far, no steps 
have been taken to secure its recognition. In order 
to facilitate comparison, I shall endeavour, so far as 
practicable, to consider the various subjects covered 
by the Report in the same order as they appeared in 
M. Fauchille's Code (2). 
(1) Arms Conference ;Report of committee on Aircraft. 
Art.39. 
(2) Ante.p.72 et sequ. 
-248- 
The first thing which strikes one when 
comparing the code agreed upon by the Commission in 
1922,6to which for convenience,I shall hereafter 
refer to as the Hague Code,) with the earlier Codes, 
is the fullness of detail contained in it, and the 
special attention paid to the classification or air: 
:craft and to the applicability of the Code. An 
endeavour was made to embody the same classification 
of aircraft as was given in the Paris Convention, 
but as Italy had put its customs aircraft under 
the control of military forces this was not exactly 
possible. Aircraft were classified as public, 
including military aircraft and non-military 
aircraft exclusively employed in the public service, 
and private, embracing all aircraft not falling 
under the category of "public" aircraft (Art.2.) The 
service in which an aircraft is employed will be 
evidenced by the papers which it carries, and in 
addition public non -military aircraft employed for 
customs or,police púrposes shall bear an external 
mark indicating their nationality and their 
public non -military character (Art.4.). Other 
public non -military aircraft will bear the same exter: 
:nal marks, and for the purposes of the Jules:,: be 
treated as private aircraft (Art.5.) The marks 
carried by aircraft must be so affixed that they 
cannot be altered in flight (Art.2.). 
Under the Hague Code, a military aircraft 
shall bear an external mark indicating its nationality 
and military character (Art.3) and must be under the 
command of a person duly commissioned or enlisted in 
the military service of the State. The crew must be 
exclusively military (Art .14 .) . Furthermore, the crew 
must wear a fixed distinctive emblem by which their 
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character may be recognised in case they become 
separated from their aircraft (Art.15.). 
The identification of "military" aircraft 
has been the cause of much divergence of opinion. 
M.Fauchille, in addition to the requisites laid 
down in the Hague Code, made it a condition also 
that the aircraft had been "assigned by the State to 
a military duty" and that it carried the national 
flag in the form of a pennant(3). Dr. Spaight's 
proposal was in substance similar to the Hague 
Code (4) . The Draft Convention of 1910 required in 
addition that the aircraft had on board a certificate 
establishing its military character (5), and by the 
Convention of 1919, every aircraft commanded by a 
person in military service detailed for the purpose 
is to be deemed to be military aircraft (6). 
The question of what constitutes a military 
aircraft is of supreme importance in times of peace 
as well as in times of war, and, since the Commission 
of Jurists met at the Hague, has been freely 
discussed. Until that date the tendency had been 
to determine whether an aircraft was or was not a 
military aircraft by the position of the person 
in charge of it. To be military it must be under 
the command of a person who, by some means or 
another could be identified as being engaged in 
military service. In such a case, States would 
decide that the aircraft was military and they would 
affix signs on it which would show its military 
character. Under that system, however, there was a 
loophole, since it was possible for an aircraft 
adapted for warlike purposes, and truly a military 
(3) hules for peace. Arts.l and 4. 
(4) Aircraft in War. 
(0 ) Ante . p . 93 . 
(6) Art.3l.and ante p.141. 
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aircraft to fly over the territory of a State if 
it was not in charge of a person under the military 
service. In other words, it was not the character 
of the aircraft itself which counted but the 
character of its commander. 
The first real attempt to classify air: 
:craft as «military" according to their own charac; 
:teristics was in 1926 when the attempt was made to 
define what were military and naval aircraft under 
Article 198 of the Treaty of Tairsailles,the Article 
by which Germany was prohibited from having any 
military or naval air forces. In the peculiar circum: 
:stances of that case, the definition "military ", was 
made as wide as possible and the object for which the 
aircraft was constructed was taken as the deter: 
:mining factor in the classification. Fortified by 
this, the German Delegate to the Conference called 
in 1929 to consider the revision of the 1919 convention 
endeavoured to have Article 31 thereof altered in 
such a way as to include as "military" aircraft for 
the purposes of that convention, aircraft which were 
armoured or protected in any way, or provided with 
the means to carry any warlike material, such as 
canons, guns for the discharge of grapeshot, torped; 
:oes, bombs, or the means of discharging material of 
that nature, but the proposal did not meet with any 
great enthusiasm, and was shelved :Tor the time being. 
,.Giannini (7) has tried to reconcile the 
two sides by suggesting the following Article 
"aircraft carrying a military identification mark and 
"those which, by their type of construction or 
"armaments are intended for military purposes will be 
"considered military aircraft," 
(7) Gli Aeromobili Miilitari, Rivista Aeronautica, 
No . 6 . June 1931. 
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and, as a possible extension thereof, 
"aircraft whose commander and crew are military and 
"in uniform are presumed to be military aircraft." 
He favours a definition based on the classification 
of the aircraft, but while there are circumstances 
in which this would be desirable, they are more 
applicable in times of peace when it might be 
dangerous to allow an aircraft, constructed for 
military purposes, to fly over the territory of 
btates other than its own except by special permis: 
: sion. The :argument is, of course, apen to the 
same objections as have caused the complete deadlock in 
the Disarmament conference, namely that all aircraft 
can be considered as being constructed for military 
purposes, a fact which Germany has recently demon: 
(¡V t''9 
:strated in no/certain manner. 
The definitions given by the jurists at 
the vague are simple and it would be difficult to 
find any more suitable for the purpose of the ttules 
of a'rarfare. Military aircraft are alone entitled 
to exercise belligerent rights (Art.13.) and, in 
such cases it is the character of the commander and 
crew which counts. une could not consider the 
civilian flying over the territory of a belligerent 
in an aeroplane constructed for warlike purposes 
being entitled to the benefit of the rules of warfare 
applicable to belligerents. it is more than likely 
that he would have difficulty in proving that he had 
not in fact been guilty of espionage. 
no precise exposition as to the theatre of 
aerial warfare, such as was given in Articles 1 and 19 
of 1v1.Fauchille' s Code (8) appears in the Hague erode 




Rules of the Hague u ode are in harmony with the 
principle of sovereignty, subject to the privilege 
of innocent passage to contracting States,recognised 
in the Paris Convention. Wherefore, 
"outside the jurisdiction of any state, belligerent 
"or neutral, all aircraft shall have full freedom of 
"passage through the air and of alighting" (Art.11.) 
and, as the freedom of innocent passage allowed under 
the Paris convention may prove impracticable during 
war, it is provided that then 
'any State whether belligerent or neutral may forbid 
"or regulate the entrance, movement or sojourn of 
"aircraft within its jurisdiction," (Art.12.), 
This right is to my mind inherent in the recognition 
of sovereignty but it has apparently been thought 
advisable to reiterate it in the Code. 
The rights of belligerents in neutral 
atmosphere under the ti.ague Code differ materially from 
s Code. indeed, in so far as they 
prohibit entry (Art.4u); regard aircraft on board 
vessels as part of such vessels (Art.41); and provide 
for the taking possession of the aircraft which do 
enter, and the internment thereof, and of the 
passengers and crew (Art.42), they are identical with 
the proposals in Dr .Spaight' s Code . (9) . This is 
perhaps not to be wondered at as the Commission worked 
on the basis of two draft Codes,one of which was sub: 
:mitted by the American delegation and the other by 
the United Kingdom. As Dr.Spaight was a member of 
the latter delegation, one would expect to find some, 
at least, of his views incorporated. In addition, 
"the personnel of a disabled belligerent military 
"aircraft rescued outside neutral waters and brought 
"into the jurisdiction of a neutral state by a 
"neutral military aircraft, and there landed, shall 
"be interned. "(Art.43. ) 
This, the report states, brings the crew of a disabled 
(9) ante .pp.74 & 75. 
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belligerent aircraft in line as to treatment with 
the crew of a belligerent warship brought into a 
neutral port in similar circumstances, as provided 
by Art.l5 of the txeneva Convention relating to 
Maritime war (1907) . While this may be so, it 
would appear that they are only dealt with under the 
Article if brought into the neutral jurisdiction 
by a "neutral military aircraft ". One is left to 
assume that the same treatment would be meted out to 
crews of disabled aircraft brought in by any other 
means. 
The difficulties to which M.Fauchille's 
suggestion (io) that the principles of the vague 
Uonvention relating to the neutral rights and duties 
in maritime war were generally applicable to aerial war 
gave rise have been provided for in the vague Code. 
Dr. Spaight is followed in the provision that a 
neutral State is not 
"bound to prevent the export or transit on behalf of 
"a belligerent of aircraft, parts of aircraft, or 
"material, supplies, or munitions for aircraft" 
(Art.45.) 
although the supply of such articles, directly or 
indirectly by a neutral government to a belligerent 
power is forbidden (Art.43.) It has been recognised 
however, that in certain circumstances an aircraft 
might be fitted out in neutral territory, just as a 
ship, for an expedition against an opposing bellig: 
:erent, and to meet this, it has been provided that a 
neutral government is bound to use the means at its 
disposal 
"to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of 
an aircraft in a condition to make a hostile attack 
"against a belligerent power, or carrying or accom: 
" :panied by appliances or materials, the mounting or 
"utilisation of which would enable it to make a 
"hostile attack, if there is reason to believe that 
asuch aircraft is destined for use against a 
(lo) Ante.pp.76 & 77. 
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"belligerent power." (Art.46.). 
The departure of any aircraft, the crew of which 
includes any member of the combatant forces of a 
belligerent power, must be prevented, as must work 
on any aircraft designed to prepare it for a 
departure in contravention of those provisions. 
M.Fauchille was at pains to prevent 
neutral atmosphere being used by the aircraft of 
one belligerent to obtain information as to the 
movements of the other. Under the Hague Code this 
could not be done directly since the circulation 
of belligerent aircraft in neutral atmosphere is 
forbidden, but it could be done indirectly, by 
neutral aircraft, for the purpose of communicating 
information to a belligerent. The Code provides 
that a neutral State is bound to take such steps 
as the means at its disposal permit, to prevent its 
atmosphere being used for that purpose. 
Privateering is forbidden under the Hague 
Code, as it was by M.Fauchille (11) and no private 
aircraft shall be armed in time of war when outside 
the jurisdiction of its own country (Art.16). The 
Commission considered the case of merchant ships 
being armed in time of hostilities but decided that 
the interests of private aircraft were better served 
by the adoption of a rule against arming. Neverthe: 
;less, while a gun may or may not be of little use to 
defend an aircraft which is illegally attacked, there 
are, as will be seen, circumstances in which it is 
not equitable to assimilate private aircraft to 
merchant vessels while depriving them of this right 
to carry arms. 
(11) Ante.p.77. 
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The right to convert non -military aircraft 
public or private into military aircraft is recognised 
(Art.9) but only within the jurisdiction of the 
State to which it belongs, and not on the high seas. 
This latter provision, which differed from that of 
lvi.Fauchille (12), was not accepted by the French delegat: 
:ion to the Conference. 
Under the heading of hostilities, the 
Hague Code provides for the use to which aircraft can 
legitimately be put in time of war, and, in particular 
what can be discharged from them for the purpose of 
destruction. Prior to 1914, the jurists had tended 
to apply the Declaration of St.Petersburg and the 
various Hague Declarations relating to the discharge 
of different types of projectiles, and to bombard: 
:ment, to aircraft where that had not been done in 
graemio of the Hague Declarations themselves. The 
hostilities, however, proved that in some cases these 
Declarations were not suited to aircraft, and, as a 
result, the Hague Commission was in a position to 
make riles in the light of experience. For example, 
one finds a declaration that the use of tracer, 
incendiary, or explosive projectiles by or against 
aircraft is not prohibited (Art.18), it having been 
found that it was only by the use of such projectiles 
that the aeronaut was able to ascertain the accuracy 
of his fire. 
It is with the whole question of air attack 
and bombardment directed at the civilian population 
that the greatest difficulty has been experienced 
in arriving at a unanimous agreement. 
There is a general agreement that the greatest 
( 12 ). knte .p.78. 
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possible measure of protection must be afforded to 
it but it is not easy to find a suitable formula 
one which will allow bombardment of legitimate 
objects but will protect the civilian population 
when such objects are to be found in centres of the 
civilian population. In the end, the Hague Com: 
:mission was able to come to a unanimous decision as 
to the text to be adopted. By it, the cases in 
which bombardment is absolutely prohibited are 
defined. These are where the bombardment is 
"for the purpose of terrorising the civilian popular 
" :tion, of destroying or damaging private property not of 
"military character, or of injuring non-combatants" 
(Art.23), 
and when it is 
"for the purpose of enforcing compliance with 
"requisitions in kind or payment of contributions 
¡yin money." (Art.23). 
The International Law Association adopted precisely 
the same prohibitions in the liegulations for war 
in the Air suggested at the Stockholm uonference in 
1924. 
Following the course adopted by the Allied 
;Powers during the Great War, the test of towns and 
the like being "defended" has been rejected in de: 
:termining the legitimate objects of bombardment. 
Aerial Bombardment is legitimate (Art.24) if 
directed "exclusively" at objects 
"of which the destruction or injury would constitute 
"a distinct military advantage to the belligerent" 
and these objects are specifically enumerated. 
when they are so situated that they cannot be bom: 
;banded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the 
civilian population, bombardment is prohibited. 
Those provisions also are followed by the Inter: 
;national Law Association. 
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As regards "cities, towns, villages, 
dwellings or buildings ", their bombardment is 
prohibited if they are not in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the land forces, but where they are 
in the immediate neighbourhood, bombardment is 
legitimate 
"provided that there exists a reasonable presumption 
"that the military concentration is sufficiently 
"important to justify such bombardment having 
"regard to the danger thus caused to the civilian 
"population." 
The International Law Association suggests a differ: 
:ent treatment. Under the regulations adopted 
by that Association aerial warfare, which includes 
either attack or bombardment, directed at cities,towns, 
villages, and ,.o ther inhabited places is prohibited, 
unless in the special case where the attack of 
bombardment of the land forces with a view to effective 
occupation of such cities, towns, villages, and 
other inhabited places is resisted, in which event 
the employment of aircraft in aid of the attack or 
bombardment may be considered lawful. 
Furthermore, under the Hague Convention, 
in Aerial bombardment, all necessary steps must be 
taken to spare 
"buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, 
-or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospital 
"ships, hospital, and other places where the sick 
"and wounded are collected" 
if such places are not at the time being used for 
military purposes lArt.25). The buildings must be 
indicated by marks visible to aircraft and 
elaborate provisions are made for the creation of 
"zones of protection" round important historic 
monuments "Art.26). The provisions for sparing 
such buildings are embodied in the ,band Warfare 
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regulations and Naval Bombardment Convention, and 
are also to be found in the Regulations of the 
International Law Association. 
There is however yet another side to this matter 
of aerial attack or bombardment on the civilian 
population. When the Disarmament convention first 
met, all the delegates gave expression to the views of 
their respective Governments on this matter. home 
favoured the complete abolition of bombing and 
military aircraft, while others, like Japan, favoured 
protection of the civilian population only in so far 
as had been suggested by the Bague Commission. But 
a perusal of the Reports discloses that several 
countries, such as Germany, bwitzerland, Austria, 
Belgium, and Latvia, were in favour of an absolute rule 
whereby the dropping from aircraft of bombs or any other 
objects or materials serving military purposes 
would be prohibited. The General commission of the 
conference adopted a Resolution on 23rd July 1932, 
before its adjournment, whereby the air attack 
against the civilian population would be prohibited, 
and bombardment from the air abolished, subject to 
agreement with regard to the measures to be taken 
to enforce such a rule (13). The same view was 
expressed in the Draft convention submitted at a 
later date by the United Kingdom Delegation, Article 
34 of which was in the following terms, 
"The High Contracting 2arties accept the complete 
"abolition of bombing from the air (except for police 
"purposes in certain outlying regions)." 
The .British Draft Convention was taken as the basis 
of discussion and finally Article 34 was referred to 
j)r.Lange, as Rapporteur in view of the doubts 
expressed as to the exception contained in the brackets 
(13) Doeuments9Series IX.Disarmament 1932.I1.51. 
No.Conf.D.136. 
-259- 
The Rapporteur, after having communicated wit1all 
the interested Delegations, proposed an amended 
Article whereby 
the high Contracting parties accept the complete 
"abolition of bombing from the air and undertake to 
"prohibit in their territory all preparations for 
"such bombardment and all training in its methods." 
an Article which i think bears distinct traces of 
German influence. 
The .uisarmament Conference is, of course, 
in abeyance meantime and no progress can be made 
towards the acceptance, in any form, of the proposed 
Article. nevertheless, it seems that the resolution 
of 23rd July 1.932 is indicative of the general 
feeling of the nations towards aerial attack 
and bombardment of the civilian population. The 
complete abolition of bombardment has much to 
recommend it, both in the interests of humanity, and 
from the point of view of the difficulty which 
must surround the putting into practice of the 
rules suggested by the Hague Commission and by 
the International Law Association. Rules for 
the conduct of aircraft in War are framed on the 
assumption, however slender, that they will be 
observed, and in that light I see no reason why 
-if the civilian population is to be protected - 
the rule of absolute prohibition should not be 
applied. Even under the Hague Code, the civilian 
population must suffer the terrors of aerial bom: 
:bardment, for it leaves too wide a discretion 
to the commander in determining how fax bombardment 
is to be effected with reasonable safety to the 
civilian population, and the difficulties attending 
its operation are such that strict observation of 
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the proposed rules would be almost impossible. 
in fact the same result would be obtained by per; 
;mitting the bombardment of military objectives 
wherever they were situated. 
The Articles on Espionage contained in 
the Hague uode (Arts.27 -29) are short and NAM. 
(14) 
rauchille and Le Moyne are followed in so far as 
the definition of a spy in the Code follows that 
given in Article 29 of the Land Warfare Regulations - 
Dr. Spaight's objections have accordingly not been 
met, but his proposed Code is followed in so far as 
it provided for an individual landing from an 
aircraft, and who is guilty of espionage, being 
subject to the Land Warfare Regulations. 
The seizure of aircraft found in invaded 
territory is dealt with rather differently from the 
way in which M.Fauchille and others proposed, although 
with the same result. ìnemy public aircraft are to 
be liable to seizure and confiscation (Art.32) as 
was proposed by M.Fauchille , (15) , but, differing 
from his proposal and that of ur.Spaight (16), 
private aircraft are to be dealt with under the 
provisions of Article 53 of the Land Warfare Regu: 
:lations, without special provision. As, however, 
it is not clear under that Article how neutral private 
aircraft found upon entry in the enemy's jurisdiction 
are to be dealt with, it is specially provided that 
such aircraft may also be requisitioned, but full 
compensation will be paid at the time of confiscation 
and not,as in the case of enemy private aircraft,at the 
peace . (Art.Z1) . Otherwise, private enemy aircraft 
(14) Ante .p.80. 
(lb) Ante .p.81. 
(16) Ante.p.82. 
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are assimilated to merchant ships and declared 
liable to capture in all circumstances (Art.52) 
although they are not entitled to be armed to enable 
them to resist capture (.,rt .16) . Like merchant 
vessels, also, they may be destroyed after capture 
if all persons on board have been placed in safety 
and the aircraft's papers have been preserved. 
The guiding principle, so far as the 
treatment of the passengers and crew of enemy air: 
:craft is concerned, has been the use to which such 
persons could be put in the service of the State, 
the principle which had caused Dr. Spaight to differ 
from M.Fauchille(17) . Where the aircraft is a 
military aircraft, both crew and passengers may be 
made prisoners of war if the aircraft falls into the 
hands of the enemy. The crew and passengers of 
public non -military aircraft will be treated in the 
same way unless in the case of a public non -military 
aircraft which is devoted entirely to the service 
of passengers who will then only be made prisoners of 
war if they are in the service of the enemy or are 
enemy nationals fit for military service. In the 
case of an enemy private aircraft, members of the crew 
who are nationals or who are neutral nationals in the 
service of the enemy may be made prisoners of war, 
but the latter may be released if they undertake not 
to serve in any enemy aircraft while hostilities 
last. Passengers will be released in the same cir: 
:cumstances as those on public non -military aircraft 
devoted to the service of passengers (Art.36). The 
crew and passengers of any neutral aircraft which has 
(17) Ante.p.83. 
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been detained are entitled to be released unless 
they are enemy nationals or in the service of the 
enemy, when they may be made prisoners of war (Art.37) . 
In all cases, the members of the crew or passengers 
made prisoners of war will be entitled to treatment 
"not less favourable than that accorded to prisoners 
of war". (Art .38.) . 
The provisions regarding the destruction of 
private or public nön- military aircraft go further 
than even Dr.Spaight had proposed (18) . They 
may be fired upon (a) while flying within the juris: 
:diction of their own State unless they make the 
nearest available landing on the approach of enemy 
military aircraft (Art .33) ; (b) if they fly within 
the jurisdiction of the enemy or in the immediate 
vicinity thereof and outside the jurisdiction of 
their own State, or in the immediate vicinity of 
the military operations of the enemy by land or 
sea (Art.34.); and (c) on the refusal, after warning 
by belligerent military aircraft to alight or proceed 
to a suitable locality for the purpose of visit and 
search QArt.5o). Neutral aircraft may'be fired upon 
in two cases, the first, where a belligerent commander 
considering that the presence of aircraft is likely 
to prejudice the success of the operations in which 
he is engaged, has issued a notice prohibiting the 
passing of neutral aircraft within the area or pre: 
:scribing a route to be followed, and such aircraft 
do not conform to his regulations (Art.30.), and, the 
second, where, while flying within the jurisdiction 
of a belligerent, they have failed to make the nearest 
possible landing on being warned of the approach of 
military aircraft of the opposing belligerent (Art.35) 
(lb) Ante.p.83. 
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The destruction of private non -military 
aircraft in other circumstances is dealt with 
under the Chapter of the Hague Code concerning 
"Visit and Search, Capture, and Condemnation ", all 
subjects which had been treated lightly by the 
earlier jurists. The Commission was unable to 
decide upon an Article covering the exercise by 
belligerent military aircraft of the right of visit and 
search of merchant vessels, due to the divergence of 
opinion as to the right to divert a merchant vessel 
from its course without first boarding it although 
the International Law Association has agreed that 
the right to visit and search and to detain a 
merchant vessel is reserved to aircraft. It was 
decided, however, that private aircraft were liable 
to visit and search, and to capture by belligerent 
military aircraft (Art.49), The capture of a neutral 
private aircraft was limited to the cases enumerated 
in Article 53 of the Code. These are as follows, 
(1) Where it resists the legitimate exercise of 
belligerent rights. 
(2) Where it violates a prohibition of which it has 
had notice issued by a Belligerent commanding Officer 
under Article 30. This is one of the cases in which it 
might be fired upon, and, according to the heport, 
the purpose of this provision is to persuade the 
party firing on the aircraft from actually destroying 
it, which, but for the provision, he would invariably 
be tempted to do. 
The Code provides for the institution of a 
prize Court in which proceedings may be taken in order 
that any neutral claim may be duly heard and deter: 
:mined (Art.55), thus putting aerial law on the same 
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footing as maritime law. Except in certain cases 
peculiar to aerial warfare - cases which are not 
recognised by the International Law Association - 
the Prize Court will apply in the ease of the capture 
of an aircraft or its cargo, the same rules as would 
be applied to merchant vessels and their cargo or 
to postal correspondence on board a merchant vessel 
(Art.56). The violation of a direction under 
Article 30 of the Code is one of the cases peculiar 
to aerial warfare, and in this case, the Prize Court 
is directed to condemn the captured aircraft "unless 
"it can justify its presence within the prohibited 
"zone" (Art.5.6). 
(3) When it is engaged in unneutral service. The 
intention of the Commission was to apply the pro; 
;visions of the Declaration of London to similar 
action taken by Aircraft. This was also the opinion 
of M.Fauchille but who further added the case of 
neutral aircraft circulating above belligerent States 
as being presumptive of unneutral service. (19) 
In this case the aircraft may be destroyed 
"if sending it for adjudication would be impossible or 
"would imperil the safety of the belligerent aircraft 
"or the success of the operations in which it is 
',engaged" (Art.58) . 
(4) GVhere it is armed in time of war when outside 
the jurisdiction of its own country, and, in the 
subsequent Prize court proceedings it is liable to 
condemnation (Art.56.). As I have already stated, 
this matter of arming private aircraft is not alto: 
;gether satisfactory, and, in the light of what has 
been said, it seems a very harsh provision that a 
neutral private aircraft should be liable to capture 
(19) Ante. p.88. 
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merely because a gun has been mounted for the 
purposes of defence. It is surely overstating the 
point to say, as does the Report, that the carriage 
of arms in such a case "gives rise to a welifounded 
"suspicion of an intention to take part in hostilities 
"in violation of the laws of war" (20) 
(5) When it has no external marks or uses false 
marks. The use of false marks is forbidden under 
the code (Art.l9). 
This again is an offence peculiar to aerial 
warfare. The aircraft is liable to condemnation 
(.rt.56), and to immediate destruction (Art.58) in the 
same circumstances as an aircraft engaged in 
unneutral service. 
(6) When it has no papers orjufficient or irregular 
papers. As the Paris convention is not yet uni; 
;versally recognised, it has been provided that the 
papers will be insufficient or irregular 
"if they do not establish the nationality of the 
"aircraft and indicate the names and nationality of 
"the crew and passengers, the points of departure 
"and destination in flight, together with particulars 
"of cargo and the conditions under which it is 
"transported." (Art.54.). 
(7) When it is manifestly out of the line between the 
point of departure and the point of destination 
indicated in its papers, and, after such enquiries as 
the belligerent may deem necessary, no good cause is 
shewn for such deviation. The necessity for this 
rule is to be found in the ease with which aircraft 
may be used to obtain information, but, as the Report 
indicates 
"it will only be where the results of such investi: 
"gation show that there is good cause for suspicion 
( 20 ) O o md .2201 .(19 24 ). p. 50 . 
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"that the aircraft was engaged in some improper 
i4operations that capture will be resorted to, "(20) . 
(8) 'Where it carries or itself constitutes contra: 
:band of war. This rule is based on the assumption 
that "contraband of war" is to have the same meaning 
as it has in maritime war. M,Fauchille followed 
the same course (21) in determining what constituted 
contraband. 
Dr. Spaight had provided that where an 
aircraft itself constituted contraband of war it 
could be destroyed -if demanded by imperative 
"military necessity "(22) but the vague erode provides 
also for the destruction of contraband carried 
"if sending it for adjudication is impossible or 
'would imperil the safety of the belligerent aircraft 
"or the success of the operations in which it is 
"engaged. " ( Art .rio .) . 
( 9) When it is- engaged in breach of a blockade duly 
established and effectively maintained, a provision 
having some resemblance to that suggested by 2rof. 
Von Bar (23). the blockade must be one in the sense 
of the .ueclaration of London. One in which aircraft 
alone are used is not contemplated. 
(1u) When it has been transferred from a belligerent 
to neutral nationality at a date and in circumstances 
indicating an intention of evading the consequences to 
which an enemy aircraft as such is exposed. The 
purpose of this is to bring aerial and maritime law 
in line with one another. The same result was 
obtained by M.Fauchille in Article 10 of his proposed 
Code. 
In all these cases where a neutral 
aircraft is destroyed, the crew and passengers must 
(21) Ante.p.86. 
(22) Ante .p.87 . 
(23) Ante .p.87. 
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be placed in safety and the papers preserved 
(Art.59). The destruction must afterwards be 
justified before the 2rize court, a provision which 
is also applicable to contraband destroyed under 
Article 6u. 
The vommission has rendered a valuable 
service, and, although some of its provisions are 
premature, and some may be fundamentally altered 
before finding any measure of support, the bode 
which it has prepared marks a distinct advance in 
the development of the j ules of Aerial Warfare. 
The day is still far distant, however, when a bode 
of hules regulating the use of aircraft in time of 
war will be universally recognised. 
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Chapter 14. Conclusion. 
I have now completed that which I set out to 
do, namely, to show how the law in relation to 
aircraft has developed from the time of its inception 
to the present day. The period covered has been 
short, less than fifty years, and, since the law is 
of such a modern nature, I have found difficulty in 
presenting anything in the way of historical 
research. I have been compelled to discuss a law as 
it now exists with the result that I have tended to 
consider the future rather than to reveal the past. 
Another factor which has contributed to the diffic: 
:ulty of research is the multiplicity and diversity 
of the problems which arise in connection with what 
I have termed "the law in relation to aircraft." That 
law is not confined to one particular branch. On 
the contrary, it is difficult to find a branch of the 
law which is not affected by the origin and develop: 
:ment of aviation. This has rendered continuity of 
treatment almost impossible. It has had a further 
effect, for, to prevent this thesis being of 
inordinate length, I have been unable to make more 
than acursory examination of topics which are 
worthy of more exhaustive study - topics, which would 
in themselves constitute fit subjects for a legal 
thesis. Nevertheless, while the material available 
for research in Great Britain is limited and I have 
been thrown back for my information on Continental 
and American publications, access to which is 
difficult, I hope I have succeeded in showing the 
various stages in what I consider a remarkable and 
rapid development in a sphere of law about which 
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little is generally known and which has many peculiar 
features of absorbing interest. 
I do not intend to recapitulate and I shall 
reiterate but one thing. The barest glance is 
sufficient to show that the outstanding characteristic 
of aviation law is the rapidity with which it has 
progressed to a very high degree of development. For 
instance, whereas in 1910 the term "aircraft" was 
defined in the Paris Convention as comprising "free 
balloons, airships, and flying machines ", in 1935 it 
comprises "all machines which can derive support in 
the atmosphere from the reactions of the air ", and the 
word aeroplane which it was not thought necessary to 
define in 1910, is now defined as 
"a mechanically-driven aerodyne smpported in flight by 
"aerodynamic reactions on surfaces remaining fixed under 
"the same conditions of flight% 
a definition of which the layman is blissfully ignorant. 
We have not yet reached the stage in the development 
of aviation in which Tennyson 
"Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of 
"magic sails, 
"Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with 
"costly bales; 
7'Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there 
"rained a ghastly dew 
"From the nations' airy navies grappling in the 
"central blue;" 
but the present generation has witnessed extraordinary 
progress in that direction. The generations of the 
future may see even greater progress. They will 
certainly see it in the law. 
The law has advanced far but I am of opinion that, 
remarkable as the development has been, it is more 
apparent than real. When one regards the mass of 
Statutes, Rules and Regulations which are now in force 
one is tempted to think that considerable progress has 
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been made. Actually they are only the bare foundations 
of the law on Which future generations will require to 
erect and carve the edifice. They are merely the 
objects on which the experiments are about to be made. 
I would not even say that those foundations which 
have been laid are themselves secure and it may well 
be that they will require to be pulled down and 
reconstructed before the wEllls can be erected. For 
example there are the organisations at work on the 
development of the law. I have shewn that they are 
numerous. They are also working at cross purposes 
for they represent conflicting interests. Among 
industrial concerns, it has been found advisable, within 
recent years, to undertake the process of what is known', 
as rationalisation - the elimination of those concerns 
working at a loss and the combining of the profit - 
making fragments into one successful profit -making 
whole. I consider that among the organisations 
existing to further the development of aviation law 
some such process of rationalisation might be profit: 
:ably undertaken. The I.C.A.N. is one which could not 
be dispensed with but there are others whose functions 
could be incorporated in one of its Sub -Commissions. 
Then there is the law itself. I have shewn that 
the tendency is towards complete uniformity', but, while 
it sounds well to say that the laws must be uniform, 
it is no simple matter to put the proposition into 
practice. There is always a danger of pressing the 
principle of uniformity too far. The danger arises 
from confusing the idea of uniformity tf legal 
principles with uniformity of detail. It is one thing 
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to get the principles of the law the same in various 
cou4tries, it is another to make the details the same. 
The one is possible but the other is not. It was for 
this reason that the Havana Convention was completed 
without Annexes such as are appended to the Paris 
Convention. It was felt that it would be better to 
agree on the principles to be observed and leave 
the details to the various States. I do not for one 
moment advocate that the Annexes to the Paris 
Convention should be discarded for I cannot conceive 
that this would be either practicable or desirable, 
but when one considers the Carious projected 
Conventions prepared and submitted by the C.I.T.E.J.A. 
one can appreciate better the attitude of the States 
parties to the Havana Convention. Not only are they 
a mass of detail. They are complicated in yet another 
respect - that of language. 
The Paris Convention has three "official" texts, 
French, English, and Italian. The other proposed 
Conventions are usually in French. This makes 
interpretation difficult, and, as in matters of detail 
they tend to introduce notions which are entirely 
foreign to some national legal systems, it will 
readily be recognised that, far from creating 
uniformity, they will have the very opposite result. 
In the Protocol of Amendments to the Paris 
Convention which came into force on 17th May, 1933, it 
is provided that, as far as concerns interpretation, 
"in case of divergencies the French text shall prevail; 
but this is not sufficient. Presumably, in any 
question concerning the interpretation of a Convention, 
say the Warsaw Convention, the text in which it is 
272. 
signed., the French text, would prevail, but I cannot 
conceive the position which would exist in Scotland 
if the Court of Session was called upon to 
interpret the French text of a Convention, 
particularly when it was introducing a principle 
which was Continental and entirely contrary to the 
established principles of the Scottish Law. It 
would inevitably interpret it, so far as possible, 
according to the Law of Scotland. A French Court 
might give it an entirely different meaning. The 
result is confusion. 
I must confess that I cannot see how any 
change can be made in the manner in which such 
International Conventions are concluded. I am also 
unable to see how the Courts can interpret them in 
the light of a law other than their own national 
law. The remedy must lie in another direction, and 
that direction I think is obvious - the Internation: 
:al Court first mooted by the Fifth International 
Congress on Aviation Law. I can conceive no better 
remedy, and, for law so essentially international 
as aviation law, there can be nothing so absolutely 
essential as the formation of an International 
Court available to private individuals to settle 
the differences of interpretation which must 
inevitably arise. 
If further support of this contention is 
required it is to be found in the matter of juris: 
:diction to which I have referred elsewhere. The 
specialities of aviation and the rapidity with which 
aircraft can proceed from one country to another 
make it difficult, although not impossible, to 
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apply the existing rules of Private International 
Law. The various proposed Conventions make 
special provisions as to jurisdiction to suit 
the peculiar circumstances of the matters to 
which they relate, but in doing so they create 
complications, and diversity rather than uniform: 
:ity of the rules by which jurisdiction is to be 
determined. The position would be entirely 
changed and greatly simplified if all such 
matters could be dealt with by an International 
Court, the judgments of which could be enforced 
against the defender in his own national State. 
It must not be assumed that the topics 
which I have considered exhaust all the matters 
which are likely to arise in aviation law. I 
have covered the ground as it is today, but, with 
the further progress in aviation, new problems 
will be added to the many which still await a 
solution. I cannot prophesy what those may be, 
but I would end this treatise by mentioning one 
which is already visible on the horizon'and which 
is of great importance in the realm: of Internat: 
:ional Law. I refer to the "seadrome ", the 
French equivalent of which, "L'île flottante ", 
has even greater significance. It is the 
floating structure, the aerodrome of the sea, on 
which aircraft engaged in transoceanic flights 
can land for refuelling or repair. 
The creation of the seadrome is indispensable 
in the interests of aviation, but, as its utility 
only arises when it is moored on the High Seas, 
the very mention of it has started the pens of 
jurists -in much the same way as did the first 
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appearance of aircraft. The crux of the whole matter 
is that the construction by one nation of a seadrome 
on the High Seas is a violation of the recognised 
principle of International Law that no nation can 
claim jurisdiction over the High Seas which will 
exclude an equal jurisdiction by every other nation. 
It may be that its construction is not legitimate but 
the interests of aviation must, in this case, prevail. 
The basis of discussion, therefore, must be that a 
seadrome can be constructed, but if that is so what is 
its legal position? Is it under the sovereignty of 
the State which constructed it? Is it to be regarded 
as the exclusive territory of that State: Can the 
aircraft of other nations be precluded from using it? 
Those are but a few of the questions to which its 
construction gives rise. 
The seadrome has to be regarded as sui generis. 
It is not an "island" in the true sense of the word 
for, at the First Conference for the Codification of 
International Law, an island was thus defined:- 
"Une ile est une étendue de terre, entourée d'eau, 
"qui s Ot- trouve dune maniére permanente au- dessus 
"de la maree haute." 
Floating structures of the nature of the seadrome were 
expressly referred to as falling outwith the scope of 
that definition. So also, from its very nature, the 
seadrome cannot fall within the definitions of a 
"ship ". It has characteristics of both the island and 
the ship but it is neither one nor the other. 
It is not my intention to examine in detail the 
views which have been expressed as to the legal posit: 
:ion of "L'île flottante ". They are many and one can 
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hardly find agreement on any point. Dr Sandiford 
supports the theories of the Comité Juridique 
International de l'Aviation in giving the entire 
ownership and control to the state which constructed 
it. M. Giannini and M. de Fonsega Hermes go to the 
opposite extreme by denying ownership and control to 
any one country and putting the control under the 
League of Nations. One thing is certain. The 
seadrome must be free to all nations and its ownership 
and control must be regulated by international 
agreement. More justice will be done by denying the 
right of States to create additional national territorz 
by way of erecting seadromes than by permitting them 
to do so, and I consider that the seadrome should be 
under the control of an International Commission. 
Thim would be in the best interest of all concerned. 
In any event, in time of war, the seadrome must be 
neutral territory, for it is unthinkable that it 
could ever be regarded as belligerent territory. 
The seadrome presents many interesting internat: 
:ional legal problems and one could enlarge upon the 
points which I have Ilust raised. That is not my 
intention. .I have mentioned them only to show that, 
great as has been the development of the law in 
relation to aircraft in the past, it is not Complete. 
It will be for future generations to add to the 
foundation which i have endeavoured to lay by writing 
a thesis on the subject at this time. 
